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All South Africans who face the harsh realities of corruption on a daily basis, and who strive for a 
better future. May your endeavour to fight corruption be filled with vigour and passion, and may you 
never forget that change is inevitable; we are the atmosphere changers of our nation. 










“Our deepest fear is not that we are inadequate. Our deepest fear is that we are powerful beyond 
measure. It is our light, not our darkness that most frightens us … There is nothing enlightened about 
shrinking so that other people will not feel insecure around you. We are all meant to shine, as children 
do. We were born to make manifest the glory of God that is within us. It is not just in some of us; it is 
in everyone and as we let our own light shine, we unconsciously give others permission to do the 
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Corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that takes various forms and functions in 
different settings. With the transition to a democratic dispensation in South Africa, there has been an 
escalation in corruption which is frequently associated with the manipulation of tender practices in the 
public procurement sector. The aim of this study was to critically investigate corruption in the 
procurement sector in local government with specific reference to the case of the eThekwini 
Municipality. The objectives of the study were: to review international trends in corruption in the 
procurement sector; to investigate specific cases of corruption in the procurement sector in the 
eThekwini Municipality; to assess the social, economic and political implications of corruption in 
eThekwini Municipality; and to examine the instruments and mechanisms that are used in preventing, 
detecting and responding to corruption and the effectiveness of such measures. 
Influenced by the Human Rights based approach, this study adopted a qualitative approach. This 
study found that corruption in the public procurement sector in the eThekwini Municipality is rife. 
The Supply Chain Management (SCM) faces numerous challenges including councillors and officials 
conducting business with eThekwini Municipality; councillors and officials incompetency due to 
limited knowledge of policy; unauthorised, irregular and wasteful expenditure; abuse of Section 36; 
unfair procurement process; inadequate and inefficient contract management and inadequate SCM 
controls. Hence, the SCM is synonymous with loopholes, kickbacks, cronyism and 
„tenderpreneurship‟. Numerous social, economic and political consequences of corruption were 
evident in this study, however, the main result of corruption in the procurement process is poor 
service delivery to citizens. This has resulted in human rights violations and citizens taking to the 
streets in violent service delivery protests in order to highlight their grievances regarding the poor 
quality of life they experience.  It is the poor of the eThekwini Municipality who face the detrimental 
impacts of corruption as they are reliant on the government for basic services for their survival. 
A holistic approach to corruption needs to be adopted in order to fully address this pandemic. An area 
that needs serious attention in procurement reform is blacklisting. Councillors and officials need to be 
educated about corruption and ethics. Greater oversight and transparency is needed throughout the 
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Corruption can be traced back for at least 5000 years, when bribery was considered a part of social 
behaviour (Terracino, 2012). Bribery was seen as a means of mutual beneficial exchange between two 
people. In ancient times, reciprocity was seen as the foundation of human relationships in economic, 
social and political instances (Pervan, et al., 2004). It was the prominence of religious values that led 
to changes in morality which gave rise to an anti-bribery ethic, and ultimately the condemnation of 
corruption. Evidence suggests that the condemnation of corruption in the form of bribery may have 
occurred in 3000 B.C. It was found in various ancient sources such as the Code of Hammurabi 
(Babylon 2200 B.C.), the Great Edict of Horemheb (Egypt, 1300B.C.) and Kautilya‟s Arthashastra 
(India 400 B.C.), that Roman emperors in the 4th Century mandated legislation between the periods 
316 A.D. and 398 A.D. against judicial corruption and had trials on corruption in provincial 
administrations (Terracino, 2012).  
Corruption can be regarded as the „enemy of human kind‟, which not only affects moral values, but 
also economic and social development in every facet (Terracino, 2012). This has resulted in 
corruption being an obligatory topic on the agenda of numerous international institutions. Beginning 
in the 1960s attention has been given, by both the academic and policy-orientated studies, to 
ascertaining the definitions, origins, character and costs of corruption around the world (Camerer, 
2009).  
Corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that takes various forms and functions in 
different settings. Hence, it can range from a single act of payment which is contradictory to the law 
to an endemic malfunctioning of a political and economic system (Andvig et al., 2000). Globally, it is 
estimated that in 2014 the cost of corruption equates to more than five percent of the global GDP (US 
$ 2.6 trillion) with over US $ 1 trillion paid in bribes each year (OCED, 2014: 2). The African Union 
estimated that 25 percent of the GDP of African states, resulting in US $ 148 billion, is lost to 
corruption annually (OCED, 2014:3).  
With the transition into a democratic dispensation in South Africa, which is based on constitutional 
commitments to ideals of openness, transparency and responsiveness, there has been an escalation in 
corruption (Ambe & Badenhorst-Weiss, 2012). The government has publicly declared itself 
committed to tackling corruption, which has largely been attributed to the „legacy of apartheid‟ 
(Camerer, 2009). Corruption did not disappeared with the fall of the old regime. Corruption takes 
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many forms in post-apartheid South Africa, and is associated most often with the manipulation of 
tender practices. The Public Procurement Sector has been riddled with corrupt practices, in which 
tender rules and regulations are not followed (Ambe & Badenhorst-Weiss, 2012). Tenders are often 
given to families and friends, resulting in nepotism. Officials and councillors collude and conduct 
business with a municipality, which is contrary to the Municipal Finance Management Act No. 56 of 
2003 (MFMA). According to Hofmeyer, the previous head of the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) 
and Assets Forfeiture Unit, between R25 – 30 billion, that is 20 percent of South Africa‟s 
procurement budget, was lost due to corruption (Bruce, 2012).  
Due to the release of the Manase Report and the informative role of the media, it has become public 
knowledge that corruption is rife in the eThekwini Municipality (Maharaj & Karodia, 2013). This 
study is a critical investigation of corruption in the public procurement sector. It adopts a case study 
approach to procurement in the eThekwini Municipality. Conceptually, this study is influenced by the 
theoretical framework of the Human Rights Based Approach. 
In South Africa corruption, in the public procurement sector delegitimizes the government and erodes 
democratic consolidation. Corruption not only erodes the confidence of citizens in government 
officials and politicians, but it also emphasises how expensive the fight against corruption is and how 
it drains the fiscus. Large sums of money are spent in the fight against corruption which could be used 
to provide basic service delivery (Zondi, 2012). Furthermore, tenders are given to companies that are 
unable to carry out service delivery, hence, the basic needs of citizens are jeopardized. The poor are 
deprived of essential services as funds are siphoned off for personal use and enrichment 
(Chattopadhyay, 2013). It has been contended that the eThekwini Municipality has done very little to 
address corruption since the release of the Manse Report. No eThekwini councillors or bureaucrats 
have been punished as a result of the findings of the Report, and no councillors have been brought 
before the municipality‟s ethics committee. Thus, proper disciplinary channels have not been 
followed (Stolley, 2013). It is against this background that this study investigates corruption in the 
procurement sector in the eThekwini Municipality.   
1.2 Geographical Orientation 
Corruption has for many years been on the periphery of political, economic and international relations 
research (Ellero, 2015). It was only in late 1980s that academic and policy debates on the character of 
corruption and anti-corruption strategies began to flourish (Doig & Riley, 1998). According to 
Bracking (2007) the world‟s opinion has changed toward corruption, and the international community 
has become far less tolerant of it than they were a few decades ago. Critical scholars and activists 
have begun to research the implications of corruption and how it infringes on human rights. 
Geographers have largely ignored corruption even though there has been a burgeoning interest in 
corruption by various disciplines (Brown and Cloke, 2004).  
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Geographers can however aid the study of corruption in many ways and they can provide a spatial 
understanding of the complexities of malfeasance (Brown & Cloke, 2004). Political corruption 
inevitably has spatial specificity (Perry, 1997). Hence, corruption is a spatial feature of specific places 
and varies greatly between geographical areas and countries (Gebeye, 2012). Geography is able to 
provide an understanding of how people, place and spatial variables interact; and how these factors 
can allow for favourable conditions for corruption activity to occur. For example, corruption may be 
more prevalent at specific spatial locations such as ports and border crossings, where bribery can take 
place. Geographical inquiry can also provide insights into variations in occurrences of corruption in 
one place rather than another (Brown & Cloke, 2004).  
According to Goel & Nelson (2010) the geography of a country can also affect the occurrence of 
corruption, and larger countries face obstacles in monitoring of government officials effectively. 
Natural resource endowments also create opportunities for rent generation and rent-seeking activities. 
In areas with dense populations, whistle-blowers or the public may have a greater chance in exposing 
corrupt practices (Goel & Nelson, 2010).  
It is evident that a geographical perspective can contribute to the study of corruption. Geographers can 
contribute to the study of corruption by explaining how different types of corruption occur at various 
geographical sites and on various scales, and how this influences the dynamics of a specific national 
or local political culture.  Geographers can also provide an empirical analysis of the success or failure 
of the various policy instruments and anti-corruption strategies (Brown & Cloke, 2004). A 
geographical perspective allows for a multidisciplinary, holistic approach to the study of corruption.  
1.3 Motivation for this Study 
The issue of corruption and how to fight it has been brought to the forefront of policy agendas around 
the world. Whilst governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have allocated resources 
to combat this phenomenon, it is evident that corruption has become a central concern for countries 
globally and it shows no sign of declining (Heywood, 2008). Corruption in South Africa is a human 
rights issue, specifically when individuals and families have to pay bribes to access food, housing, 
property, education, jobs and the right to participate in the cultural life of a society. Furthermore, 
corruption adversely affects the poor due to their powerlessness and their inability to pay bribes, 
creating inequalities which violate their human rights (Pilapitiya, 2004).In the eThekwini 
Municipality corrupt councillors and officials lead to basic services such as refuse collection, access 
to housing and water not being provided to its citizens. This has led to public outcry and resulted in its 
citizens taking to the streets in service delivery protests (Powell & Visser, 2015). Corruption distorts 
the procurement process and results in various uneconomic „white elephant‟ projects which have 
plagued many developing countries with debts they cannot repay (Sampford et al., 2006). This has 
been abundantly evident in the eThekwini Municipality, due to the city‟s over-expenditure, constant 
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contract renewals and the use of Section 36 from the SCM policy, which has been abused to validate 
shady tender practices.  
The academic study of South African corruption is rather limited. Specialists in South African public 
administration have paid little attention to corruption (Lodge, 2003). Prior to 1994 the study of 
corruption was virtually non-existent due to the secretive nature of the issue and reporting restrictions. 
After 1994, more information has become available due to official investigations and the removal of 
restrictions on public access to information (Lodge, 2003). However, it is still difficult to prove 
corrupt acts beyond reasonable doubt in court, which is necessary for a conviction  (Mubangizi, 
2004). Due to the elusive, „off the books‟ nature of corruption, it becomes difficult to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt. Also, investigations on corruption are costly, time-consuming and dangerous. 
Researchers can face intimidation and their lives can be put in jeopardy, which has served as a 
deterrent to study this issue.  
It is evident from the Manase Report on the eThekwini Municipality, that corruption is a vicious 
cycle. It penetrates all government sectors, and has drastically altered the public procurement process. 
This has affected service delivery for the poor. The adoption of a case study approach to analyse 
corruption in the eThekwini Municipality may hopefully be of great significance. In essence this study 
can enable and stimulate scholarly debate around the discourse of corruption and public procurement 
corruption within South Africa. It serves to lay the initial framework for future research on this 
subject matter.  
1.4 Chapter Sequence 
1.4.1 Chapter One: Introduction 
This Chapter presents an introduction to the study. It provides an overview to the research, 
geographical orientation and the motivation for the study. 
1.4.2 Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
Chapter Two provides an overview of the theoretical framework and provides a literature review on 
corruption from global, regional and national perspectives. It also focusses specifically on public 
procurement corruption.  
1.4.3 Chapter Three: Methodology 
This Chapter discusses the study area and the methodology utilized in this study. It further provides 
insight into why these various methods were selected. The ethical considerations and limitations of 
the study are also discussed.  
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1.4.4 Chapter Four: Data Analysis 
Chapter Four presents the data analysis, using a thematic approach. 
1.4.5 Chapter Five: Evaluation, Recommendations and Conclusion 
Chapter Five presents the evaluation, theoretical reflections, recommendations and conclusion to the 
study. 
1.5 Conclusion   
Corruption is a crippling phenomenon that has drastically altered the fabric of South African society. 
It undermines the democratic principles enshrined in the Constitution. Corrupt councillors, officials 
and business person‟s siphoned money intended for the poor through corrupt practices in the public 
procurement sector.  This leads to a violation of citizens‟ human rights through the inability of the 
local government to provide basic services which citizens are entitled to in the eThekwini 
Municipality. Scholars have largely neglected the study of corruption due to its secretive nature, 
difficulty in measuring and its inherent danger. Hence, this dissertation provides an important 


















Corruption has become a worldwide phenomenon. It has devastated economies and undermined the 
human rights of citizens. An area largely plagued by corruption is the public procurement sector 
money is siphoned from the public purse to satisfy the whims of the corrupt, rendering the local 
government incapable of providing basic services to its citizens. This chapter provides the literature 
review for the study and the theoretical content. It is divided into eleven sections. The first section 
provides the definitions, forms and types of corruption; measuring corruption is discussed in the 
second section. The theories of corruption are discussed in the third section. The causes and 
consequences of corruption are discussed in the fourth and fifth sections, respectively. In the sixth 
section, corruption in an international context is reviewed. Public procurement corruption is outlined 
in the seventh section. Corruption in Africa and public procurement corruption in Africa are discussed 
in the eighth and ninth sections. Corruption in the South African context is discussed in the tenth 
section. In the final section, the nature of public procurement corruption in South Africa is outlined. 
2.2 Definitions, Forms and Types of Corruption   
Corruption occurs in every sector of society, making it an activity that is complex, case specific and 
difficult to define. There are various forms, types and levels of corruption rendering it an „elusive 
concept‟ (Uslaner, 2008). It is important to identify the manner in which corruption is understood in 
order to determine the various strategies that may be adopted in prevention and control (Camerer, 
2009; Eicher, 2012).  
i) Definition  
The term „corruption‟ is derived from a specific form of the Latin verb, rumpere, which means to 
break, which suggests that something is severely broken (Hope & Chikulo, 2000). The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines corruption as the “perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of 
public duties by bribery or favour, the use or existence of corrupt practices, especially, in a state, 







While the Oxford Advanced, Learner's Dictionary defines corruption as “dishonest or illegal 
behaviour, especially of people in authority; the act or effect of making somebody change from moral 
to immoral standards of behaviour” (Gunardi, 2008:12).  This definition has two key words, authority 
and morality. Various authors such as Gould (1991:468) identify corruption as a moral issue, “an 
immoral and unethical phenomenon that contains a set of moral aberrations from moral standards of 
society, causing loss of respect for and confidence in duly constituted authority”.  However, 
acceptable moral behaviour differs in various societies (Gunardi, 2008). This constitutes the greatest 
challenge in trying to define corruption because its meaning varies in social contexts. Socio-cultural 
and traditional norms influence morality and the way in which corruption is understood (Dimant, 
2013). For example, some aspects of African culture provide socio-structural support for corruption, 
in the form of gift giving and providing projects and jobs to family members and friends (Egbue, 
2006). 
 
Labelling corruption as a moral issue, however, is problematic as it individualises the social aspects 
and neglects the socio-political implications of corruption (Gunardi, 2008). According to Golunov 
(2014) both wide and narrow definitions of corruption create their own specific problems. If a 
definition is too wide, it can be challenging to identify corrupt acts and develop measures to curb 
corruption. If the definition is too narrow, there lies the risk of not conceptualising certain acts that 
may constitute corrupt activity. Furthermore, it creates a „grey zone‟ between corruption, unethical or 
ethically ambiguous behaviour (Golunov, 2014). Defining corruption is so complex that even the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) does not provide a definition for corruption. 
However, it does call for states to adopt legal measures to establish specific criminal offences, 
encompassing bribery, embezzlement, misappropriation, abuse of functions and money-laundering by 
both the public and private sectors (Nicholls et al., 2011). These legal measures have been adopted in 
many countries, including South Africa.  
  
This study adopts the definition provided by Transparency International (TI) which defines corruption 
as the “misuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Asis et al., 2009:12). Various scholars and the 
World Bank (WB) have widely used this description. The definition has the merit of simplicity, and, 
to an extent, encompasses offences such as bribery, misconduct in public office, embezzlement, fraud 
and theft, which are offences that are committed during corrupt activities (Nicholls et al., 2011). The 
eThekwini Municipality also provides examples of what it considers as examples of fraud and 







Table 2.1 Examples of fraud and corruption in the eThekwini Municipality  
 Breach or disregard for the Municipal Finance Management Act 
 Breach or disregard for the Supply Change Management Policy 
 Accepting or the giving of anything of material value to gain undue favour 
 Any conflict of interest 
 The deliberate failure to report acts of dishonesty 
 The deliberate withholding of information which would provide insight into or assist in 
investigating irregularities 
 Extortion by municipal employees in the performance of their duties 
 Failure to put in place controls internally, thus causing loss to eThekwini Municipality 
 False sick leave, overtime or qualifications 
 The forgery or alteration of any financial document relating to transactions with the 
Municipality. These include cheques, bank drafts and stock records 
 Housing subsidy fraud 
 Illegal or irregular sale of Municipality property 
 Irregular allocation of low-cost houses 
 Irregular destruction, removal or inappropriate use of records, documents, furniture, 
fixtures, material and equipment 
 Misappropriation or theft of funds, securities, supplies or assets 
 Procurement fraud 
 Any other dishonest, fraudulent or corrupt act 
Source: (Ellero, 2015:27) 
 
There are also various types and forms of corruption. These will be discussed in the following 
section to enable a greater understanding of what constitutes corrupt behaviour.  
 
ii)  Types of corruption  
Beyond definitions, another way of approaching corruption is to identify the numerous types of 
malfeasance. According to Boehm (2011) corruption can manifest itself in different ways including, 
bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, favouritism and nepotism. 
 
Bribery refers to the payment that is made in a corrupt relationship and is regarded as the essence of 
corruption (Øverland, 2012).  There are various terms used to refer to bribery, such as „kickbacks‟, 
„gratuities‟ and „grease money‟. These all refer to money or favours paid to politicians or bureaucrats 
for preferential decisions or government services. It ensures that things pass quickly, smoothly and 
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favourably through state or government bureaucracies (Andvig et al., 2000). This includes favourable 
treatment in terms of taxation, environmental regulations and protection of the market (Øverland, 
2012). In this form of corruption, the representative of the state misuses his or her power for their own 
gain.  
 
Embezzlement refers to the theft of resources by those who are put in positions of authority, such as 
officials to administer them. Instead of fulfilling their role as administrators of state resources, 
disloyal employees steal from their employers (Andvig et al., 2000). From a strict legal perspective, 
this misuse is seen as theft rather than corruption. However, it is included in the broader definitions of 
corruption (Øverland, 2012). When funds are misappropriated through embezzlement, the public is 
deprived of vital service delivery.   
 
Fraud refers to deceit, trickery or to swindle (Andvig et al., 2000). Public officials manipulate or 
distort information and facts in order to gain private profit (Øverland, 2012). Fraud is a broader legal 
term than bribery and embezzlement. For example, fraud is evident when state agencies and 
representatives engage in illegal trade networks, counterfeit, racketeering, forgery and smuggling 
(Appolloni & Nshombo, 2014).   
 
Extortion occurs when money and resources are taken through the use of coercion, violence or the 
use of threats (Andvig et al., 2000). Money or resources can be extorted in a classical way known as 
the Mafia style, where criminals use insecurity, harassment and intimidation for desired ends. The 
mafia and criminals practise this form of extraction which is known as extraction „from below‟ 
 (Andvig et al., 2000).  
 
Favouritism is a construct of power abuse entailing „privatisation‟ and biased distribution of state 
resources, regardless of the intended purposes of those resources. Hence, resources are given to 
people that are close to those who are in power and who make decisions (Øverland, 2012). This 
redistribution rests on mutually beneficial relationships rather than on merit or qualifications. 
Favouritism is associated with clientelism and nepotism (Andvig et al., 2000). 
 
Nepotism is a form of favouritism in which office holders select their kinfolk and family members for 
important state positions. This occurs largely in governments which have presidents who try to secure 
their power by nominating family members to key political, military or economic positions in the state 
sphere (Andvig et al., 2000). Hence, nepotism, is strongly related to cronyism, often there is a biased 
redistribution of contracts, jobs and money to cronies or cadres.  
In addition to the various types of corruption, there are various forms of corruption. These indicate the 
scale at which corruption occurs and provides a greater understanding of the types of corruption. 
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iii)  Forms of corruption  
There are various forms of corruption that occur at different levels of society. These include petty, 
grand and systemic corruption. According to Riley (1998) policies instituted to curb forms of 
corruption need to pay attention to the types and levels of corruption that exist. A useful way to 
differentiate between the types of corruption is to make the distinction between grand and petty 
corruption.  
 
Grand corruption involves top officials and political decision-makers, it occurs on a large scale and 
involves large sums of money. In grand corruption, top officials and politicians exploit their positions 
to extract bribes, and embezzle large amounts of money or formulate regulations that will benefit their 
personal interests (Teixeira et al., 2015). Grand corruption is often motivated by greed and has been 
used to describe large-scale deals involving top public officials and companies trading or investing on 
an international scale.  An important mechanism referred to as „the cabal‟ has been used to describe 
grand corruption. According to Camerer (2009), Transparency International has noted that in each 
state there is the existence of a small cabal of individuals who are strategically positioned in 
prominent departments or agencies to assist corrupt deals. An example of grand corruption in the 
South African context is the South African arms deal (Camerer, 2009). 
 
Petty corruption occurs in less-developed countries and involves middle or low level public officials 
who interact with the public. It relates to small amounts of money but often harms those who are poor 
in society and those that are reliant on state services such as housing and health care (Teixeira et al., 
2015).  Petty corruption is usually driven by need, including the need to survive, and it involves what 
is referred to as „speed‟ or „grease money‟ (Camerer, 2009). Junior officials who render services to 
the public begin to receive and obtain grease payments. Therefore, the public engage in dishonest 
transactions with officials to prevent sanctions and to acquire services that are needed. Petty 
corruption also occurs in societies where civil servants receive low salaries, inducing the need to 
acquire basic services at a cheaper rate (Mwenda, 2007). An example of petty corruption in the South 
African context would be a bribe that a police officer requests from a citizen in order to evade a traffic 
fine. However, petty and grand corruption can go hand in hand and perpetuate levels of corruption. 
For example, both lower officials and those in higher positions, turn a blind eye to corrupt acts and 
collude for kickbacks.  
 
According to Igwe (2012) systematic corruption is not a special category of corrupt practice. Corrupt 
individuals and groups dominate and seize the major institutions and processes of the state. Hence 
citizens have limited alternatives but to deal with corrupt officials. Systematic corruption refers to 
unrestrained corruption in the civil service and public corporations. An administration develops in 
which wrongdoing is the norm and public responsibility is the exception rather than the rule 
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(Camerer, 2009). These forms of corruption can vary within a country, for example, grand corruption 
can occur where there is little petty corruption and petty corruption can take place in a country where 
the government is deemed to be „clean‟. It is imperative that sound methods of measuring 
malfeasance are employed to gauge corruption levels in a society.  
 
2.3 Measuring corruption 
Corruption is not only difficult to define but is also notoriously hard to measure (Ellis & Tutu, 2012). 
It is almost impossible to determine scientifically whether corruption is increasing or decreasing in a 
country, or if it is more prevalent in one place than another. There are various challenges that 
researchers face in developing accurate ways of measuring corruption. This is because attempts are 
being made to measure clandestine activities which are usually hidden from society (Jain, 2001). Even 
though corruption can be traced back for more than 5000 years, it was only in the 1990s that it was 
first measured (Kajsiu, 2015). This resulted in the formation of cross-country data sets and 
perception-based assessments of corruption (Arnone & Borlini, 2014).  
 
Perception indicators were developed in an attempt to measure corruption and to formulate 
appropriate combative measures. In 1995, TI developed the most popular perception indicator known 
as the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Sampford et al., 2006). The CPI ranks different countries 
according to their perceived levels of corruption and it is considered to be the most elaborate 
quantitative indicator, in which all countries are evaluated. The CPI is a composite index that is 
calculated using data sources from a range of other institutions which measure the overall extent of 
corruption in the public or political sectors (Heywood, 2008). It ranks countries on a scale that ranges 
from 100 – 0, based on the supposed level of corruption. A score of 100 indicates an honest country, 
where levels of corruption are low or non-existent. A score of 0 shows that a country is perceived to 
be totally corrupt (Ruhl, 2011).  
 
Although the CPI is widely regarded as playing a fundamental role in highlighting the issue of 
corruption, three broad weaknesses have been identified (Heywood, 2008). As is explicit in the title of 
the index, it measures perceptions, rather than reported cases, prosecutions or proven incidences of 
corruption. This is significant, because perceptions have the ability to influence behaviour in various 
ways. For example, if we believe that the whole society is engaging in corrupt behaviour, it may make 
us more prone to adopt such practices ourselves (Heywood, 2008). 
 
 The second problem relates to the question of how we can adequately interpret what respondents to 
the various surveys understand by corruption. Each of the different surveys operates with its own 
understanding of corruption; which may focus on different aspects, such as bribery or embezzlement. 
Additionally, surveys ask a panel of experts to rank corruption on a scale from low to high. However, 
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it is unknown whether the experts share a common view of what constitutes corruption. Hence, what 
constitutes a low level of corruption to one person may look high to another (Heywood, 2008). 
 
 Furthermore, when the sources used by the CPI are examined more closely, one will notice that those 
surveyed are predominantly the élite comprised of regional and international businessmen and 
academics. The question must then be asked whether these select individuals can provide an accurate 
assessment of levels of corruption in countries, beside their own. A third problem relates to the 
interval scales used in the CPI index, which ranks on a scale of 100. This suggests that a high degree 
of accuracy and precision can be achieved, and that distinct differences can be identified between 
countries that score 7.0 as opposed to 6.9. The impression of accuracy is further reinforced by ranking 
being represented in a „league table‟ format. However, since the number of countries included in each 
annual CPI varies, the position a country holds on a table can simply be influenced by the number of 
countries that are covered in that specific year (Heywood, 2008). 
 
 There are other perception indicators that have been developed, some even as a response to the 
criticism of the CPI. For example, since 2003, TI has published the annual Global Barometer based 
on the Gallup Survey which gauges both perception and lived experiences (Landman & Robinson, 
2009). The WB‟s Worldwide Governance Indicators, also includes „control of corruption‟ as one of 
its six elements and is a perception-based measure developed through weighted averages. To some 
degree it is based on similar polls and surveys that are used in the CPI (Landman & Robinson, 2009).  
 
Other popular corruption indicators are those developed by private risk firms, such as The 
International Country Risk Guide‟s corruption indicator. This captures the likelihood of special 
payments and demands made by high government officials, and the extent to which illegal payments 
are expected in the different tiers of government (Svensson, 2005). Since the mid-1990s, a large 
number of academic studies have begun to use these alternative indictors to measure corruption, either 
instead or as a complement to the CPI. However, many methods of measuring corruption are subject 
to similar weaknesses of the CPI experience and perception-based measures in general. Various 
indexes and indicators have been developed in order to quantify corruption. However, no single 
measurement system is able to accurately account for levels of corruption within a country and at a 
global level. Due to the various forms corruption takes, it is not possible for one indicator to capture 
the multidimensional nature of corruption in an objective manner (Rohwer, 2009). In addition to 






2.4 Theories of corruption 
Corruption is a complex phenomenon that has countless forms with multiple causes and 
consequences, some of which are severe and almost irreversible (De Graaf et al., 2010). There have 
been significant debates around the issue of corruption, making it difficult to theorise. Caiden 
(2010:9) compares theorising corruption with “exploring a complicated maze replete with dead ends 
and surprising turns enough to frustrate the hardiest venture”. However, theorising corruption is 
necessary as it reduces confusion, simplifies evidence and allows for the incorporation of new 
thinking into the discourse (Caiden, 2010).   
 
Apart from being a widespread phenomenon, corruption also has a long tradition as a field of 
academic inquiry (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). Many corruption theories have been identified and seek to 
explain the complex nature of corruption. These include the Weberian-Ideal Typical Approach, the 
Structural Functionalist Approach, the Systems Theory, the Post-Positivist Approach and the Public 
Choice Theory.  
 
The Weberian-Ideal Typical Approach was framed by the German Sociologist Max Weber. He wrote 
extensively on bureaucracy which has influenced the understanding of contemporary corruption 
(Rubinstein & Maravic, 2010). Weber believed that corruption was a trait of the earlier primitive stage 
of society and that it would disappear with professionalised bureaucracy. The Approach sees 
corruption as a lack of rationalisation of the public service (Rubinstein & Maravic, 2010). Basically, it 
acknowledges that loopholes are prevalent in a premature bureaucratic system which allows for 
corrupt acts to take place (De Graaf et al., 2010). The Structural Functionalist Approach sees society 
as a collection of coherent systems in which all societal problems have a function, including 
corruption (De Graaf et al., 2010). Structural Functionalist scholars try ascertaining the role 
corruption plays and satisfies in societies. The most extensive example of Structural Functionalist 
Approach to corruption is found in the writings of Fred Riggs in his theory of the prismatic society 
(Zwart, 2010).  
 
The Systems Theory was framed on the work of Niklas Luhmann‟s approach to corruption. In this 
Theory society is divided into separate entities, which have self-referential and uniformity in their 
values. This theory sees corruption as a result of overlapping systems (De Graaf et al., 2010). The 
Post-Positivist Approach seeks to explain how corruption is socially constructed. In this Approach 
corruption displays itself as a certain type of social relationship and must be understood in relation to 
its social setting. Thus there is no one singular definition of corruption, nepotism or deviance (De 
Graaf et al., 2010). The Public Choice Theory emphasises the importance of independent variables to 
explain corruption, and it focuses at the level of the individual (De Graaf, 2007). The resultant causal 
chain is that an individual makes a rational decision that has a predetermined outcome. The basis of 
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Public Choice Theory is that individual corrupt officials seek to maximise their utility. This form of 
casual theories was made popular by Rose- Ackerman (1978) who found that public officials were 
corrupt because they see the potential benefits of corruption outweigh the potential costs. Thus the 
Public Choice Theory sees corrupt officials as rational utility maximises who use the most profitable 
course of action (de Graaf et al., 2010). 
 
Each of these theories has been developed in isolation and each provides a specific insight into 
corruption through each disciplinary lens. However, these interpretations fail to provide a holistic 
understanding to the causes and consequences of corruption (Gebeye, 2012). A study on corruption is 
complex and requires a multi-disciplinary approach (de Graaf et al., 2010). The Human Rights Based 
Approach (HRBA) provides a means through which the implications of corruption can critically be 
analysed in this study. Most studies indicate that corruption in the public procurement sector, 
negatively impacts on service delivery and deprives citizens of basic services for their survival 
(Gebeye, 2012).  
 
2.4.1 Human Rights Based Approach 
The HRBA is a conceptual framework for the process of human development that is based on 
international human rights standards and is solely directed to promoting and protecting human rights 
(Pilapitiya, 2004). It aims to analyse inequalities that are central to development problems and seeks 
to redress discriminatory practices and unequal distribution of power which inevitably hinders 
developmental progress (Goodhart, 2013). International Law establishes the plans, policies and 
processes of development that are entrenched in a system of rights and corresponding obligations, 
under a HRBA. The approach embodies various elements which include, “expressing linkages to 
rights, accountability, empowerment and participation and attention to disadvantaged groups” 
(Pilapitiya, 2004:5). These have been developed to address inequalities and to ensure that the poor and 
disadvantaged are equal partners in development (Pilapitiya, 2004).  
 
There are three main criticisms of the HRBA (Katsui, 2008). The first pitfall lies in its origin. 
Although principles of human rights concepts such as equality, are not specific to Western countries, 
it is feared that the human rights discourse is not as effective in other parts of the world due to its 
origin in the West (Uvin, 2004). The human rights era began with the United Nations Declaration on 
Human Rights in 1948, when peace was on the agenda after World War Two. Due to the Cold War 
between the East and West, human rights were also classified according to political ideologies until 
the end of the Cold War. Uvin (2004) identifies three generations of human rights. The first 
generation is based on civil and political rights, this was centred on the West. The second generation 
was based on economic, social and cultural rights, encompassing an adequate standard of living, this 
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was centred on the East. The third generation of human rights was based on rights to development and 
self-determination.  
 
The second drawback is based on the problems of operationalising the HRBA. It fails on three aspects 
of operationalizing, namely, neglect in intervention, priority making and cultural insensitivity. 
According to Katsui (2008) the human rights discourse does not provide operational guidance for 
making a concerted effort for change and the operationalising mechanism is weak. Priority-making is 
also a challenge. Priority should, in principle, be given to those most marginalised. However, human 
right systems usually benefit the affluent, because human rights are usually dependent on power 
relations within a society (Steiner et al., 2008). The priority-making process which is based on the 
existing power relations further impoverishes the vulnerable and poor because they are beyond the 
reach of the activities of the HRBA (Katsui, 2008). Human rights are also vague and culturally 
insensitive and this hinders the operationalising of this approach. In practice, the HRBA adopts a top 
down, one-size-fits-all approach. Little or no attention is given to the social, political and historical 
specificity of a country.  
 
 The third critique relates to the negative consequences that are exhibited when a narrow definition of 
HBRA is applied (Katsui, 2008). When HRBA is narrowly conceptualised, legal formalisation and 
policy-making becomes a priority rather than actual implementation of the policies. For example, in 
South Africa, housing is a fundamental human right, however, there are people still living in informal 
settlements. Consequently, there are idealistic principles, but the actual follow through is neglected 
(Katsui, 2008).  
 
 2.4.2 Human Rights and Corruption   
Human rights are not given, earned or inherited; they belong to individuals simply because they are 
human and are inherent to each individual. Human rights are applicable to every person regardless of 
their gender, race, religion, ethnicity, political opinion or social origin. They are birth rights of all 
human beings and are universal (Gebeye, 2012). Human beings are dependent on human rights to live 
a minimal good life and the violation or lack of a single human right affects the quality of life a 
person experiences (Pilapitiya, 2004). There is a direct link between corruption and human rights. 
Corruption inevitably violates human rights and affects many individuals‟ lives, more specifically the 
poor, due to their powerlessness to change the status quo and inability to pay bribes. Corruption in the 
public procurement sector, specifically, negatively effects basic service delivery such as water and 
housing (Ambe & Badenhorst-Weiss, 2012). Hence, the poor face a poor quality of life as they are 
reliant on government services for their survival. When these basic services are not provided their 
human rights are violated. Hence, corruption allows for a narrow élite to amass huge fortunes within 
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the eThekwini Municipality, through tenders and this compromises the large majority of citizens 
through poor service delivery (Zondi, 2012).  
 
When citizens have to pay bribes in order to access food, housing, property, education, jobs and the 
right to take part in the cultural life of a community, it is evident that human rights are violated 
(Robinson, 2004). In essence, corruption hinders economic development, minimizes social services 
and diverts investment in infrastructure, institutions and social services which are all used to improve 
the quality of life for citizens of a country (Pilapitiya, 2004).  Since the UN Convention against 
Corruption in Seoul, 2003, large scale corruption is considered as a crime against humanity. The 
Seoul findings labelled corruption as immoral and contradictory to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Bagchi & Das, 2012).  Through the use of a human rights based approach attention 
can be placed on the implications corruption has for society; and the challenges that arise from human 
rights violations due to corruption (Gathi, 2009).  
 
There are various ways that corruption hinders human rights. It can negatively impact on human 
rights when a corrupt act is intentionally used to violate a right, for example, when a bribe is 
presented to a judge and it is accepted. It directly impacts on the autonomy and impartiality of that 
judge. It can also directly impact on human rights when states unlawfully prevent individuals from 
gaining access to a certain right (Gebeye, 2012).  Additionally, when corruption occurs in education, 
in the form of citizens bribing a principal to acquire a place in a school for their child, corruption can 
indirectly lead to a human rights violation. For example, if public officials allow for the illegal 
importation of toxic waste in exchange for a bribe and the waste is dumped in a residential area, it 
infringes on the human right to have a clean environment (Gebeye, 2012). Corruption also influences 
the social structure of society given that everyone should be treated equally in society However, when 
a person pays a bribe to a public official, they acquire a privileged status in relation to a person who is 
unable to pay a bribe. This socially stratifies society, separating the poor from the élite who benefit 
from corruption (Pilapitiya, 2004).    
 
Implementation of human rights can aid the fight against corruption because human rights addresses 
the abuse of power. Corruption is a direct abuse of power (Gebeye, 2012). The use of human rights as 
a theoretical approach highlights the power relations that persist in society. It focuses on 
discrimination, equality and the eradication of economic, social and political obstacles that prevent 
marginalised groups from receiving their human rights. Literature on corruption usually ignores the 
suffering of the poor and focuses on the economic and political impacts of corruption. The HRBA 
provides a greater understanding of the implications of corruption on those marginalised (Pilapitiya, 
2004). Furthermore, it significantly contributes to the formation and implementation of anti-
corruption policies. The human rights based approach also highlights how corruption negatively 
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affects society. This allows for greater public knowledge and accountability on the impacts of 
corruption. This spurs political will and support for anti-corruption policies to combat corruption 
(Ellero, 2015). When human rights are ensured and protected, specifically the rights to basic services, 
then corrupt practices can be reduced (Gebeye, 2012). 
 
2.4.3 The Bill of Rights and Corruption 
After the 1994 election in South Africa, the Constitutional Assembly was given the task of 
formulating the Constitution. Within the Constitution is the Bill of Rights which provides citizens 
with their rights and responsibilities (Currie & De Waal, 2013). Chapter 2 (sections 7-36) of the 
Constitution provides the human rights that are protected in South Africa. Table 2.2 contains a 
Summary of the South African Bill of Rights. 
 
Table 2.2 Summary of the South African Bill of Rights 
SECTION DESCRIPTION INFORMATION 
9 Right to Equality You cannot be discriminated 
against. But affirmative action and 
fair discrimination is allowed. 
10 Right to Human Dignity Your dignity must be respected 
and protected. 
11 Right to Life You have the right to life. 
12 Freedom and security of the person 
 
You cannot be detained without 
trial, tortured or punished cruelly. 
Domestic violence is not allowed. 
13 Slavery, servitude and forced labour Slavery and forced labour are not 
allowed. 
14 Right to Privacy You cannot be searched or have 
your home or possessions 
searched. 
15 Freedom of religion, belief and opinion 
 
You can believe and think 
whatever you want and can 
follow the religion of your choice. 
16 Freedom of expression  All people (including the press) 
can say anything they want. 
17 Freedom of Assembly, demonstration, picket 
and petition 
 
You can hold a demonstration, 
picket and present a petition. But 
you must do this peacefully. 
18 Freedom of association You can associate with whomever 
you chose. 
19 Political rights 
 
You can support the political party 
of your choice. If you are a citizen, 
and 18 years old, you can vote. 
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20 Citizenship Your citizenship cannot be taken 
away from you. 
21 Freedom of movement and residence You can go and live anywhere in 
South Africa. 
22 Freedom of trade, occupation and profession You can do whatever work you 
choose. 
23 Labour relations You may join trade unions and go 
on strike. 
24 Environment You have the right to a healthy 
environment. 
25 Property Your property can only be taken 
away from you if the proper rules 
are followed. 
26 Right of access to Housing The government must make sure 
people get access to proper 
housing. 
27 Right of access to Health care, food, water and 
social security 
 
The government must make sure 
you have access to food and water; 
health care and social security. 
28 Children‟s Rights Children under the age of 18 have 




You have the right to basic 
education, including adult basic 
education, in your own 
language (if this is possible). 
30 Language and culture 
 
You can use the language of your 
choice and follow the culture that 
you choose. 
31 Cultural, religious and linguistic communities 
 
Communities can enjoy their own 
culture; practice their own religion; 
and use their own language. 
32 Access to information You have the right to any 
information, which the government 
is in possession of. 
33 Just administrative action Actions by the government must 
be fair. 
34 Access to courts You can have a legal problem 
decided by a court, or a similar 
structure. 
35 Arrested, detained and accused persons 
 
This right protects people who 
have been arrested, imprisoned or 
accused. 
36 Limitations on rights All these rights can be limited if it 
would be fair to do so. 




Chapter nine of the Constitution also notes seven institutions or protection mechanisms that have been 
created for protecting people‟s rights. These include; the Public Protector, South African Human 
Rights Commission, Commission on Gender Equality, Office of the Auditor-General, Independent 
Electoral Commission, Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, 
Religious and Linguistic Communities and Independent Communications Authority of South Africa 
(Currie & De Waal, 2013). Some of these institutions will further be discussed in Section 2.11.2.  
 
Human rights and corruption are closely intertwined. In many cases, corrupt acts often lead to the 
violation of human rights and specifically in South Africa it undermines the Bill of Rights (Currie & 
De Waal, 2013). In South Africa it is the government‟s responsibility to provide legitimacy for the 
Bill of Rights. In many instances corrupt acts hinder the government from successfully implementing 
relevant plans and policies developed in order to fulfil the economic, social and cultural rights that are 
outlined in the Constitution. Corruption affects the quality of public services, stalls service delivery 
and results in inferior infrastructure (Corruption Watch, 2013). Additionally, corrupt procurement 
deals lead to an escalation in prices or non-delivery of imperative resources and services to citizens. 
Furthermore, the siphoning of money from the public purse and misdirection of funds affect the rights 
of citizens (Corruption Watch, 2013).The Bill of Rights outline the rights citizens should experience, 
however, corruption directly prevents these rights from being fully experienced in South Africa.  
 
2.5 Causes of Corruption  
It is significant to understand the causes of corruption in order to facilitate efficient measures to 
combat it (Bayar, 2003). There are a number of different approaches to conceptualising the causes of 
corruption, each identifying a range of prerequisites and proximate causes. According to Treisman 
(2000) very little is known about what causes corruption to be higher or lower in one place than in 
another. Discussions about the causes of corruption have tended to explain how and why corruption 
occurs, rather than identifying the deterministic causes. Studies (de Graaf, 200; Caiden et al., 2001) 
usually produce a mixture of situations, attitudes and processes that can be noted as enabling factors, 
indicators or conditions that allow or aid corruption. However, very few of these factors can, in 
isolation, contribute to corruption (Mills, 2012).  
 
The first cause of corruption relates to government size and decentralisation. Government 
involvement in the private market is often noted as a source of corruption (Lambsdorff, 2005). Larger 
governments may aid corruption by increasing the red tape and developing more regulations which 
force individuals to find illegal ways to evade the rules. These rules and restrictions can also create 
significant opportunities for rent seeking by bureaucrats (Goel & Nelson, 2010). In order to address 
government intervention, market restrictions and a burgeoning bureaucracy (Lambsdorff, 2007), 
privatisation has been instituted as a means of reducing corruption and increasing efficiency (Rose-
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Ackerman, 1999). Hence, neo-liberalist reforms are seen as a means to reduce corruption. Through 
privatisation, the size of government control on certain assets is reduced and leaves less opportunities 
for citizens to be „milked‟ of their money. However, Lambsdorff (2007) argues, that although 
privatisation may have economic advantages, the effect on reducing corruption appears to be 
ambiguous. Privatised firms are subject to their own forms of corruption. For example, the bribes 
taken from public officials would now be requested from private firm staff. Additionally, private 
firms can also be exposed to public interference and demands for bribes. Furthermore, there is no 
guarantee that the private firms are not upholding politically motivated interests (Lambsdorff, 2007). 
Neoliberal proponents also argue that privatisation and an increase in competiveness, due to the lack 
of trade controls, will curb corruption.  
 
Decentralisation of government functions, also has an effect on corruption (Goel & Nelson, 2010). 
Greater decentralisation allows for better monitoring, reducing corrupt activities and brings the 
government closer to the people (Lambsdorff, 2007). Conversely, heightened decentralisation may 
exacerbate the red tape and allow for greater opportunities for corrupt activities. According to 
Brueckner (2000) corrupt activity is an occurrence that flourishes in subnational governments. 
 
The second cause of corruption relates to the salaries that civil servants receive. When wages are low, 
citizens are barely able to meet their basic needs and are unable to survive on the salaries they are 
paid. Corruption is then used as a mechanism of survival to supplement the income they receive 
(Tanzi, 1998). Van Rijckeghem & Weder (2001) argue that low salaries cause public servants to 
supplement their incomes through corrupt activity, while Lindbeck (1998) attributes the low levels of 
corruption in Sweden to high level administrators earning 12-15 times more than an average industrial 
worker. This implies that corruption occurs due to greed or need. However, regardless of salary levels, 
some officials are corrupt due to their own psychological and moral make-up; some are weak and 
unable to resist large bribes. However, not all officials react in the same way toward bribes, 
highlighting the complex nature of corruption (Tanzi, 1998). 
 
The third cause is lack of sound political leadership. Corruption thrives when political leaders do not 
provide the right example, either because they are involved in corrupt acts themselves or condone 
corrupt acts because family members or friends are involved (Tanzi, 1998). In South Africa for 
example, President Jacob Zuma was accused of corruption on a grand scale in terms of the Nkandla 
scandal (Smith, 2013). 
 
Geographical location is the fourth cause of corruption. Goel & Nelson (2010) argue that country-
specific factors like geographic expanse have an impact on the incentives to engage in corrupt 
activity. Large, more spread out countries are more likely to face a greater amount of corrupt activity 
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(Goel & Nelson, 2010). This can be attributed to two reasons: first, it is hard to monitor government 
officials who live in different geographical locations; and second, a prisoner‟s dilemma is less likely 
to occur as employees are isolated and do not have the threat of other employees reporting them to the 
authorities for engaging in corruption (Goel & Nelson, 2010). The resource curse and the paradox of 
plenty also allow for corruption to occur, more specifically in developing countries. When a country is 
rich in natural resource endowments, an opportunity for rent generation and rent seeking activity is 
established. Multinational corporations pay bribes to officials for access to natural resources, which 
are then exploited (Hanson et al., 2014).   
 
Historical influences shape the cultural norms that influence corrupt activity in societies (Goel & 
Nelson, 2010). In Africa, for example, corruption appears to be a social phenomenon rooted in the 
historical process of colonisation. Thus, African leaders continued in the same manner as their 
previous colonial rulers, manipulating institutions for self-enrichment (Mulinge & Lesetedi, 1998). 
 
In different societies and cultures, bribe giving and taking may be more socially acceptable in one 
country, while in other countries they are seen as taboo (Goel &Nelson, 2010). According to Hope 
(2000) loyalty to families, tribes and friends is widespread in Africa and is a norm. Over periods of 
time bribe-givers and takers are able to formulate effective mechanisms to engage in mutually 
beneficial corrupt practices. These practices are difficult to uproot and become entrenched over time 
(Goel & Nelson, 2010). 
 
2.6 Consequences of Corruption 
Corruption has many dimensions and has numerous political, economic, social and environmental 
consequences (Boersma, 2012). Rose-Ackerman (1999) describes corruption as a symptom of 
something gone wrong in the management of the state. The institutions designed to govern the 
interrelationship between the citizen and the state are used for personal enrichment, rather than for the 
provision of basic services for citizens. Corruption reflects poor governance and erodes the moral 
fibre of society. Corruption in any form affects societal harmony, dignity, freedom of speech, equity 
and social development (Pathak & Prasad, 2005). It is imperative to understand the consequences of 
corruption, in order to develop and enforce measures to counteract corrupt acts (World Bank, 2000). 
 
2.6.1 Political  
Corruption undermines trust in the efficient functioning of a political system, which leads to 
instability and possible disengagement of citizens (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). It weakens good 
governance by discouraging public trust in government and can lead to a reduction in political 
participation by citizens (Akonor, 2009). Numerous political contestations arise when individuals vie 
for the benefits that corrupt activity may generate (Jain, 2001). Consequently, it becomes difficult for 
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governments to form and implement policies that respond to citizens needs and to use scarce 
resources in beneficial ways (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). 
 
Corruption directly erodes democracy and the legitimacy of government. It hinders democratic 
governance, for example, an election that is rigged, will result in those in power not being accountable 
to the public (Adediji, 2013). When corruption is prevalent, citizens are unable to put their trust in the 
political system, which renders it illegitimate. Governments‟ political decisions are undermined by 
corruption, causing citizens to lose faith in the state‟s ability to provide services.  
 
Corruption can also lead to armed conflict, especially when large endowments of natural resources are 
present (Bannon & Collier, 2003). Corruption significantly heightens grievances and opposing 
demands for political change. The negative economic connotations of corruption and increasing 
inequalities result in discontentment (Boersma, 2012). Thus, political instability arises as citizens 
begin to support movements that advocate for political change. Le Billion (2003) indicates that 
leaders of violent coups promise to address corruption by the previous government to gain political 
support. War also provides many opportunities for individuals to participate in illicit practices. For 
example, the allocation of wages to ghost soldiers and the selling of illegal weapons (Le Billion, 
2003). 
 
2.6.2 Economic  
Economic growth plays a role in development, specifically to improve the quality of life of citizens. 
Poor countries may have economic growth without development, however no country can sustain 
economic development without growth (Dong, 2011). Several empirical studies provide statistical 
evidence that countries with greater corruption levels have a weaker economic performance 
(Chetwynd et al., 2003). Corruption is detrimental to economic development and growth because it 
reduces domestic and foreign investment, alters the size and composition of government expenditure 
away from basic services, to projects that can be easily manipulated (Camerer, 2009).  
 
Corruption is a major disincentive for foreign investment. A seminal study by Mauro (2002) analysed 
106 countries to show that high levels of corruption are associated with lower levels of investment. 
Investors who seek a transparent, fair and competitive business environment will avoid investing in 
countries where there is a high level of corruption.  
 
Corruption has significant consequences on the revenue and expenditure of the government budget 
(Cooray, 2013). It weakens the financial and tax system and further strengthens the underground 
economy that aids organised crime (Camerer, 2009).  Paying bribes can lead to a reduction in various 
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sectors such as taxes and public utility charges. However, bribes can also be used to evade paying for 
services such as water and electricity. This leads to major losses of revenue in the government budget 
(Myint, 2000). A study by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) analysed the extent to which corruption changed 
the allocation of public spending away from basic needs such as education and health care.  
Corruption can be directly linked to the rise of the underground economy. There are two types of 
underground economic activities. First, those that are illegal due to them engaging in the drug trade or 
smuggling. Second, the activities that are legal but not recorded in order to escape taxes (Myint, 
2000). When a large area of an economy goes underground, official macroeconomic data, which 
covers the formal sector becomes unreliable, making it difficult to formulate economic policies. 
 
2.6.3 Social  
There is vast literature on corruption, and many of the approaches provide an economic or a political 
viewpoint on the subject. Therefore, analyses of the causes, effects and combative measures reflect 
these approaches (Pearson, 2001). However, these approaches do not provide an understanding of the 
actual social consequences of corruption. Corruption can simply be put as the stealing from the 
ordinary man and giving to the rich. Under a corrupt regime, the privileged élite symbiotically benefit 
from connections to government officials (Myint, 2000).   
 
Corruption derails the poor as they are unable to pay required bribes to send their children to schools, 
acquire healthcare and basic services. Resources which are meant to provide for public services are 
siphoned off to the bank accounts of those in power, resulting in basic services such as healthcare 
being reduced in both quality and quantity (Gebeye, 2012).  
 
Widespread corruption also has a detrimental impact on development and distribution of the 
associated benefits (Pearson, 2001). Corrupt practices undermine meaningful development efforts; 
corrupt officials rechannel allocated resources for personal enrichment. Poor targeting of social 
programmes persist, due to the use of government-funded programmes that benefit the wealthy 
(Gupta et al., 2002). For example, in India and Pakistan, the subsidy in agriculture is distributed 
unevenly, and those at the bottom of the system have a limited access to these benefits (Rose-
Ackerman, 1997).  
 
Corruption also erodes established social standards of society, and citizens turn to illegitimate means 
to earn money for their survival (Igwe, 2012). Thus, corruption becomes the norm and destroys the 






Corruption not only has economic, social and political consequences, but it also severely impacts on 
the environment. Natural resource endowments may lead to corrupt practices, and the exploitation of 
resources can undermine the principles of sustainability (Boersma, 2012). Due to globalisation and the 
current economic system, many multinational corporations try to do business with countries that have 
low taxes, cheap labour and lax environmental regulations. In order to attain profit, businesses may 
bribe public officials to overlook environmental regulations. For example, Monsanti, a US 
agrochemical corporation, bribed a high level official in the Indonesian Ministry of Environment to 
ignore the environmental assessment of genetically modified cotton (Winbourne, 2004). 
 
Corruption is also detrimental to wildlife, public officials are bribed to turn a blind eye to poaching. 
Public officials also embezzle money intended for anti-poaching and conservation projects (Boersma, 
2012). Corruption allows for environmentally damaging practices to be established, which aid 
bureaucrats and criminals. This allows for the ease of trafficking in wildlife and other natural 
resources and provides a platform for the depletion of natural resources and pollution of the 
environment (Winbourne, 2004). Corruption is a widespread phenomenon that has numerous 
consequences. It has also manifested itself greatly at an international scale and has significantly 
influenced the way in which states operate.  
 
2.7 The International Context 
Since the 1960s there has been some scholarly interest in policy-orientated studies to understand the 
character, origins, definition and cost of corruption (Camerer, 2009). Events in developing countries 
and the previous Soviet Block in the mid-and late-1980s changed the academic and policy debate on 
the character of corruption and anti-corruption strategies (Doig & Riley, 1998). This allowed for 
political and administrative reform, and the rise of structural adjustment programmes and 
democratisation in the developing world (Camerer, 2009). Publicised acts of corruption at the end of 
the Cold War, in the 1990s, highlighted that malfeasance was increasing in both the developing and 
developed world. Since 1996, addressing corruption has been a key issue amongst international 
institutions such as the WB, and the United Nations (UN) and has been prominent on the agenda of 










2.7.1 The Current Situation 
Over the last 15 years, the issue of corruption has radically changed from being mainly a national 
concern into a global political issue that has been largely driven by civil society organisations and 
watchdog groups (Cockcroft, 2010). In 2001, a TI survey showed that in Pakistan 90 percent of homes 
that had access to public education paid an average bribe of $90 to teachers to ensure that children 
made it to higher grades. Surveys in Ecuador, Paraguay and Bolivia all indicated that public service 
delivery required bribes. In 2009, a survey in Uganda found that citizens were obliged to pay bribes of 
$20 to $60 for basic health services. In 2009, an assessment of India‟s food distribution programme 
revealed that 40 percent of the supplies were diverted through corruption (Cockcroft, 2010).  
 
In the 2014 CPI, a total of 175 countries were evaluated, scores range from 0-100. A score of 100 
indicates a clean country, free of corruption, while 0 indicates a highly corrupt country. The global 
average CPI score was 43 (Transparency International, 2014). Table 2.3 contains the 2014 CPI results 
by region.  
 
Table 2.3 2014 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) results by region 
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Source: (Transparency International, 2014:6-7) 
 
It is significant to note the disparity in CPI scores between nations that are considered developed and 
developing. With developed countries attaining scores that are closer to 100, countries that are 
developing acquired scores closer to 0. South Africa falls within the Sub-Saharan region and attained 
a CPI ranking of 44 (Transparency International, 2014). In an attempt to curb corruption a number of 
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international organisations, instruments and conventions have been formulated. These form part of a 
broader set of international regulations that have been implemented to fight corruption.  
 
2.7.2 The International Regulation of Corruption 
In the 21
st
 Century corruption has become an international concern (Ferreira & Morosini, 2013) and is 
regulated by international law. It is essential to note anti-corruption treaties and the resolutions 
adopted by international organisations, as an integral part of international corruption regulation 
(Terracino, 2012). Table 2.3 contains a summary of international instruments and conventions in the 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It is evident that international organisations such as the UN, the WB, OCED, the CoE and a number of 
other international governmental organisations and NGOs have engaged in various anti-corruption 
initiatives, informed by a  „good governance‟ institutional reform agenda. Table 2.4 shows the various 
international organisations and the resolutions and conventions that have been adopted in the fight 
against corruption on a global scale. The two areas in which international organisations reform efforts 
have been situated include the criminalisation of bribery and corruption and institutional reforms and 
capacity building. In order to make international corruption a crime, laws have to be changed or new 
mechanisms adopted to ensure uniformity. A fundamental aspect to international cooperation is the 
exchange and sharing of information about corruption and curbing techniques and legislation. The 
UN, through the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch in Vienna, has made efforts to 
provide materials to assist nations in developing anti-corruption reforms, including the development 
of a manual to combat corruption (Camerer, 2009). 
 
In 1977, the United States (US) began the anti-corruption campaign, with the formulation of the US 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act making it a criminal offence for US companies to bribe foreign 
officials. This legislation aimed to create a level playing field and secure good governance by 
enforcing an internationally binding convention that would ensure that multinational companies were 
bound by the same rules when functioning around the world (Boersma, 2012). In 1994, the OECD 
urged developed and developing nations to take effective measures to deter, prevent and combat the 
bribery of foreign public officials in relation to international business transactions (Camerer, 2009). 
 
Organisations such as the WB and IMF have in recent years used their financial influence to promote 
anti-corruption efforts. According to the WB (1997) the main way to reduce corruption is to 
encourage economic liberalisation and deregulation in borrowers. Previously lending decisions were 
based firmly on economic criteria, however, now financial assistance can be suspended or delayed if 
poor governance is exhibited by borrowing states. For example, in 1997, the IMF cut off a $220 
million loan to Kenya due to the failure of the Kenyan authorities to address bribery. However, cynics 
argue that corruption is another means by which the WB can ensure that its real goal of structural 
adjustment is adopted and has less interest in strengthening public institutions, and increasing public 
education and awareness on the issue (Camerer, 2009).  
 
The arguments that favour international organisations playing a role in combating corruption in the 
developing world are compelling (Davis, 2009). However, there are also disadvantages with regard to 
international organisations dealing with corruption in developing countries. According to Davis 
(2009) the disadvantages fall into three categories: indifference, incompatibility and institutional 




Firstly, it is argued that foreign actors could exhibit selective indifference in the fight against 
corruption in the developing world. For example, foreign actors may focus on combating corruption 
as a way of obtaining legitimate government contracts in jurisdictions whose economic development 
is deemed important, while turning a blind eye to bribes paid to obtain unobtainable goods such as 
illegal logging concessions. Secondly, it is argued that foreign institutions‟ anti-corruption efforts may 
be incompatible with a developing country‟s local needs or desires. For example, incompatibility can 
stem from a clash of values, foreign actors may impose harsh penalties on acts that may be not 
considered as corrupt in that specific society, due to cultural dynamics. Thirdly, the argument of 
institutional displacement suggests that foreign institutions can serve as substitutes for domestic 
institutions. For example, if victims of corruption only relied on foreign police forces, prosecutors, 
lawyers and courts to investigate, prosecute cases of bribery and to levy criminal or civil sanctions, 
there would be no need for domestic institutions. Hence, international institutions would actively 
retard the development of these institutions (Davis, 2009). Corruption has also become endemic 
within the public procurement sector and has undermined the ability of governments to provide 
essential services to its citizens.  
 
2.8 Public Procurement and Corruption 
Corruption has been a focal point in recent years in the development agenda of numerous international 
organisations, both in the developed and developing world (Williams-Elegbe, 2012). The public 
procurement sector however, is an area of rampant corruption. Procurement of goods and other 
services by public bodies average between 15 percent and 30 percent of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). Damage from corruption is estimated between 10 percent and 25 percent, and in some 
instances it escalates to 40 percent to 50 percent, of the contract value (Kostyo, 2006). Due to this, 
states have adopted various measures to prevent and curb corruption in the public procurement sector. 
This section will attempt to define and outline the procurement cycle and associated risks, and assess 
preventative measures against procurement corruption.  
 
Transparency International broadly defines procurement as:  
the preparation, award and administration of contracts for goods, 
works and other services, and thus covers, not just the narrow 
selection of a contract partner by a purchasing body and the actual 
entering into a contract between the two, but the entire process from 
needs assessment through preparation, award and administration of 
contracts for goods, works and other services such as consultant 




Public procurement specifically relates to all contracts between a government department, publicly 
owned corporations, companies or individuals (Kostyo, 2006). According to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (2015), public procurement is the acquisition, whether under formal contract or 
not, of works, supplies and services by public bodies. This spans from the purchasing of routine 
supplies and services to formal tendering and applying for contracts for large infrastructural projects. 
2.8.1 Corruption in the Procurement Cycle 
Corruption and its associated risks are manifest throughout the entire public procurement cycle, and 
may differ at each phase. Figure 2.1 presents an outline of the procurement cycle and the common 
manifestations of corruption and risks at each stage as outlined by the Transparency International‟s 
Handbook for Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement (Kostyo, 2006).  
 
 
i)           ii)          iii)           iv)    v)  
 
Figure 2.1: Procurement Cycle 
Source: Kostyo (2006:17) 
i) The Needs assessment phase/Demand determination 
This stage pertains to the decisions on the scope, economic viability, environmental and social 
impacts of the project and the subsequent budget allocations (Rozo, 2010). The associated risks are as 
follows:  
 The investment or purchase in this phase is redundant. Therefore, demand is encouraged in 
order for particular companies to made deals. However, this provides little or no benefit to the 
society.  
 Rather than the use of systemic leak detection or grid loss reduction, a new capacity is 
established which allows for a greater bribe potential. 
 The investment that is presented is economically unjustified or environmentally detrimental.  
 The goods and services are overestimated to favour specific providers.  
 Previous political favours or kickbacks are paid by incorporating a „tagged‟ contract, which is 
a budget for a contract that has a pre-arranged contractor.  
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 Conflicts of interest are unmanaged, thus decision-makers decide on the need for contracts 
that affect their old employers.  
 Over-specification and lock-out specification occurs which results in procurement orders 
being developed to lower the number of potential firms (Fitzpatrick, 2003).  
ii) Preparation phase/Process design and bid documents preparation  
During the project review and the approval process, the contracting authority is required to formulate 
detailed technical designs and to prepare a comprehensive procurement plan. The authority should 
ensure that the appropriate procurement method under the law has been selected, to develop the 
bidding documents and thereafter they should announce the call for bids (Rozo, 2010).  The risks in 
this phase are as follows: 
 Essential goods and services are under- or over-estimated to favour a specific bidder; 
 Needless complexity of bidding documents or terms of reference are utilised to create an air 
of confusion to conceal corrupt acts and to make monitoring problematic; 
 Consultants develop a design that benefits a specific bidder; 
 Bases for direct contracting are abused; 
 Bidding documents or terms of reference are developed to benefit a specific provider, hence 
competition cannot occur;  
 Cover biddings or phantom bids occur that give the impression that there is competition;  
 Bid suppression occurs which allows the winning of contracts by designated firms;  
 Bid rotation where firms rotate the winning bids amongst themselves and through a side 
payment each receives a share of the income; and  
 Market division takes place where firms agree not to enter a bid in order to suppress 
competition against one another (Fitzpatrick, 2003).  
 
iii) Contractor/supplier selection and award phase 
This stage provides clarification to interested bidders, the submission, evaluation of the bids and the 
awarding and signature of the contracts (Rozo, 2010). The various risks are: 
 Decision-makers are biased, thus, bribes, kickbacks or conflicts of interest are involved;  
 The selection criteria are subjective and this allows bias to influence decisions;  
 Advantages to specific bidders are granted through the transfer of confidential information 
prior to the bid submission or during the classification period;  
 Confidentiality is abused and prolonged beyond legally protected information, making 
monitoring and control problematic; 
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 The bases for selection of the winner are not made public, hence there is no transparency in 
the bid; and  
 Costs are inflated due to limited or non-existent competition. 
iv) Contract Implementation phase  
In this stage the contractor or supplier has been given the contract, and they provide the goods or carry 
out the work or services as required. This is done under the supervision of the contracting authority of 
an outsourced consultant. The payment occurs after the supervision of the process (Rozo, 2010). 
Frequent risks in this phase include:  
 Winning bidders/contactors tend to produce poor quality and defective work which 
usually requires early repairs or costly correction; 
 Contract renegotiations or „change orders‟ make changes to the contract, this occurs 
in small proportions which can be determined by the site engineer; 
 Price increases throughout execution due to „change orders‟ reflect in changes in 
specifications or cost escalations. This is usually enabled by collusion between a 
corrupt contractor and a corrupt control official; 
 False or non-existent claims are approved;  
 Contract supervisors or monitors are bribed to justify false or non-existent claims; 
and   
 Contract renegotiations are allowed that render the bidding process ineffective.  
 
v) Needs assessment phase/Demand determination 
At the conclusion of the contract execution, the contracts final accounting and payment occurs under 
the supervision of government employees (Rozo, 2010). The risk in this phase is:  
 Accountants who handle the final accounts and auditors are biased or can be bribed, and 
become willing to support falsified certificates.  
  
2.8.2 Combative measures 
Many public procurement regulations cover measures that are directed at preventing corruption in the 
public procurement sector. However, these measures in procurement legislation against corruption 
may not be specifically directed against corruption and may address related issues such as 
transparency, open competition and heightened accountability in awarding government contracts 
(Williams-Elegbe, 2012). Other measures pertain directly to the prevention of corruption in the public 
procurement sector. However, corruption is a complex issue, with indigenous casual factors. The 
strategies adopted need to be state and country specific, taking into consideration the history and 
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cultural complexities of a country (Andvig et al., 2000). Six measures have been identified by Kostyo 
(2006) to address procurement corruption. 
The implementation of Good Procurement Principles is the first preventative measure of procurement 
corruption. According to Kostyo (2006) the adoption of principles of integrity, transparency, 
accountability, fairness and efficiency in the decision-making process on investments and purchases 
will reduce corruption. Integrity refers to the procurement process being honest and compliant with 
laws, and it ensures that the possessor of the appropriate technical expertise is appointed. Also, fair 
and open competition allows for an adequate pricing and quality product to be provided (Williams-
Elegbe, 2012). Transparency means that laws, regulations, institutions, processes, plans and decisions 
are accessible to the public. This allows for processes and decisions to be monitored, reviewed and 
decision-makers can be held accountable (Kostyo, 2006). Accountability means that government and 
public institutions must be held responsible for decisions taken and for the completion of tasks and 
duties. Records that justify all decisions and actions should be created. Where violations occur the 
perpetrator must be held accountable and they must be dealt with appropriately (Kuhn & Sherman, 
2014). Contracts awarded should be fair and impartial, suppliers and contractors should be 
appointment on merit in terms of their qualifications and expertise. 
The implementation of Good Procurement Laws is the second preventative measure. Due to 
globalisation, trade agreements and conditions together with procurement laws worldwide are 
becoming similar. For example, many of the laws establish open bidding as the norm and restricted 
bidding, short listing or direct contracting as the exception (Kostyo, 2006). At the international level, 
the World Bank‟s Procurement Guidelines and the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model are used (Nicholas, 2010). In 1995, UNCITRAL issued a Model Law 
on Procurement Goods, Construction and Services. The Model Law comprises the WB‟s procurement 
principles and seeks to evaluate and modernise countries‟ procurement laws and practices (Nicholas, 
2010).  
Law enforcement is another combative measure against procurement corruption. Criminal punishment 
entrenched in the national legal structures are significant in reducing corruption. Criminal liability of 
legal persons/corporations and administrative fines can be used as a deterrent to corruption. When 
companies can be held liable, under the law, for the prevention of corrupt acts, they ensure that 
measures are taken to reduce corruption. Although the levying of administrative fines can be used as a 
significant deterrent, it often makes little or no impact due to the low ceiling on the fines (Kostyo, 
2006). Hence, fines need to be set at a level that far exceeds the economic benefits of illicit activity, in 
order to be a successful measure. Liability for damages can also be used as a measure to reduce 
corruption in the public procurement sector (Wickberg, 2013). Corruption during the procurement 
process can cause damage to the principal and other bidders who incurred costs in preparing their 
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bids, thus corrupt individuals and companies need to be held liable for the damage. The practice of 
pre-determining thus means that, if damages occur, a certain percent of the contract value will be 
deducted.  
Another effective sanction is the forfeiture or confiscation of illegal gains and profit. Companies that 
have received contracts through corrupt acts can be forced to return not only the actual „profit‟ of the 
payment, but the entire payment for the contract (Kilchling, 2001). Debarment (blacklisting) of 
corrupt individuals and companies has been seen as an effective way to reduce corruption. This 
prevents the participation of corrupt entities in the competition for public contracts. Debarment lists 
are published through the internet, for example, the WB debarment register (Williams, 2007).  
The use of prevention is another key strategy to curb public procurement corruption. Methods to 
prevent corruption in the public procurement sector should be the responsibility of the government 
officials and the bidders. A clear and transparent process is required, where governments provide 
clear procurement rules that focus on competitive and open bidding procedures (Kuhn & Sherman, 
2014). The use of the „four eyes principle‟ and rotation of officials has been seen as a successful 
administrative preventative measure to prevent corruption. The staff needs to develop clear behavioral 
rules, in the form of codes of conduct. The Code of Conduct needs to be based on the commitment to 
integrity and ethical behaviour, and corruption should be strictly prohibited (Kostyo, 2006). 
Information gathering in the form of whistle-blowing is another important measure to curb public 
procurement corruption. Corruption is characterised by secrecy. Individuals who are most likely to be 
aware of corruption are office colleagues of corrupt officials or competing bidders. Usually these 
individuals are reluctant to approach authorities (Masuku, 2005). Hence companies should develop 
whistle-blower encouragement and protection rules. Establishing a central anti-corruption office, 
hotline telephonic connection or an electronic information gathering system for the purposes of 
anonymity will encourage individuals to divulge corrupt activity. 
In recent years, governments have made use of the internet for the public procurement process 
(Søreide, 2002). E-procurement is the collaborative procurement of goods, works and services using 
electronic methods at the various stages to maximise efficiency and transparency (Satyanarayana, 
2007). The main purpose of using e-procurement is to attain value for money, foster access to 
competition, impartiality and transparency and to allow for some control by civil society. The E-
procurement process provides general procurement information on all government departments, 
tender notices, bidding documents, minutes/records of bidders‟ conferences, the submission of bids, 
received bids and reports of award proceedings, for example, who won and at what price (Kostyo, 
2006). However there are some constraints to using this method such as cultural barriers in terms of 
getting smaller companies to work with the internet, as well as resource constraints in terms of 
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personnel and finances (Kostyo, 2006). Corruption is not, however, only an international concern; it is 
also endemic in Africa and has had devastating impacts on the developing world.  
2.9 Corruption in Africa 
“Corruption in African has had an extremely negative impact on the socio-economic development and 
the fight against poverty on the continent. Corruption in Africa has been characterised by economic 
stagnation, political instability and uncontrollable public debt” (Sebudubudu, 2002).  It has thus 
become a global concern and has attracted the attention of numerous international organisations which 
have focused their attention on the root causes and consequences of corruption, in order to provide 
effective means to curb this practice (Hope, 2000).  
Corruption in Africa is entrenched in the politics of the post-colonial state and the problems that 
followed after independence (Sebudubudu, 2002). The post-colonial state did not possess the capacity 
and resources to meet the demands that were required. Furthermore, the institutions that were 
inherited during independence sought to serve the economic interests of the colonial state (Griffiths, 
2005). Due to the economic strain and societal demands, a few years after independence, the African 
states became characterised by centralisation, authoritarianism, personal rule, patronage and clientelist 
politics (Szeftel, 2000). Thus, the post-colonial state in Africa after independence was based on 
authoritarian personal rule and on the use of force.  According to Hope (2000) these neo-patrimonial 
states were characterised by bureaucratic autocracies which lacked accountability, transparency and 
the rule of law.  
Clientelism also became rife and a source of corruption, supporters of the clientelist network showed 
loyalty to the ruling party and in return would be rewarded or gain access to state resources 
(Sebudubudu, 2002). Additionally, politicians and senior public officials‟ lack of ethical leadership 
prevented accountability. Hence, personal and private interests took priority over national interests 
(Hope, 2000).  
According to the WB and African Union (AU) Surveys, corruption costs Africa $148 billion a year 
(Blandy, 2007). It is estimated that corruption occurs in up to 70 percent of public procurement 
contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa (Tutu et al., 2014). In these cases, bribes and illicit transactions 
inflate the project costs by 20-30 percent (Mawenya, 2008). African countries are taking an extensive 
interest in this area as it increases poverty, human suffering and further marginalises the poor, 
undermines capacity building and increases the misuse and looting of Africa‟s natural resources. 
During the initial years of independence in Africa, states paid their public workers low wages. 
However, the workers were required, not only to financially support themselves and their nuclear 
family, but to share the benefits of their public office with their extended family, which in some 
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instances, included the whole village (Appolloni & Mushagalus, 2013).  It was thus argued that unless 
the civil servant was permitted to supplement his income with a bribe, which in essence would 
enhance his ability to meet his various obligations, he was unlikely to remain in the public sector 
(Mbaku, 2007). However, in contemporary African society, civil servants continue to engage in 
corruption. Corruption has also ravaged the public procurement sector in Africa and has actively 
undeveloped and impoverished its citizens.  
2.10 Public Procurement Corruption in Africa 
Public procurement in Africa is known to be prone to corruption. This impedes the socio-economic 
development and growth of the continent (Mawenya, 2008). There are various determinants of public 
procurement corruption in Africa, which are complex and multi-faceted. According to Appolloni and 
Mushagalus (2013) the major economic determinant of public procurement corruption in Africa was 
related to the low salaries of public servants and officials. 
 
Appolloni and Mushagalus (2013) also point out that there are organisational determinants of 
procurement corruption in Africa. These include: lack of transparency and accountability in the codes 
or organisational functions; lack of capacity amongst technical staff of various public organisations 
relating to procurement planning; writing of specifications; evaluation of bids and contract 
management; lack of effective supervision in organisations; and adequate facilities for procurement 
staff in organisations (Appolloni & Mushagalus, 2013).  
 
According to Appolloni and Mushagalus (2013) political factors also play a role in heightening 
corruption as political leaders reign over complex governance structures. Politicians both at the 
central and local government levels, manipulate public resources to bribe voters. Thereafter, they 
recover the money spent by swaying the award of government contracts to receive direct benefits.  
However, in most cases of procurement corruption in Africa, it is the officials who have strong 
political connections that influence the award of government tenders through collaboration with 
technical officials of the government and the private sector (Appolloni & Mushagalus, 2013). 
 
Two organisations, namely, the UN and the AU, have spurred the fight against public procurement 
corruption in Africa.  In its Resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003, the UN‟s General Assembly 
instituted UNCAC, which was followed by the Convention. UNCAC is significant when dealing with 
public procurement corruption. Article 9 is entitled Public procurement and management of public 
finances (Nicholls et al., 2011). This Article requires states to take the necessary action to formulate 
relevant systems of procurement, which is founded upon transparency, competition, and objective 
criteria in decision-making in order to combat corruption (Appolloni & Mushagalus, 2013). 
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The AU has also instituted a number of measures to address corruption in the public procurement 
sector, the most prominent being the African Convention on Corruption, which requires state parties 
to ensure that public officials declare their assets at the inception and conclusion of their time in 
public service. It also requires State parties to ensure transparency in their public procurement sectors 
(Williams-Elegbe, 2012). 
The WB Country Procurement Assessment Survey conducted in 2012, revealed that $60 out of every 
US$100 spent by the African Union was being lost to corrupt acts (African Union Procurement 
Authority, 2015). An average of $25 billion was being lost annually to fraudulent practices, exhibiting 
itself in the form of insufficient procurement plans, poor project prioritisation, poor budgeting 
processes, lack of competition and value for money and various other manipulations of the 
procurement and contract award processes (African Union Procurement Authority, 2015). Hence the 
AU initiated the Public Procurement Reform as measure to restore due process in the award and 
execution of contracts. This led to the formation of the AU Procurement Authority Unit in 2013, 
which was tasked to implement the AU's Public Procurement Reform Policy aimed at minimising 
abuses in processes and standards, in the awarding of public sector contracts in the region (African 
Union Procurement Authority, 2015). 
In Africa, public procurement frameworks have made significant progress in formulating safeguards 
against public procurement corruption. Countries such as Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya have used 
regulatory frameworks to prevent corruption (Appolloni & Mushagalus, 2013). However, adjustments 
and reforms could aid and strengthen safeguards. Williams-Elegbe (2015) notes that procurement 
reform in Africa tries to make procurement less prone to corruption, fraud and mismanagement. 
However, a number of strategies need to be adopted in order to impede procurement corruption in 
Africa (Appolloni & Mushagalus, 2013).  
A comprehensive legislation for public procurement is fundamental first for a clear, transparent and 
fair public procurement system. In order to strengthen trust in the fairness of public procurement, 
legislation should be unambiguous and reliable and the main regulations should be passed as 
parliamentary law. Second, specific steps in the procurement process, such as needs assessment, 
definition of technical specifications and contract execution need to be extensively revised, as a high 
degree of discretionary decision-making is needed which is prone to corruption. Third, standardised, 
clear and concise procedures which are comprehensive are needed as it creates transparency in the 
public procurement sector. Fourth, emphasis needs to be placed on emergency procurement or 
exemptions that will apply when tendering fails. Fifth, safeguarding the integrity of individuals who 
engage in the public procurement sector, such as procuring entities or suppliers of products, is an 
essential means of preventing corruption in public procurement. Sixth, the active use of sanctioning 
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and temporary or permanent debarring from public procurement is crucial and acts as a deterrent to 
public procurement corruption (Appolloni & Mushagalus, 2013). 
In addition to corruption being a grave problem in Africa, it has also manifested prominently in South 
Africa.  
 
2.11 Corruption in South Africa 
With the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa a new democratic dispensation dawned, based on 
a constitution that has core values of openness, transparency and responsiveness (Rai & Johnson, 
2014). The South African government has publicly committed itself to deal with issues of corruption, 
which has been substantially blamed on the legacy of the apartheid regimes (Heidenheimer & 
Johnston, 2011). The South African government however, has not fully dealt with this phenomenon, 
as it has been found that South Africa has lost R700 billion to corruption over the last 20 years, since 
its democracy (Sibeko, 2015). In the 2014 CPI, South Africa ranks a disappointing 67 out of a 
possible 175 countries, with a dismal score of 44 out of 100. Even with the fall of the apartheid 
regime, corruption is still rife and active in democratic South Africa.    
 
The difference between corruption in the apartheid era and during democracy is that the latter allows 
for greater detection of corrupt activities, allowing for the exposure and prosecution of corrupt acts 
(Hyslop, 2005). The media is flooded with numerous cases of government misappropriation and illicit 
acts but little is done to formulate measures to combat it. According to Ellero (2014), South Africans 
are immune to corruption and it is becoming the norm. Citizens and politicians alike, feel powerless 
and fearful to report on corruption, due to fear of being victimised. However, it is imperative that 
cases of corrupt activity are reported in order to ascertain the true extent of corruption in South Africa 
in order to develop specific combative measures.  
 
2.11.1 History of Corruption in South Africa   
What typifies the South African context is its historical legacy of apartheid. For the last 300 years 
South African has endured intense colonisation and racial discrimination (Hilliard and Wissink, 
2001). Nearly every contemporary challenge faced by South Africa cannot be explained without 
reflecting on its past, as they are intertwined. According to Hyslop (2005), during the age of Paul 
Kruger corruption in the Transvaal was used as a means of propaganda; administrative corruption was 
noted as a downfall of the ruling party and a way to advocate a British takeover of the territory. The 
pro-imperial lobby in the Transvaal and Britain, showed the Boer regime as primitive and unable to 
provide the necessary support for the modernisation of the country during the gold discoveries in 
South Africa (Hyslop, 2005).  
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In the late 1880s and 1890s however, Kruger made efforts to modernise. A civil organisation was 
formed under the leadership of Dr. Leyds, who brought well educated Dutch administrators to run the 
system. Kruger further developed economic policies that brought about rent-seeking opportunities 
within patronage networks, hoping that his supporters would benefit from such policies. One of his 
main policies granted concessions, specifically the right to manufacture or distribute certain category 
goods in the Transvaal. This usually went to entrepreneurs who were sympathetic to the regime 
(Hyslop, 2005).  
Decades after the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910. Led by Jan Smuts, the main goal was to 
form a strong white controlled polity within the British Empire. During this period, corruption levels 
in the hierarchy of the senior bureaucracy seemed to have been low, even though the use of the pass 
system to control the movement of black labourers allowed for bribery between officials and workers 
(Hyslop, 2005). The victory of the National Party in 1948 introduced apartheid policies and indicated 
an administrative change (Hilliard and Wissink, 2001). The use of preferential funding for Afrikaner 
cultural and educational institutions, and the awarding of contracts to Afrikaner enterprises and other 
policies all favoured government supporters. However, even though the role of patronage was 
immense, there was little evidence of obvious corruption in the higher levels of bureaucracy. 
Furthermore, legal fetishism that was the characteristic of the Afrikaner nationalist ideology of the 
time constrained corruption. However, the administration of racist legislation, specifically the pass 
laws, heightened corruption at the lower levels of bureaucracy (Van Vuuren, 2006).  
From the 1980s onwards, there was a withdrawal from the harsh form of the Verwoerdian model of 
apartheid, in which the presence of the urban black population was accepted and an attempt was made 
to include coloured and Indian minorities into the white polity. However, corruption during this 
period began to increase in government administration and parastatals, especially in the Bantustans 
(Hyslop, 2005). There was also much confusion in the ideological vision that was present. The 
National Party leadership ethos changed from that of the service of the volk to that of the Swiss bank 
accounts. The Afrikaner rule was unable to constrain its followers and there was a rush for personal 
enrichment. This can be illustrated by the „Muldergate‟ scandal of the 1970s (Hyslop, 2005), whereby 
concealed funds were used to manipulate internal and external media‟s presentation of South Africa. 
For example, the entrepreneur Louis Luyt used such funds to create a pro-government newspaper, The 
Citizen, but used some of the money to help his failing fertiliser company (Van Vuuren, 2006). 
The mid-1980s saw the last endeavour to maintain white control through repression and the military.  
By the end of the decade this attempt had collapsed and under the leadership of FW De Klerk of the 
National Party negotiations for political transition began. It was at this time that corruption at the top 
levels of administration increased significantly. Once the fall of white rule was evident, there was 
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haste to attain as much of the spoils as possible before the curtain came down on apartheid (Hyslop, 
2005). 
Corruption was not only evident in the apartheid regime, but was also present in the political struggle 
carried out by African National Congress (ANC) aligned organisations during the 1980s. Foreign 
donors began to put money into the hands of trusted resistance figures to aid the struggle. However, 
proper records of this money were not kept, and some leaders did not honour the trust that was placed 
upon them (Hyslop, 2005). There was also a political culture that developed in the ANC, that of 
organisational loyalty, which has been further carried into the post-apartheid government. Such 
loyalties make it problematic for acts of corruption by the old comrades, to be publicly denounced by 
the ANC (Hyslop, 2005). 
With the fall of apartheid in 1994, the ANC government inherited a divided South Africa, 
characterised by high crime rates, extreme poverty, high levels of unemployment and the dubious title 
of being the most unequal society in the world (Hilliard and Wissink, 2001). According to Hyslop 
(2005), when looking at the old apartheid regime and its leadership, the new democratic regime has 
just exacerbated old forms of corruption and created new ones. A small black élite was benefiting 
from the new opportunities, while the majority were still largely disadvantaged (Ellero, 2015).  
2.11.2 South African Anti-Corruption Initiatives 
There are a number of international treaties that have been signed and anti-corruption agencies have 
been established in South Africa to curb and prevent corruption. According to Majila et al., (2014) 
South Africa has formulated and promulgated legislation that is regarded as an international example 
of good practice and has developed agencies for the purpose of combating corruption. However, the 
effectiveness of these anti-corruption measures has been questionable. Overall, the challenge lies in 
the implementation of South Africa‟s anti-corruption legislation, which, in essence has proven to be 
ineffective (Majila et al., 2014). South Africa has ratified four main international and regional treaties 
these  are the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and Corruption (2005), the 
OECD Anti-bribery Convention (2007), the AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption (2005) and the SADC Protocol against Corruption (2001) (Nicholls et al., 2011; Boersma, 
2012). All four of these treaties require the South African government to institute legislation to take 
aggressive action to address corruption. 
 
In addition to the international conventions and treaties, there are also a number of anti-corruption 
agencies to combat corruption. The National Development Plan refers to the use of a multi-agency 
corruption system for combating corruption in South Africa. Table 2.5 outlines some of the anti-




Table 2.5 Anti-Corruption Agencies in South Africa 
ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY DESCRIPTION 
South African Police Services (SAPS)  Based on an initiative of the National 
Commissioner of 1995, the National Anti- 
Corruption Unit (ACU) was formed in 1996, 
within SAPS. The functions of SAPS ACU is to 
investigate all allegations of corruption and 
related instances in SAPS, to initiate and 
implement an anti-corruption awareness 
programme and to coordinate all anti-corruption 
investigations in SAPS. 
The Auditor-General (AG) The Mandate of the AG is to conduct audits of 
government departments and other public sector 
bodies. This provides assurance to Parliament 
that these accountable bodies have attained their 
financial objectives and managed their finances 
according to fair financial principles and in line 
with the legal framework formulated by 
Parliament. 
The Public Protector (PP) The PP has the power to investigate any conduct 
in the state or in the public administration in 
government, that is seen to be improper or that 
may lead to impropriety or prejudice. 
The Public Service Commission (PSC) The PSC is an independent and impartial body 
responsible for investigating, monitoring and 
evaluating the organisation and practices of the 
South African Public Service.  
The Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) The DSO nicknamed the Scorpions mandate, 
was to combat organised crime, corruption 
within the criminal justice system, serious 
economic crimes and crimes against the state 
such as terrorism. In 2008, the Scorpions were 
disbanded and a total of 287 DSO cases were 
transferred to the Directorate for Priority Crime 
(HAWKS).  
The Special Investigating Unit (SIU)  The purpose of the SIU is to investigate serious 
malpractices or maladministration in reference 
to the administration of State Institutions, State 
assets and public money as well as conduct that 
may harm the interest of the public. 
Source: (Public Service Commission, 2001:3-21; Sebudubudu, 2002:153-203; Berning & Montesh, 
2012:3-8).  
 
Table 2.4 shows that there are numerous anti-corruption agencies in South Africa. All of these 
agencies play a distinctive role in curbing malfeasance. However, these agencies suffer from 
challenges that affect their ability to carry out their mandated task in the fight against corruption in 





2.11.3 Critical reflection of Anti-Corruption initiatives in South Africa 
Government‟s efforts to deal with corruption have largely failed. Similarly, the anti-corruption 
agencies in South Africa face various problems which ultimately impact on their effectiveness in 
combating corruption. Rangata (2008) notes that many agencies and laws suffer from overlapping 
mandates which affect their operating ability and hinders their efficiency in combatting corruption 
(Public Service Commission, 2001).  
 
In South Africa, anti-corruption agencies are under-resourced in terms of financial and human 
resources. In the Financial Year 1998/1999, the PP requested R22 million but was given R7. 5 million 
(Sebudubudu, 2002). Hence the PP had to cancel a planned communications campaign due to a 
shortage of financial resources. In terms of human resources, it was noted in the Public Service 
Commission Report (2001) that it was very difficult to find training opportunities for ombudsmen 
officers. In 2000, the Office of the PP had 61 investigators and had a huge backlog and could only 
handle half of the 200 complaints it received monthly (Sebudubudu, 2002). According to Camerer 
(2008) a successful and effective anti-corruption agency should have sufficient monetary resources. 
With inadequate funds, institutions are unable to attract or retain qualified personnel who are needed 
to carry out activities effectively such as prosecution, investigation and civic education programmes 
(Rangata, 2008). 
 
A successful and effective anti-corruption agency should also have special powers and independence. 
Agencies that are not independent face challenges in being an efficient agent to combat corruption 
(Camerer, 2008). This is seen in the case of the SIU who experience delays in issuing or approving 
proclamations. The SIU works on the basis of proclamations which are made by the Department of 
Justice and these are thereafter sent to the President for approval. Without the proclamations the SIU 
cannot function, causing delays that can take up to six months (Sebudubudu, 2002). Agencies such as 
the PP and DSO lack independence and autonomy from the government.  
Combatting corruption requires a holistic approach, as it takes various forms and occurs at all levels 
of government and society (Ellero, 2015). This is particularly evident in the public procurement sector 
of South Africa in which corruption is rife, and is the focus of this study.  
 
2.12 Public Procurement Corruption in South Africa 
Corruption in procurement is one of the main forms of malfeasance in South Africa. In 2011, 
Hofmeyer, the previous head of the SIU and Assets Forfeiture Unit, noted that between R25 – 30 
billion, that is 20 percent of South Africa‟s procurement budget, was being lost annually due to 
corruption (Bruce, 2012). Hofmeyer further contended that the SIU was investigating 558 
procurement contracts that were valued at R1.9 billion (Bruce, 2012). Most cases of procurement 
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corruption are related to areas of government that have large outsourcing budgets. Therefore, 
allegations of public corruption have received publicity in terms of the Department of Public Works, 
Department of Health, Department of Education, Municipalities such as the eThekwini Municipality 
and parastatals such as PetroSA (Speckman, 2013). 
 
During the apartheid regime, public procurement was a method to protect the interest of the minority, 
that is, the large white owned enterprises. It further discriminated against the small, medium and black 
owned businesses (Williams & Quinot, 2007). However, with the fall of apartheid, it was decided that 
public procurement would be a way to democratise the economy and provide employment and 
business opportunities for those who were previously excluded from the system (Williams & Quinot, 
2007). Major legislative reforms were needed in order to reach this goal.   
 
The Green Paper on public sector procurement reform was published in 1997, and specified the 
required legislative and policy changes (Bolton, 2006). The Green Paper tried to define the new 
procurement system in relation to four principles: addressing the injustices of the past without 
compromising on the ideal of value for money; to maintain good governance and sound financial 
controls, zero tolerance for corruption in the public sector and within public procurement, and to 
ensure that all government suppliers meet their tax obligations (Bolton, 2006). In 2001, the South 
African Cabinet further approved methods to reform the procurement process, based on the principles 
of value for money, open and effective competition, ethics and fair dealings and accountability 
(Ellero, 2015). However it is questionable as to whether or not these measures have been successful in 
upholding its principles, specifically, in relation to corruption. 
 
2.12.1 The Legislative Framework for procurement practices in South Africa 
The SCM is an integral tool for managing public procurement in South Africa. The aim of SCM is to 
add value at each stage of the procurement process in an attempt to address deficiencies in practices 
relating to procurement, contract management, inventory and asset control, and unnecessary planning. 
The national government developed the regulatory framework within which the SCM operates, this 
extends to provinces and local government bodies  (Ambe & Badenhorst-Weiss, 2012). There are 
numerous legislative frameworks that guide procurement practices in South Africa and these include 
the: 
 
• The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
• Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 
• Municipal Finance Management Act No 56 of 2003 
• Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act No 5 of 2000 
• Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 
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• Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No 3 of 2000 
• Promotion of Equality and the Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act No 4 of 2000 
• Construction Industry Development Board Act No 38 of 2000 
• Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act No 12 of 2004 (Table 2.5) 
 
Table 2.6 Legislation and their functions in procurement practices in South Africa 
ACT FUNCTION 
Public Finance of Management Act  
of 1999 
Establishes a regulatory framework for SCM, 
which includes procurement in 
national and provincial departments and state-
owned enterprises. 
The Promotion of 
Equality and the 
Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 
of 2000 
Prohibits the state or any person from 
discriminating unfairly against any 
person on the grounds of race or gender through 
the denial of access to 
contractual opportunities for rendering services 
or by failing to take steps to 
reasonably accommodate the needs of such 
persons. 
Preferential Procurement 
Policy Framework Act 
of 2000 
Establishes the manner in which preferential 
procurement policies are to be 
implemented. 
Construction Industry 
Development Board Act of 2000 
Establishes the means by which the Board can 
promote and implement 
policies, programmes and projects, including 
those aimed at procurement 
reform, standardisation and uniformity in 
procurement documentation, 
practices and procedures within the framework 
of the procurement policy of 
government, through the establishment of: 
1. a national register of contractors (and if 
required, consultants and suppliers) 
to manage public sector procurement risk and 
facilitate public procurement; 
2. a register of projects above a financial value 
with data relating to contracts 
awarded and completed and a best practice 
project assessment scheme; 
3. best practices 
Establishes a code of conduct for the parties 








Empowerment of 2003 • development of qualification criteria for the 
issuing of licences or 
concessions, the sale of state-owned enterprises 
and for entering into 
partnerships with the private sector; and 
•development and implementation of a 





Establishes a regulatory framework for SCM 
which includes procurement in 
municipalities and municipal entities 
Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act of 2004 
Makes corruption and related activities an 
offence; establishes a Register in order to place 
certain restrictions on persons and enterprises 
convicted of corrupt activities relating to tenders 
and contracts; and places a duty on certain 
persons holding a position of authority to report 
certain corrupt transactions. 
Source: (Ambe & Badenhorst-Weiss, 2012:249).  
 
2.12.2 Challenges faced in Public Procurement  
Despite the formulation of an extensive legislative framework and the use of SCM as a management 
tool, public procurement in South Africa still faces numerous challenges which have left the sector 
open to corruption. The first challenge is the lack of proper knowledge, skills and capacity. Skills and 
capacity shortages have been noted as the greatest impediment to the success of public procurement in 
South Africa (Sheoraj, 2007). SCM Officials lack of capacity and knowledge has led to poor 
governance and has allowed for loopholes in the procurement process. Non-compliance with policies 
and regulations is the second challenge  public procurement faces (Ambe & Badenhorst-Weiss, 2012). 
Numerous policies and regulations guide the however, compliance with these laws has become 
problematic. This has allowed for the manipulation of laws for self-enrichment. This can be typified 
in the abuse of section 36 of the Supply Chain Policy. Section 36 allows for the by-passing of normal 
tender processes in the case of emergencies. However, what constitutes an emergency is manipulated 
by officials which leaves the tender process open for abuse (Ellero, 2015).  
  
Inadequate planning and linking the budget to demand is the third challenge to the public procurement 
processes in South Africa (Ambe & Badenhorst-Weiss, 2012). Demand management is an integral 
entity to the SCM process. It defines the decision-making process and allows departments to procure 
at opportune times. Some government entities are unable to quantify the needs of the public, properly 
estimate costs, nor can they accurately track, control or report on expenditure. This allows for abuse 
of legislation to occur in terms of Section 36, and causes renewals of previous contractors, without a 
fair competitive bidding process (Luyt, 2008). Lack of accountability and inadequate measures for 
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monitoring and evaluation for the SCM is the last challenge. Without transparent, accountable and 
adequate monitoring systems, the entire procurement process can be manipulated. Collusion between 
state officials, politicians and business owners can occur at any stage of the procurement process, 
allowing for kickbacks and illicit activity  (Ambe & Badenhorst-Weiss, 2012).  
 
An example where government officials have colluded with a service provider in the manipulating of 
the issuing of public procurement is the former Commissioner of SAPS, Bheki Cele, and the previous 
Minister of the Department of Public Works (DPW) Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde‟s leasing of the 
Transnet building in Durban and Pretoria (Public Protector, 2011). Cele sealed a lease contract to 
move the offices of senior leaders, such as the Minister of Police and the Deputy Minister, to Roux 
Shabangu‟s building two months prior to purchasing. This deal violated procurement procedures as 
provided by the Treasury, since it was never publicly advertised in order to invite potential bidders. It 
further undermines the Treasury regulation that states that all tenders that exceed R500 000 should be 
awarded in a process that was transparent and fair (Public Protector, 2011).  
 
It was also reported that the National Commissioner of the SAPS endorsed a second contract to move 
the SAPS offices in Durban to a different building that Roux Shabangu was negotiating to buy. This 
contract failed to follow the procurement principles in Section 217 of the South African Constitution 
and the 2007 Department of Public Works and Supply Chain Management Policy (Zondi, 2012). After 
the Public Protectors‟ investigation, it was found that the leasing of the Transnet buildings and 
Middestad buildings were against public procurement rules.  
 
Some other examples include that of the Free State provincial government that issued four tenders 
valued at R63.7 million to bidders who did not score the necessary points. Hence, the Free State 
provincial government violated the Preferential Procurement Act of 2001. In Limpopo, almost 42 
contracts valued at R227. 6 million were given to suppliers some of whom who did not have the 
capacity to handle multiple contracts. The key figure of the manipulation of tenders in Limpopo is the 
former President of the ANC Youth League, Julius Malema, who used his position to influence the 
issuing of tenders to his friends who, in turn, aided his extravagant lifestyle (Zondi, 2012). These 
examples reflect the ways in which those with power and authority collude in order to seek improper 
financial gain by manipulating the public procurement procedures of South Africa.  
 
According to Nathan (2013) almost all municipalities in South Africa have experienced corruption at 
one time or another. This is particularly true for the eThekwini Municipality in which corruption, 
specifically in the public procurement sector, has been highlighted in the Ngubane, Manase and AG 
Reports. Various commissions, committees and units such as the Ombudsman, Municipal Public 
Accounts Committee (MPAC) and City Integrity and Investigations Unit (CIIU) have been 
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established to curb corruption. However, these have largely been unsuccessful due to the numerous 
challenges they face such as lack of expertise, competency, skills and finance (Ambe & Badenhorst-
Weiss, 2012).  
 
In the eThekwini Municipality corruption in procurement process means tender rules and regulations 
are frequently broken and flouted (Ellero, 2015). Nepotism, cronyism, cadre deployment, and 
collusion between government officials, politicians and business owners for self-enrichment 
characterise the procurement process. Instead of providing basic services, which are needed for 
survival, the procurement sector of the eThekwini Municipality is manipulated for private gain and 
characterised by „turning a blind eye‟ and „cover ups‟ for personal enrichment. Hence many citizens 
experience poor service delivery and are largely dissatisfied; this has spurred violent service delivery 
protests and fostered political instability in the eThekwini region.  
 
2.13 Conclusion  
This chapter reviewed the published literature to explain corruption and public procurement 
corruption from an international, continental and national perspective. It is evident that corruption has 
infiltrated into all spheres of government and has incapacitated the application of the principles of 
good governance, democracy and basic human rights. In South Africa, corruption has its roots in the 
apartheid and the colonial periods. In South Africa, the public procurement sector is riddled with 
corruption, and undermines the goal to alleviate poverty and provide basic services for all. 
 
Corruption inevitably violates human rights and has a detrimental impact on citizens‟ lives. More 
specifically it is the poor, due to their powerlessness to change the status quo, who are adversely 
impacted.  Corruption in the public procurement sector negatively effects basic service delivery 
(Ambe & Badenhorst-Weiss, 2012) and thus a poor quality of life is experienced by those who are 
reliant on government services for their survival. When these basic services are not provided their 
human rights are violated.  
 
Through the use of the human rights based approach an understanding of the implications of 
corruption on the poor and disadvantaged is revealed. Even though legislation and various measures 
have been implemented to curb corruption: cronyism, „tenderpreneurs‟ and abuse of legislation have 
rendered these measures ineffective in the eThekwini municipality (Zondi, 2012). The inability 
actively to address corruption has resulted in poor service delivery, human right injustices and poor 








When conducting research it is imperative that the methodologies utilised are sound and that the 
strengths and weaknesses of the methods adopted are acknowledged. When conducting research on 
corruption there is an air of secrecy and sensitivity that surrounds the topic, which makes it difficult to 
gather significant information. Data if available are often „soft‟, unreliable and masked (Andvig et al., 
2000). Furthermore, it is difficult to quantify or measure activities which are hidden from society 
(Jain, 2001). This chapter outlines the methodology that was utilised in the study and provides a 
description of the study area. 
3.2 Aim 
The aim of this study is to critically investigate corruption in the procurement sector in local 
government with specific reference to the case of eThekwini Municipality.  
3.3 Objectives  
The objectives of the study are to: 
i) Review international trends in corruption and the procurement sector; 
ii) Investigate specific cases of corruption in the procurement sector in the eThekwini 
Municipality; 
iii) Assess the social, economic and political implications of corruption in eThekwini 
Municipality; and 
iv) Examine the instruments and mechanisms that are used in preventing, detecting and 
responding to corruption and the effectiveness of such measures. 
3.4 Study Area 
This critical investigation on corruption employed a case study approach that focused on the 
eThekwini Municipality which is a Metropolitan Municipality that includes the city of Durban 
(Sutherland et al., 2013). This Municipality was created in the Year 2000. eThekwini is a Category A 
Municipality and is one of the eleven districts of the Province of  KwaZulu-Natal. eThekwini is the 
largest Municipality in KwaZulu-Natal and the third largest Municipality in the country, with a 
population of  3.5 million people (eThekwini Municipality, 2011). The area of the Municipality is 
2297 km
2 
; 36 % of this area comprises rural areas and a further 29% is considered peri-urban. The 
Municipality extends from Umkomass in the South, through some tribal areas in Umbumbulu, to 
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Tongaat in the North, stretching inland to Ndwedwe and ending at Cato Ridge in the West (Cogta, 
2015).  
A 206 member city council manages the eThekwini Municipality, which has 103 wards. The Council 
consists of the Mayor James Nxumalo (2011-2016), councillors, executive committees and several 
mayoral committees. Additionally, the council facilitates the provision of infrastructure and services 
to the people of the Municipality (eThekwini Municipality, 2011). The City administration is headed 
by the City Manager Sibusiso Sithole (2012-2016), who is supported by an Executive Management 
Team. The City‟s service delivery sectors are divided into seven administrative clusters, and include: 
Corporate and Human Resources, Governance, Health and Social Services, Procurement and 
Infrastructure, Safety and Security, Sustainable Development and City Enterprises, and Treasury. 
These all have their own roles and responsibilities in aiding service delivery in the Municipality 























Figure 1. 1: The eThekwini Municipality 
(Source: Geography Cartographic Unit, UKZN Howard College) 
55 
 
3.5 Research Methodology 
This section outlines the methodology adopted in this study. It will discuss the case study approach, 
the Data Sources, Sampling techniques and the ethical considerations for a study of this nature. 
3.5.1 Case Study Approach 
This investigation utilised a case study approach in order to provide greater understanding of 
corruption, specifically focused on the public procurement sector at the local government level.  This 
study focuses specifically on corruption in the eThekwini Municipality. Simons (2009) describes a 
case study approach as an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and 
uniqueness of a specific project that takes place in a real life context. The primary purpose of this 
approach is to attain an in-depth understanding of a specific topic and to generate knowledge to 
inform policy and civil society. The case study approach is an investigative approach which can be 
used to describe highly complex phenomena thoroughly, and in a way that provides new and greater 
understanding of these phenomena (Moore et al., 2012). 
A case study approach is ideal when investigating corruption in the public procurement sector as it 
allows for specific incidences of corruption to be focused on and allows for an in-depth understanding 
of corruption. The case study approach often identifies participants through the use of purposive 
sampling, as opposed to random sampling. With the use of purposive sampling informants are 
selected according to who can provide the most information. Furthermore, interviews are often used 
in the case study approach, which make use of open-ended questions which allow for more details to 
be provided (Moore et al., 2012). All these techniques are ideal when conducting research on 
corruption. They allow for the complexities of corruption to be addressed when focused on a specific 
location such as the eThekwini Municipality.  
The case study approach does have drawbacks. It has been criticised for focusing on a small area and 
is seen as not useful in theory creation or as providing the basis for making generalisations (Flyvbjerg, 
2006). However, such criticism is oversimplified and misleading, because the case study approach 
allows for in-depth analysis. Accourding to Hesse-Biber & Leavy (2011) the case study approach 
provides a researcher with a holistic understanding of a problem or issue within its social context. By 
adopting a case study approach an in-depth understanding of the complex nature of corruption is 
developed. Furthermore, it allowed for specific cases of corruption in the public procurement sector to 
be outlined. It also allowed for a greater level of understanding of the social, political and economic 
implications of corruption within the eThekwini Municipality. It further aided the study by providing 
an understanding of the instruments and mechanisms that are used in preventing, detecting and 




3.5.2 Sampling Methodology 
There are a number of different types of sampling methods that can be adopted in a study that is 
qualitative in nature (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). A sampling method needs to be selected that best suits 
the study, which allows for the maximum amount of appropriate data to be gathered. For this study, 
non-probability sampling was utilized, where units are deliberately selected to represent specific 
features of groups within the population. This method is not intended to be statistically representative 
and the chances of selection for each of the elements are unknown, but the features of the population 
serve as the foundation of the selection process (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). It is this aspect of non-
probability sampling which makes it suited to small scale and in-depth studies which are optimal for 
this study. This study made use of two sampling techniques, purposive and snowball sampling. 
The purposive sampling technique, allows a researcher to selects subjects with the particular goal of 
focusing on a characteristic of a population that is of interest, which allows for the research questions 
to be answered (Mugera, 2013). In this technique the sample units are selected because they have 
features and characteristics which allow for a detailed study of the focal themes the researcher wishes 
to study (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). However, purposive sampling has been critiqued for being prone to 
bias and the element of subjectivity when selecting individuals to be interviewed (Mugera, 2013). 
Purposive sampling has many advantages these include efficiency and the collection of relevant 
information. This method allows individuals who are knowledgeable and who will provide maximum 
information on the topic of study, to be selected.  
It is for these reasons that 205 councillors of eThekwini Municipality were contacted via email, in 
which the nature of the study was outlined, and an inquiry for a possible interview was made. Fifteen 
councillors from different political parties responded. Thereafter, contact was maintained via email 
and telephone calls made over a period of three months. Interview dates were set and meetings were 
held across the eThekwini region over a period of two months, May and June 2015.  
The other sampling technique adopted in this study was snowball sampling. This can be defined as an 
approach which asks people who have already been interviewed to identify other individuals that they 
know that will best fit the selection criteria (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). Some populations that 
researchers are interested in studying are hard to reach or are hidden due to their social stigma which 
renders them socially marginalized, for example, drug addicts or individuals with HIV/AIDS 
(Mugera, 2013). Snowball sampling provides a way to gain access to hidden populations and enables 
research on sensitive areas of study. The limitation of snowball sampling is that it is impossible to 
determine the sampling error and to make statistical inferences from the sample to the population, 
because units are not selected randomly (Mugera, 2013). 
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However, snowball sampling can be useful when conducting research because it enables the 
identification of those that are hard to reach and allows for the issues of sensitivity to be addressed. 
When conducting a study on corruption it is difficult to identify bureaucrats or councillors who would 
be willing to avail themselves for a sit-down interview. The researcher had developed contact with 
councillors from frequent emailing and telephone calls over a period of three months. Once interviews 
were conducted the researcher asked all the councillors, to provide names of other councillors or 
bureaucrats who could be contacted on the basis of reference for possible interviews.  
3.5.3 Data Sources 
This study made use of both primary and secondary data sources, which allowed for the complex 
nature of corruption to be investigated. The primary data were obtained from in-depth interviews 
conducted with councillors and bureaucrats. Secondary data came from Media Analysis, the Manase 
Report, Auditor-General Reports, a Municipal Public Accounts Committee Agenda, and published 
literature in the form of journal articles and books on corruption. 
a) Primary data 
Primary data is the original data gathered for a specific purpose of solving a research problem 
(Goeldner & Richie, 2006). It is data that is made during the time period under investigation by 
individuals who witnessed or experienced an event (Hines, 2012).  
3.5.3.1 In-depth Interviews with Councillors and Bureaucrats 
In-depth interviews were conducted with eThekwini Municipality Councillors and City bureaucrats. 
The use of in-depth interviews is a qualitative research technique that allows for the conducting of 
intensive individual interviews with a small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on 
certain topics (Boyce & Neale, 2006). The interview guide (Appendix 1) allowed for open-ended 
responses. The interviews conducted with officials and bureaucrats were unstructured, which allowed 
for a confidential and secure conversation between interviewer and respondent.  
The use of in-depth interviews has limitations; it could lead to bias, in terms of interviewees saying 
what the researcher wants them to say or through the use of leading questions. It is also time 
intensive; in terms of conducting the interview and transcribing interviews. Furthermore, if the 
researcher is not properly trained in the interviewing style, this technique may not be successful as in-
depth interviews require probing and creating a comfortable setting (Boyce & Neale, 2006). 
This form of interviewing has been selected for its ability to provide detailed information about 
corruption and the freedom it provides the researcher to probe certain aspects during the interview. 
Furthermore, it provides a relaxed atmosphere in which to obtain information where interviewees can 
have a comfortable conversation with the researcher as opposed to filling out a survey or 
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questionnaire. (Boyce & Neale, 2006). Fifteen eThekwini councillors and bureaucrats agreed to be 
interviewed on the basis of anonymity. The recording of the interviews was done through the use of 
an electronic device that created a voice note. The respondents were allowed to say whatever they 
wanted, and the researcher had to make crucial decisions pertaining to what went into the analysis. In 
this study the researcher had to listen to audio recordings in order to engage with the themes, read 
transcripts and use a highlighter to note the key themes that were crucial for the study. The 
information from these interviews were thematically analysed in Chapter 4.  
b) Secondary data  
Secondary data refers to information that is already available, which has been collected and analysed 
by other individuals. Secondary data may be either published or unpublished data (Kothari, 2004). In 
order to gain an intensive understanding of the corruption, a literature review was conducted. Previous 
case studies were used to understand the nature of corruption specifically in public procurement. The 
secondary data included Media Analysis, the Manase Report, Auditor-General Reports, a Municipal 
Public Accounts Committee Agenda and published literature, journal articles and books.  
3.5.3.2 Media analysis 
Another technique that was utilized in this study was that of media analysis. Information from the 
media was used to provide insight into corruption.  Media content analysis is a distinct sub-set of 
content analysis and is a well-formulated research method (Macnamara, 2003). Media content 
analysis is the evaluation of pieces of media through either quantitative or qualitative research 
methods. According to Ellero (2015) quantitative media analysis is more structured but it is still a 
restricted form of data gathering, while qualitative methods involve open discussions and debate on 
themes and content. 
Media analysis is subject to limitations, especially relying on a researcher‟s interpretation, which can 
lead to bias. In addition, media reports can be sensationalist, focusing on aspects that can have a great 
shock value, but which fail to pay attention to the actual issues (Smith & Martin, 2007). However, 
media analysis has the benefit of being able to utilise combined methods. It allows the social scientist 
to see how society deals with various social issues and provides insight into the historical and cultural 
aspects of society through texts. Furthermore, media analysis is an unobtrusive form of analysing 
interactions which allows for insight into human thought through language (Macnamara, 2003).  
This study has utilized media sources in the form of newspapers articles. Newspapers were scanned 
for relevant information relating to corruption both nationally, provincially and to site-specific 
instances within the eThekwini Municipality. Online newspapers such as the City Press, Daily News, 
Mail and Guardian, The Mercury, News24, The Sunday Times and Sunday Tribune were all utilized. 
Furthermore, the search engine SABINET was utilised which has a database of newspaper articles 
59 
 
from SA Media and the South African Press Association (SAPA). These articles were selected from 
1994 to 2015.  
3.5.3.3 Manase Report 
One of the most important documents utilised in this study was the Manase Report. The Department 
of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs commissioned this Report to investigate 
corruption in the eThekwini Municipality (Maharaj & Karodia, 2013). This was after evidence of 
corruption and maladministration in the Municipality was revealed in the 2010/2011 AG Report. The 
AG found that the Municipality had illegally spent R532 million and that 10 councillors had business 
interests in the eThekwini Municipality. The Manase Report consists of more than 7000 pages that 
outline corruption and fraud in the eThekwini Municipality. The Report was initially kept secret and 
only a summarised version was made accessible to the eThekwini Municipality councillors, who had 
to sign a confidentiality clause to see the Report. However, due to pressure from opposition groups 
and the media, the Manase Report was publicly released in June 2013 (Maharaj & Karodia, 2013). 
The Manase Report was used in this study as it divulges irregularities in the tendering process, 
implicates councillors who were involved in corrupt deals with the Municipality and makes 
recommendations to address corruption and fraud within the Municipality. 
3.5.3.4 Auditor-General Reports 
In terms of legislation the Auditor-General was appointed in terms of Section 181 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996 (Corder et al., 2014). The independence of the 
AG is entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which notes that it must be 
impartial and carry out its mandate without fear, favour or prejudice. The AG reports on all finances 
including accounts and financial management, at all levels of government (Ellero, 2015). The AG 
releases annual reports of financial performance of government. In this study AG Reports, specifically 
the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) and Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) 
general reports were sourced from the Auditor-General‟s Website. These documents ranged from 
Financial Year 2001/2002 – 2013/2014.  
3.5.3.5 Municipal Public Accounts Committee Agenda 
MPAC is a committee of the municipal council, appointed in accordance with Section 79 of the 
Municipal Structures Act (SALGA, 2012). The main purpose of MPAC is to provide oversight over 
the executive functionaries of council and to maintain good governance in the Municipality. The 
MPAC meet at least four times per annum, agendas of the meetings are delivered to members in 
advance in order for them to prepare for the meeting (SALGA, 2012). In this study a councillor of the 
Municipality released the MPAC Committee Agenda for the 5 May 2015 to the researcher, on the 
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basis that anonymity was to be maintained with regard to the councillor and that the agenda was to be 
utilised solely for the purpose of this study. 
3.5.4 Ethical Considerations  
Integrating ethics into the entire research process is of vital importance. It ensures that the research is 
guided by ethical principles and it gives validity to a study (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011).  Corruption 
is a complex act and is carried out in secret. It is a sensitive topic due to its composite nature. It was 
imperative that when dealing with the issue of corruption that ethical principles were maintained. 
Ethical clearance for the study was obtained from the University of KwaZulu-Natal Research Ethics 
Committee (Appendix 2).  
3.5.4.1 Informed Consent 
Informed consent covers a variety of procedures that must be followed when a study includes human 
subjects. It is imperative that respondents are informed of the nature of the study and their consent 
obtained prior to their participation in the study (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011). In this study the 
councillors and bureaucrats who were willing to be interviewed for the study were asked to sign a 
consent form that provided a detailed description of the study (Appendix 3). The tape recording was 
explained and signed permission for recording was obtained. The informed consent was categorized 
in the following sequence: 
i) Voluntary Participation and Freedom to Withdraw  
A major principle of research ethics is that participation must be voluntary. No one should be forced 
to participate. All participants must be aware that they are participating in the study and they should 
be informed of all consequences of the study (Rubin & Babbie, 2009). The Councillors and 
bureaucrats of eThekwini Municipality were informed on numerous occasions that participation in 
this study of corruption was voluntary.  This was further emphasized in the consent letter that they 
were required to sign. Councillors and bureaucrats were also made aware of their right to withdraw 
from the study at any point if they wished to do so (Appendix 3).  
ii) Anonymity and Confidentiality 
Corruption is a sensitive topic, in essence it is a crime that is being committed in the form of stealing. 
Thus, it was imperative that anonymity and confidentiality of the respondents were maintained. This 
was done to ensure the safety and privacy of each respondent. It was made known to all respondents 
that anonymity and confidentiality is of vital importance throughout this study. In the analysis 





Due to the secretive and complex nature of conducting a study on corruption, various challenges and 
limitations had to be overcome, in order to conduct a sound study.  
These limitations include: 
 Building trust with councillors and bureaucrats was a difficult task. The study 
involved identifying various councillors and bureaucrats to be interviewed on 
corruption. This was challenging due to political affiliations of some councillors and 
due to the lack of understanding about the research process. Many councillors refused 
to participate, due to fear for their lives. However, respondents who participated were 
continually assured of the anonymity and confidentiality of the study and by signing a 
consent form which was a signed agreement between respondent and researcher. 
Furthermore, the snowball technique adopted, allowed for a greater sample to be 
obtained. Due to the trust that was built during the interviews, many respondents 
provided assistance in referring the researcher to different councillors and bureaucrats 
who would be willing to participate. 
 Time constraints was an issue as some councillors and bureaucrats either postponed 
the interview or on several occasions forgot about the interview, even though 
reminders had been sent to them. This created a backlog in the interviewing process. 
However, the researcher adopted a resilient attitude and continued to reschedule 
interviews until the interview was conducted.  
 Issues of safety for the interviewer was a concern, as a young Indian female, going 
into the field, it was challenging. This was largely due to the fact that the majority of 
interviews were conducted in the Durban Central Business District (CBD). Some 
interviews were even conducted at Councillors‟ homes. Concern for security was 
overcome by establishing prior knowledge of the councillors and bureaucrats, and by 
proposing to meet in public places, which created a sense of safety. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter explained the methodology adopted in this study. It outlined the information on the data 
sources and sampling techniques that were employed. This study made use of in-depth interviews 
which, coupled with media analysis, the Manase Report, Auditor-General Reports and the Municipal 
Public Accounts Committee Agenda, allowed for a critical investigation into corruption in the public 
procurement sector. This study adopted a case study approach which allowed for an analysis of 
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corruption specifically in the eThekwini Municipality. Ethical clearance was obtained from the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal Research Committee to ensure that ethical principles were upheld 
throughout the duration of the study. The assessment of corruption levels is a difficult task, measuring 
corruption is almost impossible due to the illegality and secrecy that surrounds the topic (Pellegrini & 
Gerlagh, 2008). Various challenges and limitations had to be overcome. The main challenge was the 


























The aim of this study is to critically investigate corruption in the public procurement sector in local 
government with specific reference to the case of the eThekwini Municipality. This chapter provides 
the research findings of this study. Thematic analysis was used to analyse data collected from in-depth 
interviews conducted with councillors and bureaucrats from the eThekwini Municipality; data 
obtained from AG Reports; documents from councillors such as the 2015 MPAC Minutes and 
Agendas, newspaper articles and The Manase Report. Pseudonyms were used to protect anonymity of 
interviewers and quotations from interview transcripts have been edited for grammar, stutter words 
and clarity.  
This chapter has been divided into four sections. The first section discusses corruption in the 
eThekwini Municipality. The second section focuses on corruption in the SCM, especially how this 
has been manipulated for private gain.  The third section provides insight into the social, economic 
and political implications of corruption in the eThekwini Municipality. The fourth section discusses 
government adopted measures to curb corruption and the role the media and NGOs play in the fight 
against corruption.  
4.2 Corruption in eThekwini Municipality 
Corruption in South Africa has become endemic within municipalities and there is a view that it has 
reached a point of no return (Maharaj & Karodia, 2013). It hinders the functioning of an active 
democracy and the billions of Rand squandered deprive the poor of basic needs such as housing, 
health care, food, water and social security. Corruption has adversely affected the eThekwini 
Municipality, specifically in the Public Procurement Sector. Councillors, officials and bureaucrats 
alike, manipulate the tendering system, for the purposes of self-enrichment. The AG in several audit 









Table 4.1 AG Audit opinion of eThekwini Municipality from 2006-2014 
Year Audit Opinion 
2006-07 Financially Qualified (with other matters) 
2007-08 Financially Unqualified (with no other matters) 
2008-09 Financially unqualified (with other matters)  
2009-10 Unqualified with findings 
2010-11 Unqualified with findings 
2011-12 Unqualified with findings 
2012-13 Unqualified with findings 
2013-14 Unqualified with findings 
Source: AG Reports (2006 – 2014) 
The AG‟s reports highlight areas of concern which include issues pertaining to non-compliance with 
SCM policy; unauthorised, irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure; underspending and 
mismanagement of funds (Auditor-General, 2007/2008, 2008/2009, 2009/2010, 2010/2011, 
2011/2012, 2012/2013 and 2013/2014). All of this will be discussed further in detail in the subsequent 
sections of the analysis. The Manase Report also revealed many examples of corruption in the 
eThekwini Municipality. 
4.2.1 The Manase Report 
When the Manase Report was publicly released in June 2013 (after some public and political 
pressure), it revealed major monetary irregularities. It published names of councillors and officials 
who were seen as contravening the SCM legislation and the MFMA. It even made recommendations 
to address the transgressions highlighted in the Report. Initially the full 7000 page Report was not 
released and a summarised version was released for public view. Stolley (2013) noted that councillors 
who wanted to see the Report had to sign a confidentiality clause barring them from going public with 
any of its contents. It was divulged that anyone who wanted to view the Report had to make an 
application to the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) under 
the Promotion of Access to Information Act. Hence, opposition parties accused the government of 
wanting to keep the Manase Report under wraps (Stolley, 2013). However, in an article in the City 
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Press (2013) COGTA argued that the C ity needed more time to complete investigations and 
disciplinary procedures against councillors and staff and investigations could be jeopardised by 
making the full Report public.   
Furthermore, ANC councillors argued that witnesses cited in the Report needed to be protected and 
that the document also made reference to names of individuals that had to be verified prior to release 
in order to prevent court cases (ANC 1, 21 May 2015; ANC 2, 22 May 2015 and ANC 3, 3 June 
2015).  According to Mbuyazi (2012a) some councillors were worried that there might be legal 
consequences for the City if the Report was made public, given that implicated officials threatened to 
take action against the City. However, due to pressure from the media, lobby groups and political 
parties, through the Promotion of Accesses to Information Act, the Manase Report was released in 
2013. However, councillors from the opposition parties argued that the Report was disappointing, 
weak, watered down and essentially incomplete (DA 9, 28 May 2015 and IFP 1, 14 May 2015). 
According to Nair (2013) opposition parties felt that the Report was a "cover-up" and watered down. 
An additional concern was that the ANC had tampered with the Manase Report and that an edited 
version was released to the public (IFP 1, 14 May 2015; DA 1, 4 May 2015). However, in an article 
by the Daily News, Nomsa Dube (KwaZulu-Natal MEC for COGTA), denied that the report been 
“doctored, watered down or sanitised in any way” (Madlala, 2013: 1).  
The previous City Manager, Mike Sutcliffe, contended that foul play was evident with the Manase 
Report being released without him being able to see or respond to it. He further argued that the proper 
process of presenting the findings to whom the allegations were being made and the opportunity for 
them to state their responses had not been followed and that this invalidated the investigation (Teke, 
2012a). In a letter via his lawyer to Manase and Associates, Sutcliffe called for the firm to reopen the 
forensic probe and claimed that Manase had lifted the wrong information from the previous Ngubane 
Report, without conducting investigations of their own (Teke, 2012b). 
The Manase Report highlighted numerous instances of corruption and implicated many councillors 
and officials in corrupt activities. No eThekwini councillors have ever been punished as a result of the 
findings of a forensic audit report. Neither has any councillor been brought before the Municipality‟s 
ethics committee (Stolley, 2013). Subsequent sections in this chapter will draw from the Manase 
Report to illustrate examples of corruption. 
Corruption as a term has caused much confusion in eThekwini Municipality, in terms of what it 





4.2.2 The Corruption Conundrum 
It is evident from Chapter Two that there are different definitions and interpretations of corruption. 
Hence, a corruption conundrum arises in terms of what is considered as inappropriate, immoral and 
unethical. Councillors identified having difficulty in distinguishing what constitutes a corrupt act:  
When politicians take decisions that are blatantly wrong at a council 
or committee level we need to ask whether that actually constitutes 
corruption. We sit in a council meeting, like we did on the 3
rd
 April. 
We get told there is a recommendation. The Metro police are going 
to engage in sport and games. The recommendation is that the 
councillors from the community and emergency services will receive 
tracksuits and kits because they will join the team at the games and 
represent the Municipality. We did not have a problem with that as 
all the financials were stated in the report. We came to the council 
meeting, the ANC makes a recommendation that every single 
councillor now in the Municipality must get a tracksuit and kit. So 
now it‟s gone from about 20-25 Councillors getting kits to 206 
Councillors getting kits. Now you must remember when they are 
getting kits you are talking about Adidas or Reebok, name-brand 
stuff. A kit itself could cost about R3000, now multiply that by 206 
and you see what the financial implications are. So when you tell 
people you cannot pass that because it has financial implications, it‟s 
against the MFMA. you get dismissed as not knowing what you are 
talking about and the recommendation gets passed, even though you 
vote against it. Now that I would question whether that is a form of 
corruption. It is an angle that needs to be looked at. It‟s not 
mismanagement anymore (DA 1, 4 May 2015).  
Another conundrum is the difficulty in proving that there is corruption, which by its very nature is 
clandestine:  
There are things that cannot be see … sometimes it is very hard, 
because there are no bank transactions, because someone took a bag 
of money (ANC 4, 25 June 2015). 
Now the problem we have with corruption in eThekwini is that we 
hear a lot of stories … and as Councillors we get tip offs … But it‟s 
only once investigations begin that you can actually start proving 
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these things. Because the people doing the corruption are within the 
departments, they are handling the paperwork. They are the people 
that are able to cover it up again and unless somebody comes out 
with paperwork to prove these things or bank statements it is very 
difficult to prove (DA 1, 4 May 2015). 
Lots of rumours and no actual facts. People are clever and hide their 
tracks (DA 5, 7 May 2015).  
It‟s all about a cash business, so when they are giving the money to 
the Councillors and the Politicians, they are giving them cash in 
brown paper bags (DA 8, 19 May 2015).  
Corruption is a complex phenomenon. Blurred lines have developed in identifying what could be 
defined as corruption. The lack of concrete evidence and its elusive, secretive nature makes it difficult 
to expose corruption. Corruption in the eThekwini Municipality can be attributed to various causal 
factors and this will be discussed in the next section.  
4.2.3 Causes of Corruption 
Within the eThekwini Municipality, councillors and bureaucrats alike, share similar sentiments about 
the causes of corruption – greed, money, power and position:  
In eThekwini Municipality, greed is the cause of corruption … people 
tend to budget for more than what they earn (ANC 4, 25 June 2015).  
Greed, it has everything to do with money, in some cases it has to do 
with politics and sometimes with position and power… there are 
officials who are corrupt simply because they want to make more 
money. They are not satisfied with the salaries they earn and have 
found loopholes or a way to manipulate the system to make extra 
money (DA 1, 4 May 2015).  
 A bigger problem is that the ANC has got lots of power. So they are 
power drunk (IFP 1, 14 May 2015). 
Its universal cause, whether eThekwini Municipality, provincial 




Councillors and bureaucrats‟ abuse, and lack of knowledge, of legislation and the absence of 
transparency and accountability were also identified as factors contributing to corruption: 
I think that the primarily cause of corruption in eThekwini 
Municipality will be by and large the disregard of what is entailed in 
the Acts, most especially the MFMA (ANC 1, 21 May 2015). 
I would say that the causes of corruption would stem from the fact 
that we have proper policies in place like your MFMA, your Systems 
Act, they are all really sound policies and legislation. Corruption 
comes in when the legislation is not enforced … it is the people who 
have been appointed to follow these policies to ensure legislation is 
enacted properly who are the people abusing policies (DA 2, 4 May 
2015).  
There is this blurring of the administrative side and political side 
that‟s where the abuse comes … because the SCM is being 
manipulated for private gain (DA 3, 4 May 2015).  
The persisting problem in the Municipality is that while policies and laws have been established to 
maintain an efficient and transparent governance system, implementation and understanding of the 
legislation is weak, loopholes are exploited, and this contributes to malfeasance.  
Opposition parties identified the strength and hegemonic dominance of the ruling ANC party as the 
cause of corruption. Thus, the ANC is able to enforce unpopular decisions without public oversight, 
essentially creating an environment in which corruption can thrive:   
I would also suggest that when you have a huge majority running a 
city, when somebody that has 75% of the vote in the city they feel 
everything is their way. So they don‟t listen to anyone else. And they 
just do their own thing and just say sorry we are in charge (DA 4, 4 
May 2015).  
Major cause is the strength of the ANC in Durban ...  where you have 
the current situation where the ANC is 106 out of 205,  that is 51% 
and  they can do what they like (DA 5, 7 May 2015).   
However, in an article by The Citizen, ANC MP Bertha Mabe stated, “that government could not be 
blamed for the alarming high incidents of corruption, and that it had inherited corruption from the 
apartheid government" (Williams, 2015:1). Additionally, ANC MP Xoliswa Tom responded to the 
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accusations that the ANC is the cause of corruption. She stated, “cynicism, scoffs and sneers at the 
human efforts … it‟s important for us to stop and think because cynicism is a form of self-
righteousness … The ANC is committed to a corrupt free society” (Williams, 2015:1).  
ANC councillors also expressed concern about severe party political pressure to endorse or turn a 
blind eye to questionable decisions:   
Political pressure … is exerted on officials by politicians or the 
principals … let me make a scenario, you will find those that have a 
high position in the ANC will put more pressure on those at lower 
levels or would want officials to do things probably outside the 
boundaries or parameters of what is expected by the law (ANC 1, 21 
May 2015).  
I have a good relationship with some ANC councillors … majority of 
ANC councillors realise what is going on but the sad fact is they are 
threatened by senior people and that is the problem (DA 5, 7 May 
2015).  
I do think there are one or two deputy or city managers and one or 
two heads of the department that are not politically aligned. But they 
do come under severe pressure … people from administration are 
told what to do, in most cases for political expediency rather than 
administration (DA 1, 4 May 2015).  
This indicates how ANC councillors are subject to political pressure from senior members of the 
party, to witness or carry out acts that could be classified as malfeasance. More disturbing is the 
hierarchy that prevails in political parties, which hinders lower-ranking members from exposing 
individuals who are corrupt.  
According to respondents, other causes of corruption included passive citizens who fail to report 
corruption, lack of moral obligation, and those who appear to be indifferent to malfeasance:  
Then again I blame society, we have become immune to corruption 
… for example, if someone goes missing in our society, we don‟t 
know about it, unless people make a noise about it … Yet if someone 
goes missing in Paris or Sweden the entire country comes to a 
standstill … we have become desensitised. I blame society, ask not 
what your government can do for you, but what you can do for your 
government (DA 2, 4 May 2015).  
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People should report incidences … everyone is to blame … there 
should be an effort from everyone, basically if you talk about 
eThekwini municipality as citizens if you are aware or suspicious 
that something might be happening, do what you have to do to report 
it (Bureaucrat 1, 28 May 2015)  
ANC councillors expressed another view, that there was no corruption - it does not exist in the 
eThekwini Municipality. Rather, there is a perception that corruption is prevalent in Durban:  
I wouldn‟t say that the eThekwini Municipality is corrupt… the 
corruption is not rife, it‟s the manner they perceive, especially the 
people who are outside, when you are inside dealing with documents 
its different (ANC 2, 22 May 2015).  
If you speak about corruption without concrete evidence you are 
speaking of a perception … Sometimes it‟s how you view corruption 
… for argument sake if I‟m a Councillor and I do business with the 
government and I don‟t disclose it … maybe it may be termed as 
corruption … I would classify this as a breach of the Systems Act … 
but it can be quickly termed as corruption (ANC 3, 3 June 2015). 
At best, this can be regarded as a form of denialism. 
Due to the composite nature of corruption, various casual factors have been evident in the eThekwini 
Municipality. An area largely affected by corruption in the eThekwini Municipality is the public 
procurement sector, the focus of this study, and this will be discussed in the next section.   
4.3 Corruption in the Supply Chain Management in eThekwini Municipality  
Notwithstanding the protestations to the contrary, a sector in which corruption is rampant in the 
eThekwini Municipality is in the SCM. According to the AG Report (2013/2014) the irregular 
expenditure of eThekwini Municipality was R334, 8 million. A significant amount of expenditure was 
incurred without complying with the relevant SCM legislation and associated procedures.  
This section focuses on corruption in SCM in the eThekwini Municipality. It will analyse areas of 
concern and risks, illustrating how corruption has manifested itself in the SCM. More specifically, the 
focus will be on councillors and officials conducting business with the eThekwini Municipality; 
councillors and officials‟ incompetency and limited knowledge of policy; unauthorised, irregular and 
wasteful expenditure; abuse of Section 36; unfair procurement process; inadequate and inefficient 
contract management, and inadequate SCM controls.  
71 
 
4.3.1 Councillors and officials conducting business with the eThekwini Municipality 
Councillors and officials conducting business with the Municipality is an issue repetitively 
highlighted in SCM as an area of concern. SCM Regulation 44 prohibits awards to persons or entities 
whose directors, managers, principal shareholders or stakeholders are in the service of the state 
(Supply Chain Management Policy, 2005). SCM Regulation 13 (c) (i) and (ii) requires a provider to 
declare whether they are in the service of the state. Non-disclosure is tantamount to being corrupt, 
and, according to SCM Policy Regulation 38 this will result in the cancellation of the contract (Supply 
Chain Management Policy, 2005). These regulations have been contravened in eThekwini on several 
occasions as illustrated in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Contracts awarded to persons in the service of the state in eThekwini Municipality, 
South Africa (2009-2012) 
Year Awards Provider did not declare 
interest 
2009/2010 53 
(R 16 931 998) 
12 awards 
(R1 882 221) 
2010/2011 127 
(R39 240 000) 
127 
(R39 240 000) 
 
2011/2012 74 
(R77 440 000) 
74 
(R77 440 000) 
  Source: AG Reports (2009/2010, 2010/2011 and 2011/2012).  
Table 4.2 indicates the progressive increase in the contracts awarded to persons in the service of the 
state from the period 2009-2012. Another disturbing issue is that the number of contracts awarded and 
those who did not declare a conflict of interest was the same between 2010 and 2012. This was a 
violation of the MFMA in terms of which persons in the service of the state cannot conduct business 
with the Municipality. It is evident that the legislation is being flouted and the procurement sector is 
being manipulated for private gain in the eThekwini Municipality, and this was emphasised in the 
Manase Report.  
This blatant flouting of legislation in the eThekwini Municipality has serious implications for the 
procurement process. Not only does this nullify a fair and transparent process, but also reduces the 
ability of ordinary citizens in the eThekwini Municipality to bid for tenders and contracts. Those who 
control tenders are able to acquire wealth at the cost of the ordinary citizen and the public purse.  
 
Councillors conducting business with the Municipality were also an issue noted by the respondents:  
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We have two Councillors in Exco Committee, Stanley Xulu … who is 
our Chief Whip of eThekwini and Ndumiso Cele. Both of these people 
were found guilty of doing business with the municipality and when 
you‟re a councillor you are not meant to do it. So they would argue 
they were found guilty of doing business, while others would argue 
that they are corrupt. They should know as senior Councillors to not 
do business with the municipality (DA1, 4 May 2015).  
Our Chief Whip, he had a contract with the city for R8 million, he 
was fined R28 000 and in actual fact the law systems and structures 
says he should have been dismissed, but because of political 
cronyism, he is still there (DA 9, 28 May 2015).  
According to the Manase Report (2012) ten councillors were identified as having business interests 
with companies that conducted business with the eThekwini municipality (Table 4.3).   
Table 4.3 Councillors who conducted business with the eThekwini Municipality, South Africa 
Name of Councillor Name of Trading Entity Trading Period Total 
R 
Gabriel Mbongeni Cele Sxexasethu Contractors CC   2008 - 2010   177 860. 75 

















  2008- 2011 
 
  2008-2011 
 





  11 091 734.96 
 
  589 875.00 
 
  705 245.23 
 
  12 386 855.19 
Joice Nondumiso Cele Cuphiwe Trading Enterprise 
CC 
  2009-2011   251 872.74 
Bonke Armstrong Chili Yiphe Building 
Construction CC 
  2009-2011   531 522.00 
Sithembiso Gumede Namibia Construction CC 2008-2011   772 752.00 
Mduduzi Phineas 
Gumede 
Cupra 011 Trading CC 2011   35 728.50 
Themba Solomon 
Mtshali 
Solly Themba Trading CC 2009-2011   186 878.25 






  3 812 168.15 
  366 448. 50 




     19 395 309.08 
      Source: Manase Report (2012: 80) and Mbanjwa (2013b) 
 
The 10 Councillors referred to in Table 4.3 had contravened paragraph 6 of Schedule 1, Code of 
Conduct for Councillors of the Municipal Systems Act, No. 32 of 2000. Additionally, the Manase 
Team found no evidence to support the previous City Manager Mike Sutcliffe‟s  response to the AG 
of 5 November 2010, which stated that action would be taken against all councillors who have „not 
disclosed‟ and who have „disclosed but were still doing business with the Municipality‟. It was further 
highlighted that due care was not practised in the completion and submission of disclosure forms. A 
review revealed inconsistencies in the dating and appending signatures of disclosure forms (Manase 
Report, 2015).  
The purpose of this study is to critically assess corruption in the eThekwini Municipality and to 
analyse cases of corruption in the SCM. Two case studies of councillors doing business with the city, 
based on the largest amounts received as reflected on Table 4.3, will be examined in detail.   
Case Study 1: Councillor Stanley Zamokwakhe Xulu 
Councillor Xulu was appointed to office on 12 September 2000 (Manase Report, 2012). Igasasi 
Lolwandle Trading CC was registered on the 21 April 2006 of which Xulu was the sole member of 
the CC. The company Igasasi Lolwandle Foundation (Pty) Ltd was registered on the 27 March 2008 
and Xulu was also registered as the only director on that day. A review of Xulu‟s disclosure form 
showed that it was duly signed by him on the 5 November 2010. However, it was dated and signed by 
the Commissioner of Oaths on the 4 November 2010 (Manase Report, 2012). These documents were 
not signed and dated by the Deputy City Manager or City Manager and did not indicate the 
councillor‟s date of appointment. Xulu listed the companies under section 2 of the form titled, 
„Directorships and Partnerships‟. However, section 4 of the same form titled, „Remuneration work 
outside the Municipality‟ and section 5 titled, „Consultancies and Retainerships‟ had not been 
completed. The disclosure form was then date-stamped received on the 03/02/2011 by the eThekwini 
Performance Monitoring Evaluation Department.  
The application for registration of Igagasi Lolwandle Trading CC was signed by Xulu listing himself 
as the only shareholder with home address „House 528 Umgababa‟, the same address as the company. 
The application for registration of Igagasi Lolwandle Foundation CC was also signed by Xulu, 
making reference to Sfiso as a contact person and lists himself as the only shareholder with the home 
address of „House 528 Umgababa‟, the same home address as the company. In the application for 
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registration of Inkasa Development Primary Co-operatives; a third company Xulu was a shareholder 
of, he was listed as 20% shareholder of the company.  
According to the Manase Report (2012), Igagasi Lolwandle Trading CC was paid an amount of 
R11091 734.96 from the period July 2008 to June 2011. The majority of the payments related to 
services of the rehabilitation of council dwellings. Payments totalling R589 875 were made to Igagasi 
Lolwandle Foundation CC during a period from July 2008 to June 2011. A review of these payments 
indicated, Accounts Payable Department of eThekwini Water and Sanitation for services provided in 
terms of collection of refuse to Lovu C Section, Ward 97 and Ekhabazel, Enhlango, Protea and 
Gudlintaba areas, Ward 8. Payments of R705 245.23 over a period of July 2008 to June 2010 were 
made to Inkasa Development Primary Co-operative. A review of these disbursements indicated that 
payments were made through the Accounts Payable Department of eThekwini Water and Sanitation 
for services related to refuse collection in Kingsburg West A, and for the supply of labour for the 
installation of a 721m water pipe for the Bhekulwandle Project (Manase Report, 2012).  
The Manase Report (2012) notes two interviews conducted with Xulu in an attempt to ascertain his 
thoughts on payments received by his companies. In the first interview, he indicated that he was not 
aware that it was wrong to register the companies while he was a councillor and had done so in the 
event of him not being re-elected as a councillor, resulting in him not having an income. He further 
stated that he had no knowledge of the provisions of the MFMA and both companies had been duly 
declared and it was his understanding that if he declared his business interests, he could conduct 
business with the Municipality. When asked why he did not declare acquiring money from these 
companies on his disclosure form, he indicated he had left it blank as he did not understand how to fill 
in the form.  
Xulu also stated that in 2009 he had been cautioned by the previous Municipal Manager, Mike 
Sutcliffe, on his conducting business with the Municipality. He then went on to appoint an attorney to 
help him with resignation from Igagasi Lolwandle Trading which he sold to Ms. Ashika Ramcheret 
who was appointed as director around the 8 December 2010. Despite being warned by Sutcliffe in 
2009, Xulu continued to accrue financial benefits from Igagasi Lolwandle Trading until December 
2010. When questioned further on his involvement with Igagasi Lolwandle Foundation and the waste 
removal services conducted for the Municipality, Xulu stated that, despite being cautioned by the 
Municipal Manager, he continued to trade with the Municipality through this business. In the second 
interview conducted by the Manase team with Xulu, he stated that all three companies had stopped 
trading with the eThekwini Municipality in mid-2011. He also wrote a letter to SCM indicating that 
all three companies were in the process of ceasing to trade. However, he still holds interest in all three 
companies, but they „have resigned from Council‟. Currently, Xulu represents the ANC political party 
as Public Representative No.1 as the Chief Whip (Mbuyazi, 2012b). 
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Case Study 2: Councillor M Shezi 
 According to the Manase Report (2012), Councillor Shezi was appointed in June 2011. Through two 
companies, Chatsworth Cleaning Services Primary Co-operatives and Khethezakhe Trading Services 
CC, he received the sum of R4 178 616.65 from contracts with the Municipality from the period July 
2008 to June 2011. A disclosure form was signed by Shezi in the presence of a Commissioner of 
Oaths on 27 May 2011. He made one disclosure of an entity named Khethezakhe Trading CC under 
the heading “Name of Company Person” with the “Nature of Business” as cleaning services and the 
amount of remuneration indicted as R17 000.00. The company, Chatsworth Cleaning Services 
Primary Co-operative, was not indicated on the form which was signed by the City Manager on the 27 
May 2011. A review of the Application for Registration on the eThekwini Municipality Procurement 
Directory indicated Shezi having 100% interest in Khethezakhe Trading Services CC and a 20% 
interest in Chatsworth Cleaning Services Primary Co-operative. In an interview conducted with Shezi 
by Manase, it was relayed that he had previously been a member of the Chatsworth Cleaning Services 
Co-operative, but had resigned in mid-2011, when he became aware of the Code of Conduct. He 
further mentioned being a 60% shareholder in the company, Khethezakhe Trading Services CC, 
which was awarded a grass cutting contract through the Durban Solid Waste (DSW) Unit. He claims 
that the job is run by another member of the Company known as Veli, but the money from the 
contract is deposited into his bank account of which he takes a stipend of only R2000.00 per month, 
while the rest is given to Veli (Manase Report, 2011).  
From the two case studies discussed above, there are glaring issues that have been revealed in the case 
of councillors conducting business with the eThekwini Municipality. These include inconsistencies in 
the proper filling out of disclosure forms by the two councillors; forms being incomplete, and 
inaccurate information being captured. Furthermore, the inconsistency of required signatures from 
Deputy City Managers or the City Manager and the incompetency of the mentioned authorities in 
signing these documents even though they are either incomplete or inaccurate is also an issue. 
Another conspicuous issue is the repetitive lack of knowledge of the MFMA, Codes of Conduct and 
SCM policy. There also appeared to be a misconception that disclosure meant that councillors could 
conduct business with the Municipality. Most disconcerting is the failure of officials to identify 
councillors who are shareholders in companies doing business with the city:  
It begs the question in terms of our Supply Chain Management 
processes why did they not pick up that these companies are owned 
by these two prominent people (Councillors Xulu and Cele) (DA 1, 4 
May 2015).  
The Manase Report recommended that action should be instituted by the Council, in terms of 
paragraphs 13 and 14 of Schedule 1, Code of Conduct for Councillors of the Municipal Systems Act, 
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No. 32 of 2000, against all implicated councillors for contravening paragraph 6 of Schedule 1, Code of 
Conduct for Councillors of the Municipal Systems Act, No. 32 of 2000. However, following the 
release of the Manase Report, Council indicated that it would not suspend implicated employees or 
take disciplinary action recommended by the forensic auditors until it was clear as to the appropriate 
procedure to be followed. Additionally, the Report (Manase) had not found anyone guilty, and the 
different parties would be given a chance to state their side of the story (Mdletshe, 2012). However, 
two years after naming and shaming the councillors, the City had yet to take action against the 11 
ANC councillors who flouted the rules (Khoza, 2013). In response to the Manase Report and the 
public outrage, the Council established the Ethics Committee to address councillors‟ infringements 
and the appropriate sanctions (Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4 Action taken against councillors who had conducted business with the eThekwini 
Municipality, South Africa 
NAME VERDICT ACTION TAKEN 
Cllr Stanley Zamokwakhe Xulu Guilty A years‟ worth of salary 
(R195 002.22) 
Cllr Primrose Phumzile 
Hlengwa 
Guilty Six weeks salary 
Cllr Sezangakhona Shange  Guilty Four weeks of salary  
(R18 187.95) 
Cllr Nondumiso Joice Cele Guilty Two weeks salary 
(R8 248.19) 
Cllr Gabriel Mbongeni Cele Cleared No longer a Councillor 
Cllr Bonke Armstrong Chili Cleared  
Cllr Sithembiso Gumede Cleared Deceased 
Cllr Mduduzi Phineas Gumede Cleared  
Cllr Solomon Themba Mtshali Cleared  
Cllr Mthembeni Shezi Cleared Deceased 
Source: Daily News (2013) and Mbanjwa (2013b) 
Although action was taken against the guilty councillors (Table 4.4), there was a public outcry that 
they had seemed to get away lightly with a „slap on the wrist‟ (Nair, 2013) :  
Councillors found guilty of doing business with the municipality 
should have not got off lightly with just a fine and should rather have 
been removed from their positions as councils are empowered to do 
this … these sentences could be setting a wrong precedent. Are we 
saying (as a councillor) I can break the law and the only sanction I 
am going to get is a fine? (Khoza, 2013:1)  
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The Manase Report not only identified councillors engaging in corruption, but officials of the 
Municipality were also mired in malfeasance. This was reiterated in interviews with councillors who 
confirmed that some officials colluded with councillors for self-enrichment: 
 Also there is the collusion that is between officials and councillors 
(ANC 1, 21 May 2015)  
If I have to look at the officials that I work with, there are few in this 
city that I perceive to be honest and not corrupt (DA 1, 4 May).  
According to the AG‟s Management Report titled, “Consolidated Regularity Audit of eThekwini 
Municipality and its Municipal Entities for year ended 30 June 2010”, irregular expenditure was 
incurred due to the lack of compliance with applicable legislation, resulting in irregular expenditure.  
Contracts were awarded to people who were in the service of the state which is contrary to the 
Municipal SCM Regulation 44 (Manase Report, 2012). According to the AG‟s Report titled, 
“Specific focus areas, significant findings from the Audit of procurement and contract management, 
irregular expenditure: Awards to persons in service of the state”, a total of 46 awards to the value of 
R5, 496 million was made to entities whose directors/ members/ principal shareholders/stakeholders 
were in service of eThekwini Municipality (Manase Report, 2012). In order to ascertain whether a 
provider is in the service of the state, a declaration by the provider is needed. All of the 12 awards that 
went through the Bid Adjudication Committee (BAC) in 2010 did not declare their interests, 
contravening the Municipal SCM Regulation 13 (c) (i) and (ii).  
In a report from the Office of the Ombudsman to the City Manager, dated 15 May 2011, a complaint 
had been received by their office from the AG in which 45 companies were owned by council 
employees who were conducting business with the eThekwini Municipality (Manase Report, 2012). 
This was in contravention of Section 4(2) (a) (i) and (ii) and Section 5(1) of Schedule 2 of the 
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. Furthermore, the names of companies and employees were 
identified and disciplinary action was recommended. Through municipal correspondence it was then 
revealed that 38 council employees‟ names were submitted to the City‟s Legal Services for 
disciplinary proceedings. On 22 November 2011, a follow-up was conducted with the eThekwini 
Legal Department to ascertain the progress in the disciplinary proceedings of officials. The Legal 
Department redirected the Manase team to the Office of the Ombudsman who revealed the outcomes 





Table 4.5 Action taken against local government officials who had conducted business with the 
eThekwini Municipality, South Africa 
No Surname Initials Department Position Action 
1 Mkhwanazi DS Metro Police Senior Constable Final Written 
Warning 




3 Sosiba JM Metro Police Senior Constable Final Written 
Warning 




5 Mseleku AS Metro Police Senior Constable Final Written 
Warning 
6 Ngubane SD Metro Police Principal Clerk Final Written 
Warning 












10 Moloisane ZD Parks Small Plant 
Operator 
Matter to be 
rescheduled 




12 Sifumba AD Parks Food Supervisor Final Written 
Warning 
13 Madikizela ME Parks General Assistant Final Written 
Warning 
14 Duma MJ Parks General Assistant Final Written 
Warning 
15 Dlamini BH Parks Principal Clerk Final Written 
Warning 
16 Mngwengwe BY Parks General Assistant Final Written 
Warning 
17 Ngwenya CV Parks Pool Supervisor Final Written 
Warning 
18 Cele PZ Parks General Assistant Final Written 
Warning 
19 Narainsamy D Water and 
Sanitation 
Civil Engineer Final Written 
Warning 




Matter to be 
rescheduled 






22 Ndzoyiya ZS Housing Administrator Resigned 




24 Mphunyuka PP Housing Secretary Final Written 
Warning 
25 Mthembu TB Housing Senior Clerk Final Written 
Warning 
26 Gumede BE Electricity Principal Clerk Final Written 
Warning 




28 Linganisa MB Electricity Meter Reader Final Written 
Warning 
29 Nkophe M DSW General Assistant Final Written 
Warning 
30 Zondi CM DSW General Assistant Final Written 
Warning 
31 Sibeko SC HR Senior Clerk Final Written 
Warning 
32 Ngubo BR EMS Fire Fighter Final Written 
Warning 
33 Msomi LH SCM Stores Clerk Final Written 
Warning 
34 Mkhize C Safer Cities Clerk Final Written 
Warning 
35 Nxumalo ME Tourism Clerk Final Written 
Warning 




37 Mlungwana LM Treasury Administrator Final Written 
Warning 
38 Sikakane ZC Regional Centre Principal Clerk Final Written 
Warning 
Source: Manase Report (2012: 346-349) 
In addition to the previous 38 employees mentioned, the Office of the Ombudsman, through 
investigation, provided the Manase team with the names of eight officials, all of whom were also 






Table 4.6 Names and action taken against local government officials who had conducted 
business with the eThekwini Municipality, South Africa 
No Surname Initial Department Action 
1 Msimang V Health Final Written 
Warning 
2 Mjola SAL Housing Deceased 
3 Phewa SM Housing Dismissed 
4 Mthembu PG Engineering Dismissed 
5 Cele SM IS Dismissed 
6 Luthuli SH City Hall Dismissed 
7 Makhanya NC Parks Dismissed 
8 Ximba EV Business Support Dismissed 
Source: Manase Report (2012: 349-350) 
Apart from the officials implicated by the AG and the Ombudsman, a further 123 employees were 
identified by the Manase team as having conducted business with the Municipality. It was 
recommended in the Manase Report that similar action should be taken against the additional 123 
officials.  However, since the Manase Report, the Municipal Manager, Sibusiso Sithole, has argued 
that there has been a dramatic decline in the number of councillors and officials doing business with 
the Municipality. He contended that in 2009/2010 there were only six councillors conducting business 
with the state, and at the moment (2015), there were no councillors or officials doing business with 
the city (Khoza, 2015a).  
 It is evident that the SCM in the eThekwini Municipality is an area that is prone to corruption. 
Councillors and officials alike have flouted legislation in order to acquire monetary benefits. When 
dealing with corruption in the SCM, it is significant to note the determining factors of these corrupt 
occurrences. Councillors and officials lack of knowledge of policy and legislation, and the 
incompetency they exhibit, are ideal conditions for corruption to manifest. 
4.3.2 Councillors and Officials‟ incompetency and limited knowledge of legislation  
According to the AG‟s Reports (2009/2010, 2010/2011, 2011/2012, 2012/2013 and 2013/2014) the 
MFMA requires officials to meet prescribed competency levels in financial management and SCM. 
However, a number of chief officers and heads of the SCM Unit fail to meet the minimum 
qualification and competency requirements, but are appointed in high positions.  
There were suggestions that some councillors and officials in eThekwini Municipality were not very 
competent, stemming from their failure to carry out their duties. One reason for some councillors 
being incompetent was due to their lack of education and training. According to Mbanjwa (2008) one 
in three municipal councillors cannot read or write, and more lack basic competencies to understand 
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local government finances. Some are embarrassed to admit they do not understand English and are 
therefore unable to follow council proceedings or training sessions. On average, only half of local 
government politicians have a post-matriculation qualification. SALGA noted that 32% of councillors 
required ABET training. Without such basic skills (reading and writing) councillors may not be able 
to fully develop their abilities and contribute optimally to council activities (Mbanjwa, 2008).   
The inability to understand the complexity of local government hinders councillors‟ and officials‟ 
capability to function at their full capacity, leading to inadequate services being provided to citizens. 
Councillors in the eThekwini Municipality find it difficult to understand the complexities of a local 
government system: 
 The local government is very complex … If you come into the 
municipality and if you don‟t have an education, it‟s very difficult for 
you… Have you seen Schedule 1 … A master‟s student can 
understand but I can guarantee you if I give an undergrad, they 
cannot understand the things in there … imagine an ordinary aunt or 
uncle that gets elected in a ward to come inside here with very 
limited education (ANC 3, 3 June 2015) 
We are given financial reports … a thick stack of documents for us to 
read. Who‟s going to read that, we never read that because we don‟t 
understand the way it is prepared (DA 8, 19 May 2015) 
A related issue is the limited of knowledge of legislation by officials and councillors of the eThekwini 
Municipality, more specifically that of SCM and MFMA. According to Mbanjwa (2008:1) “More 
than two-thirds of councillors, including those who serve on mayoral committees, don‟t understand 
their roles, their responsibilities or local government legislation”. Due to the lack of knowledge, 
councillors and officials contravene legislation, which can be viewed as an act of corruption. This was 
highlighted in the Manase Report (2012) in which many councillors contended that they were 
unaware that trading with the Municipality was against the legislation. Many who were found guilty 
indicated that they were under the impression that disclosure allowed them to continue to conduct 
business with the Municipality. Some councillors stated that they did not have a clear knowledge or 
understanding of the provisions of the MFMA and the code of conduct:  
As I sit on a committee called MPAC, each and every time we 
interview the head of department you will find out our workers are 
not well equipped with our policies especially SCM and MFMA ... 
there is poor performance in SCM policies (ANC 2, 22 May 2015).  
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The one thing that‟s put across is that when the issue of disclosure of 
interest was explained to them … in a manner that was not clear cut, 
in terms of a breach of conduct. You can have a company and 
disclose but the issue of if you have disclosed can you trade … but it 
then depends on an interpretation (ANC 3, 3 June 2015). 
Another area that has been noted as a concern in SCM is the unauthorised, irregular and wasteful 
expenditure.  
4.3.3 Unauthorised, irregular and wasteful expenditure 
An area that has constantly been noted in AG‟s Reports (2009/2010, 2010/2011, 2011/2012, 
2012/2013 and 2013/2014) is the issue of unauthorised, irregular and wasteful expenditure. There are 
clear distinctions between these three terms (AG Report, 2012/2013). Unauthorised expenditure refers 
to spending that was not incurred in accordance with the approved budget. Irregular expenditure refers 
to a deviation from expenditure prescribed by legislation. Fruitless and wasteful expenditure refers to 
costs that were incurred in vain and, which could have been prevented, if there had been reasonable 
due diligence. In eThekwini, there have been serious concerns about unauthorised, irregular and 
wasteful expenditure, largely due to the failure of the political and bureaucratic leadership to enforce 
the necessary supply management regulations (AG, 2008/2009). Hundreds of millions of Rands of 
public funds have been squandered, which impacts directly on the Municipality‟s ability to provide 
efficient and effective service delivery to its citizens, especially the poor. According to the AG, the 
irregular expenditure in the eThekwini Municipality for the Financial Year 2013-2014 was R334,8 
Million (AG Report, 2013/2014).  
Respondents contended that there is no oversight or accountability within the Municipality over 
money spent, resulting in legislation being flouted and money being misused.  Some examples 
included: 
Typical example, the Fire Department show in Germany, two firemen 
had been chosen to go and participate in the fire department contest. 
Now they sent two councillors, what are the councillors going to do 
there… They go for a free ride, first class, all from the ANC … When 
I was in the economic and development committee, they sent a 
councillor to China who came back and gave no report on what 
transpired (DA 8, 19 May 2015).  
There were 400 security guards that were employed in the city, the 
initial process was for only 40 to be employed … no one authorised 
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the employment of those 400.  No one from the department was 
owning up to the authorisation … they said it was mentioned in a 
presentation. But the municipality was compelled to pay those people 
because they provided the services. But we did not procure for those 
services, how could we pay? Can somebody come to your house with 
the cooked food and ask you to pay because the service has been 
provided? (ANC 4, 25 June 2015). 
The Manase Report also recorded various instances of unauthorised, irregular and wasteful 
expenditure. It is important to note that the Manase Report was initiated after the AG Report 
(2009/2010) stated that the eThekwini Municipality had irregularly spent R532 million. One example 
from the Manase Report that will be used to exemplify unauthorised, irregular and wasteful 
expenditure is the allegation of duplicate payments and irregular, upfront payment to Dimension Data. 
It was alleged that a duplicate payment of R2 million was made to Dimension Data and that it 
received an upfront payment on a contract that required payments to be made on a month-to-month 
basis in relation to the services provided (Manase Report, 2012). 
These allegations were made by a former employee of the eThekwini Municipality, Mr Pragasen 
Govender, who in an affidavit stated that in his second month of employment in the Municipality a 
payment of R2 million was signed off and paid to Dimension Data KZN by Ms. Subban, the former 
head of Geographic Information and Policy Office (GIPO)  (Mbanjwa, 2013a). This payment was a 
duplicate payment and he requested Dimension Data to return the overpaid R2 million through the 
accounting department of GIPO. In his affidavit, Govender alleged that Maroshnee Craig, a senior 
Administration Clerk of GIPO, noted that Dimension Data had been paid an amount of R15 million in 
September 2009 (Mbanjwa, 2013a). This was authorised by the City Manager, City Treasurer and 
Subban, for a month-to-month maintenance contract that began on the 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2011. 
This payment was irregular and a breach of the SCM regulations. Additionally, Govender alleged that 
the City Manager and Subban placed the eThekwini IT network at risk by enabling Dimension Data to 
solely control the data network by awarding exclusive Section 36 tenders to Dimension Data and H20 
Networks South Africa (Manase Report, 2012).  
The Manase Team found that a duplicate payment of R2 629 750, 86 was made to Dimension Data on 
10 September 2008, after a similar amount had been paid on the 2 September 2008. The duplicate 
payment was recovered by credit note issued by Dimension Data, and received by the eThekwini 
Municipality on the 18 March 2009 (Manase Report, 2012). However, the allegation of irregular 
upfront payment to Dimension Data was found to have no merit. Disciplinary action was 
recommended against Subban on a charge of negligence, in three instances. First, for her approval for 
the second payment to Dimension Data within nine days of approval of the first payment for the same 
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service. Second, her failure to show the due care that is expected of a person in her position in 
reference to when she endorsed the credit note from Dimension Data as “Approved for payment”, and  
third, for not immediately recovering the overpayment to Dimension Data when it was initially 
brought to her attention (Manase Report, 2012).  
Following the release of the Manase Report, internal disciplinary charges were brought against 
Subban for the offences revealed in the Manase Report (Mbonambi, 2012). However, in an article by 
The Mercury, it was reported that Subban was still employed by the Municipality and continued to 
receive a salary despite the Minister of Police, Nathi Nhleko, reporting to the National Assembly that 
Subban was no longer employed by the Municipality.  
 Since 2012, the City has faced a lawsuit of unfair dismissal from the former deputy IT head, Mr 
Govender (Manda, 2015a).  He claims that he was fired in 2010 on the basis of what he claims to be 
fabricated charges after he reported irregularities and corruption within the IT department in 2008 and 
2009. Among these irregularities was the duplicate payment of R2, 6 million made to Dimension 
Data. He accused Subban of being the mastermind behind his dismissal and claimed he had been 
victimised for blowing the whistle on irregularities in the IT department (Mbanjwa, 2013a). In this 
ongoing case Govender seeks to be reinstated and paid the equivalent of his annual pay of about R400 
000 for two years (Barbeau, 2013) as well as suing his ex-bosses for R50 million (Manda, 2015a).  
Even after the release of the Manase Report, irregular expenditure, fruitless and wasteful expenditure 
are still issues that are prominent in the eThekwini Municipality due to the lack of adherence to 
MFMA and SCM policy. Another issue relating to irregular expenditure is the improper regularisation 
of irregular expenditure.  
4.3.5 Abuse of Section 36 
Section 36 1 (a) of the SCM policy makes provision for an emergency where a municipality cannot 
wait 75 days for „essential services‟, for example, emergencies relating to natural disasters. 
Additionally, it accommodates situations in which services are only available from one single 
provider (Supply Chain Management Policy, 2005). However, there has been a blatant abuse in the 
eThekwini Municipality of this legislation, which can be attributed to various reasons such as 
cronyism, self-enrichment and poor planning. Former city manager, Sutcliffe, argued that, since 
Sithole‟s take-over as City Manager, the value of Section 36 contracts had increased fourfold. In the 
2010/2011 Financial Year, authorisation of Section 36 contracts totalled R469 million.  In the 
2011/2012 Financial Year, this escalated to R1.1 billion and in the 2013/2014 Financial Year a total 
of R1.8 billion was spent on Section 36 contracts (Mbanjwa, 2013b).  
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Abuse of Section 36 (1) (a) was repeatedly mentioned in interviews as a problem faced in the SCM. 
Councillors indicated numerous occasions when Section 36 was used to justify awarding of a contract, 
even though it was being used in the wrong context: 
There is a lot of speculation of corruption happening at a supply 
chain management level. We see examples where things might be 
going wrong. Certain companies are given housing contracts. Time 
and time again  they give these contracts on what is known as Section 
36 contracts … and the same company will get it again and again 
and in fact that the company has about R2 to 3 billion worth of 
housing contracts in the past 2-3 financial years from the 
Municipality (DA 1, 4 May 2015).  
 Even if you look at the number of tenders given under section 36 
because that is the section that has been utilised or has been 
perceived to be utilised by most of the people implicated by 
corruption. This is because in terms of giving tenders with Section 
36, we don‟t have to go through all the processes, we just give a 
person a tender and say its justified by saying, no it was an 
emergency (ANC 1, 21 May 2015).  
 I raised my concerns with section 36, I‟m aware there‟s a bit of 
reduction on the use of Section 36 … Section 36 is legally a part of 
legislation, its law, it‟s not a crime, but the way it is implemented is 
the problem (Bureaucrat 1, 28 May 2015).  
The Manase Report highlights numerous examples of the abuse of Section 36 in the eThekwini 
Municipality and a deviation away from the prescribed tender processes to ensure that certain 
companies or individuals acquire lucrative contracts from the Municipality. In some instances, the 
companies that acquire these contracts are ill-equipped to handle the task on hand, leading to poor 
workmanship and an inadequate service delivery to citizens. One example from the Manase Report is 
the case of Section 36 contracts awarded to H20 Networks.  
On the 8 January 2009, GIPO prepared a report to the BAC to get approval for the appointment of 
H20 Networks South Africa. This is a company which specialises in putting fibre-optic cables in 
sewers to create high-speed broadband networks. H20 Networks was noted as the only South African 
supplier of this technology and was awarded a contract through Section 36. A pilot project for the 
laying of these cables over a distance of 1, 25 km at a cost of R282 459. 57 was awarded to H20 based 
on a quote from that company which was dated 12 December 2008 (Manase Report, 2012).  
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The apparent reason for the use of Section 36 was that H20 networks South Africa was the only 
company that could provide this solution. The document was signed on behalf of GIPO by former 
City Manager, Sutcliffe, and it stated that document queries were to be referred to Ms. Subban, the 
former head of GIPO. The quote from H20 was for R293 575, instead of R282 459.57 (Manase 
Report, 2012). On the 7 October 2009, GIPO prepared a report to BAC indicating that the Pilot 
Project should be extended so that the Municipality could consider a greater adoption of the 
technology. This was also carried out through Section 36, as was the quote given by H20 Networks 
South Africa for installation of 129 km of cables, which was for R24 015 728, excluding VAT. Even 
though funds had not been allocated for this expenditure in the 2009/2010 Financial Year, the savings 
would be highlighted and an Adjustment Budget would be made to meet this expenditure. Mr 
Petersen, the Deputy Head of SCM accepted H20‟s proposal on the 11 November 2009 (Manase 
Report, 2012).  
The prima facie evidence showed that two Section 36 awards made by Ms. Subban were irregular and 
did not comply with the requirements of the SCM policies of the eThekwini Municipality. The first 
award of R293 572 was irregular as it was awarded on the 30 January 2009 when H20 Networks 
South Africa did not have a valid tax certificate which they only acquired on 30 June 2009. 
Furthermore, Ray Dhavraj, a former employee of GIPO, who had previously reported directly to 
Subban was involved in the management of H20 Networks South Africa. The pilot project was 
awarded to H20 Networks South Africa, only eight months after Dhavraj had resigned from the 
Municipality. At the time of the award of the Section 36, H20 Networks South Africa was not even a 
registered supplier on the database (Manase Report, 2012). The second contract for the amount of 
R27 377 932 was found to be irregular as the vendor enjoyed undue preference, due to the contract 
being drafted by H20 Networks South Africa. Additionally, on the 22 January 2010, H20 Networks 
South Africa was paid in advance an amount of R15 977 929.92 for the project (Manase Report, 
2012).  
The City Manager, Sbu Sithole, subsequently argued that new procedures had been introduced to 
reduce abuse of Section 36. For example, Section 36 applications had to be approved in principle by 
Executive Committee (EXCO) before being submitted to the BAC (Mbanjwa, 2013b). Additionally, 
in an interview by the Daily News, the chairperson of the Finance and Procurement Committee, 
Fawzia Peer, stated that her Committee was doing everything in its power to address the abuse of 
Section 36 (Teke, 2013). For example, the committee was monitoring all Section 36 contracts on a 
monthly basis. Councillors also supported the use of EXCO and the Finance and Procurement 
Committee as screening agents of Section 36 contracts:  
Section 36 is law … People tend to abuse Section 36, because it was 
meant to address situations of real emergencies … but also the 
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municipality has now since agreed that all the cases of Section 36 
must go via EXCO for approval ... Hence, there has been a decrease 
in amount of tenders … (ANC 1, 21 May 2015).   
In terms of Section 36, we have called for a budget plan on the 
project … if we find poor planning then someone needs to be held 
accountable in this case the heads of department … we will be 
looking at their bonuses … Because we can‟t use Section 36 for poor 
planning ... so we are targeting the heads of department, the DCM 
and the City Manager to be charged … they will have zero bonuses 
… we will sample some Section 36 applications, we will be calling 
some departments to Council, come and explain this Section 36 ... If 
people lose money out of this then they will definitely change their 
behaviour (ANC 4, 25 June 2015).  
A SCM report presented to the Finance and Procurement Committee on 23 July 2015 however 
revealed that the City had awarded more than R36 million in contracts in June alone, without any 
public tender (Rondganger, 2015). City Treasurer Krish Kumar argued, however, that the awarding of 
Section 36 contracts has been reduced in recent years due to stricter measures (Rondganger, 2015).  In 
an article by the Daily News, the Chairwoman of the Finance and Procurement Committee, Fawzia 
Peer, noted the different measures instituted to crack down on the abuse of Section 36. She claimed 
that her committee monitors all Section 36 awards on a monthly basis, as well as all other tender 
awards. Furthermore, they had introduced a quote management system to facilitate e-procurement to 
allow for an accountable and transparent SCM process (Teke, 2013). Nevertheless, in an article by 
Noseweek it was reported that in the last financial year (2014/2015), the City used Section 36 no 
fewer than 869 times, but only on 23 occasions did the header actually read „emergency‟ (Hamilton, 
2016).  
Section 36(1) (b) has also been manipulated and has caused the improper regularisation of irregular 
expenditure in the eThekwini Municipality. According to the SCM Policy (2005) Section 36 (1) (b) 
indicates that an accounting officer may ratify any minor breaches of the procurement processes by an 
official or committee acting in terms of delegated power or duties which are solely of a technical 
nature. Additionally, the accounting officer must record the reasons for the deviation and report it to 
the next meeting of Council. However this section is being abused since major deviations of a non-
technical nature are being regularised and are not reported to Council:  
One thing that annoyed me, I raised it yesterday in a meeting. 
Section 36 (1) (b), you can deviate. The city manager can regularise 
the irregular expenditure of a technical nature or a minor deviation. 
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Now they regularise any amount and they quote that section (ANC 4, 
25 June 2015).  
An example that can be utilised to depict this abuse of legislation is the retrospective regularisation of 
irregular expenditure raised by the AG in his audit report on the 2009/2010 financial statements. 
According to the Manase Report (2012) the regulatory audit conducted by the AG showed numerous 
irregularities, all of which were relayed to the former Accounting Officer and City Manager, Sutcliffe. 
The Report stated that the irregular expenditure totalling R532 576 million (2009/2010) was as a 
result of contracts awarded to suppliers that were in contravention of the SCM regulations. The 
Manase team obtained the documents produced by the BAC for the approval of the retrospective 
regularisation of irregular expenditure for the Year ending June 2010. The AG report found that there 
was material non-compliance with SCM policy in terms of Section 36(2) of the MFMA, in that the 
deviations from the procurement process had not been reported to Council (Manase Report, 2012).  
Another instance of abuse of Section 36 1(b) was noted at the eThekwini Finance and Procurement 
meeting on the 19 June 2013, where the DA voted against the regularisation of irregular expenditure. 
According to Crouch (2013) the irregular expenditure was not a situation where someone had made a 
mistake, but was a deliberate act of fraud by municipal employees illegally conducting business with 
the city. The amounts involved ranged from R251 by a Senior Civil Engineering Technologies 
employee to R15 751 414 by the Manager of Race and Gender, which can hardly be described as a 
minor deviation. However, the recommendation to regularise such crooked expenditure was approved 
due to the ANC‟s majority vote (Crouch, 2013).  
Section 36 has been abused repeatedly and has led to various instances of corruption. However, the 
contravention of legislation also leads to an unfair procurement process and this will be discussed in 
the next section.  
4.3.7 Unfair Procurement Process 
An area that has been largely problematic in the SCM is the unfair procurement process. The AG 
Report (2010/2011) states that the principles of contracting goods and services in a manner that is fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective is enshrined in the South African constitution. 
Legislation such as the SCM and MFMA outline the processes that need to be followed to ensure that 
these principles are followed. Additionally, the Preferential Procurement Framework (PPF) takes into 
consideration previously disadvantaged communities and allows for affirmative remedies. However, 
the use of Section 36 has led to an uncompetitive procurement process, which appears to favour 
politically connected cronies. 
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According to the AG Reports (2009/2010, 2010/2011, 2011/2012, 2012/2013, 2013/2014) the 
eThekwini Municipality has an unfair procurement process.  These include not obtaining three price 
quotations, not listing accredited prospective providers, inadequate administration of providers, 
competitive bids not being invited, preferential points not applied, and inadequate public invitations to 
tender. All of these factors contravene the SCM policy and the MFMA, creating a tendering process 
which is unfair and uncompetitive.  
A number of similar issues were also highlighted by respondents who complained that tenders and 
contracts were not advertised in the public arena: 
The municipality will say we want quotes … they will not even put 
out an advert they will just get quotes from three people …  people 
say contracts are not advertised properly and are going to cronies, 
connections of Councillors or people who work in SCM (DA 1, 4 
May 2015).  
This lack of advertising can be illustrated by an example from the minutes from the MPAC meeting 
held on the 12 February 2015. At this meeting the head of the Community Participation and Action 
Support Unit, Mr. Cebekulu, indicated that due to delays in the finalisation of dates for the budget 
hearings, the Unit had failed to comply with SCM regulations. Only one quote had been obtained for 
catering (MPAC Minutes, 2015), however it had not been advertised, as per the SCM policy. Mr. 
Cebekulu further assured the committee that measures had been instituted to prevent the recurrence of 
such an irregularity. It was resolved at the meeting that the explanation provided by Cebekulu in 
relation to the irregular expenditure by the Community Participation and Action Support Unit in 
2013/2014 be noted, on the basis that Mr Cebekulu and the City Manager would formulate a strategy 
for procuring marquees and associated services for budget hearings in a way that was compliant with 
legislation (MPAC Minutes, 2015).  
Another issue that was highlighted by respondents as problematic was the manner in which contracts 
were awarded. In terms of Standard Operating Procedures (2013) the Municipality shall only award a 
contract where it represents Best Value. Furthermore, a contract shall only be awarded using the 
tender evaluation criteria; price, quality and preference. However, due to incompetency, political 
interference, cronyism and deliberate neglect, officials do not research companies before they award 
tenders. Hence, whether the company has the necessary resources such as equipment and the skills to 
successfully complete the project is largely unknown. Often a contractor‟s lack of skill results in 
incomplete projects and poor service delivery:  
Our tendering process at the moment gives the company or person 
who is most responsive. Now that‟s the key word, because it‟s got to 
90 
 
do with money and not ability. You could form a company, came in 
cheaper on a R5 million contract and get the job, and you may not 
have built a road in your life before but you got a tender to do a road 
and this is why our contracts keep failing … I‟ve had numerous 
contractors coming to my ward to do the simplest things and they 
walk off site or run out of money or they just can‟t finish the job (DA 
1, 4 May 2015).  
Another problem identified by interviewees is the awarding of tenders to specific companies by 
officials before the contract is even discussed by the BAC. This occurs due to the kickbacks which are 
difficult to prove unless there is a lifestyle audit of officials. Contractors thus inflate charges and costs 
knowing that the tender award is guaranteed, leading to an inevitable increase in the cost of services 
and products to citizens:  
If I may make an example, where you may procure the goods to a 
preferred bidder, as opposed to going to public tender process … 
and you actual assure him or her is going to get the job. Definitely he 
will put a lot of fat in that tender, if the tender is R30 million, he may 
tender with R70 million, so you have to get your cut. Also triple their 
interest or profit … So if the electricity pole costs R1000 per pole, in 
this kind of situation the municipality might pay R4000 per pole. It 
cripples the finances of the city (ANC 4, 25 June 2015). 
 It‟s sad, sad reality, the people really suffer because instead of 
paying for R20 for a phone we are paying R200 … The other day, the 
NFP guy raised an issue about the JoJo tank. We are paying about 
R10 000 ... It is concerning because the JoJo tank cost is R4000, why 
we paying R10 000 and they never had an answer for him … prices 
are inflated … because they got to give the kickback and that robs the 
poor people of service delivery (DA 8, 19 May 2015).  
Corruption in the eThekwini Municipality and specifically in the tender process has hindered the 
ability to have a fair and transparent tender process. It has resulted in situations where many 
businesses refuse to tender for projects because they know that the award has been predetermined. 





4.3.8 Inadequate and inefficient contract management 
Contract management refers to how tenders are managed after they have been awarded. The AG 
Report (2013/2014) indicates that shortcomings in contract management result in delays and fruitless 
and wasteful expenditure. Inadequate and inefficient contract management manifests itself in the SCM 
process in numerous ways. These include contract amendments, extensions or renewals without 
approval to avoid the competitive bidding process (AG Report, 2009/2010) inadequate contract 
performance measures and monitoring, performance of contractors not being evaluated on a monthly 
basis, and payments made in excess of approved contract price, with further approved extensions (AG 
Report, 2011/2012). Usually, Section 36 is used to renew these contracts.  
Inadequate and inefficient contract management was highlighted by interviewed councillors as an area 
of concern:  
[Sigh] the tendering process is without a doubt flawed, whereas it 
looks good on paper. The application of the tendering process is a 
problem, the fact that we have so many appeals to tenders that are 
given out … we keep on renewing the current service providers (DA 
1, 4 May 2015).  
For example if we need chemicals, for the next week and if you don‟t 
… no one will get water. So in a senior position what do you do, 
definitely you will allow for Section 36 … I said to council, there 
should be consequences for poor planning (ANC 4, 25 June 2015).   
The system is lax. Let‟s assume I give you an IT contract to maintain 
our system. I give it to you for two years. Surely to goodness, six  
months or a year before the contract is to be terminated there must 
be some system on our computer that flags and says the contract is 
due to expire in December. We must start doing the paper work to 
get a new contract, six months before awarding and put out the paper 
work for new contract … it doesn‟t prevent you from reapplying but 
on 31 December when your contract comes to an end we have a new 
person to step in effortlessly into the job. But they wait, to the very 
last minute and there is a mad rush now we can never get it done and 
then they say  let‟s use  Section 36 … that is joke and a very very 




Councillors also identified sub-contracting as a means of tender abuse and exploitation. The main 
contractors sub-contract the work awarded to them by the eThekwini Municipality. The sub-
contractors are paid a pittance and are forced to cut corners and produce shoddy work. This form of 
malpractice occurs because there is a lack of monitoring of contractors being hired by the eThekwini 
Municipality: 
It‟s like when you have any tender for a project, the main contractor 
gets a lot of money and those that are subcontracting get peanuts and 
you will find that it is not even easy to complete the job (ANC 2, 22 
May 2015).  
People tender for jobs, they have no skill whatsoever, because they 
have the right classing structure and BEE credentials, they get the 
contract. The moment they do they subcontract … happens mainly 
with Indian subcontractors … some black guy gets the job … he 
phones his Indian pal and says, „Rajesh, I have a job for you‟. Guy 
says thank you very much, the contract is worth R4 million, you put 
R1 million in your pocket and you do it for me … (DA 9, 28 May 
2015).  
An area neglected in the tendering process was the sub-division of contracts. This refers to larger 
contracts being divided among smaller emerging contractors who otherwise would not have the 
capacity to tender for a project. It can lead to the creation of more jobs and smaller sub-contractors 
can acquire more experience and expertise. However, this process is unpopular in certain projects 
such as building of roads or building of a hospital, as it is hard to monitor a project if sub-division 
takes place:  
Depends on the nature of the project … you can be able to subdivide, 
for example, maybe a senior citizens function, the various things can 
be subdivided … but in the case of maybe roads or central structures 
being built, it‟s definitely hard to subdivide … it‟s better for it to be 
monitored at a central level by the main contractor (ANC 4, 25 June 
2015).  
A popular company got a tender of R300 million. My question is why 
we gave that one company a tender of R300 million why don‟t you 
slice the cake for 10 companies. Because there are so many people 
who are tendering in eThekwini (IFP 1, 14 May 2015).  
93 
 
Even if it‟s a huge contract and if you get 200 bidders, subdivide that 
contract into 200 ways and give everybody a portion of that pie to 
eat. Everybody gets a fair share. So we will be giving people 
employment from different walks of life and giving other people the 
opportunity to grow big as well (DA 8, 19 May 2015).  
Inadequate and inefficient contract management has become a grave stumbling-block in the SCM 
department. The failure to adequately monitor contracts the CSity has awarded has led to countless 
renewals to the same contractors, hindering the competitive bidding process and denying 
opportunities for new entrepreneurs. Additionally, the failure to conduct follow-ups on contracts and 
monitor projects on site has led to poor workmanship, and, ultimately, poor service delivery. 
However, inadequate contract management can largely be attributed to the weak SCM controls.  
 4.3.9 Inadequate SCM controls 
Inadequate SCM controls is one of the contributing factors to corruption. It creates loopholes for the 
abuse of SCM legislation and the MFMA. The AG‟s Reports (2009/2010, 2010/2011 and 2011/2012) 
note inadequate SCM controls as a concern in the eThekwini Municipality.  Inadequate controls in the 
SCM manifests itself in numerous ways in the eThekwini Municipality (see Table 4.7).   
Table 4.7 AG findings on SCM controls for eThekwini Municipality (2010/2011) 
FINDING DETAIL 
Inadequate controls to ensure interest is declared Controls inadequate to ensure: 
 Officials declare whether they or their 
close family members, partners and 
associates have interests in suppliers. 
 Suppliers declare any connections to 
persons in service of the state or other 
state institutions. 
 
Inadequate controls for vendor acceptance and 
maintenance 
Controls inadequate to ensure: 
 Only vendors meeting the acceptance 
criteria of the municipality are added to 
its database. 
 That the vendor database is updated 
frequently to include only those who still 
meet the acceptance criteria. 
Inadequate separation of duties in procurement  Separation of duties relates to the 
dividing of the responsibility for 
authorisation, recording and custody 
among employees. There was inadequate 
segregation of duties in procurement.  
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Other controls  No controls to monitor performance of 
contractors 
 SCM officials not adequately trained 
 Register of bids received on time not 
published on website 
 No SCM policy 
 Source: AG Report (2010/2011: 50)    
The Manase Report identified multiple examples of inadequate SCM controls in the eThekwini 
Municipality. It demonstrated how lax implementation and pure disregard for SCM policy by officials 
allows for the contravention of SCM legislation and the MFMA. A good example would be the case 
of Councillor Senzangakhona Shange who was found guilty of doing business with the municipality 
through the company, Khetha Thina Trading 16 cc.  An amount of R873 223 was paid to this 
company by the eThekwini Municipality (Manase Report, 2012).  
The Manase team held an interview with Councillor Shange on the 25 July 2011, he revealed that he 
had been a councillor for Ward 95 for 10 years and had some understanding of the code of conduct. 
He further indicated that he was under the impression that disclosing his company would allow him to 
continue trading with the Municipality. Furthermore, in a sworn affidavit, he stated that the company 
had been registered by his girlfriend, and that he received monthly cash payments of R2000 from her. 
The last payment was received during May 2011 (Manase Report, 2012).  
Another shortcoming relating to SCM controls is the lack of multi-party political oversight in the 
tender process. Previously, councillors used to sit on the tender and contracts committee. However, 
councillors are now not allowed to be involved in the bid adjudication and evaluation process, 
resulting in a lack of transparency and contravention of SCM policy and the MFMA: 
When the new Procurement Act was introduced, six-seven years ago, 
there was what was used to be known as the tender and contracts 
committee in eThekwini. It was a multi-party committee. I myself was 
on that committee, we would have never allowed most of the things to 
occur… but they did away with the committee and removed political 
oversight, and they left it in the hands of the officials (DA 9, 28 May 
2015).  
The process of giving tenders is up to officials in the SCM, they have 
a bid committee and adjudication committee and all systems in their 
department. So when it comes to us as councillors, we have the least 
powers to change anything (ANC1, 21 May 2015).  
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Furthermore, the lack of oversight in the tendering process has allowed officials to abuse their power 
leading to a manipulation of the procurement process. Officials decide who gets tenders, resulting in 
kickbacks and collusion between potential bidders, councillors and officials:  
 People are able to get away with murder, because they are their 
where they can make decisions according to their preferences … they 
have selected people they wanted that work to be completed and at 
the end of the day get a kickback (ANC 1, 21 May 2015).  
The SCM unit in eThekwini Municipality has been fraught with corruption. Councillors and officials 
have manipulated the tender system to designate contracts to preferred individuals, enabling them to 
secure kickbacks and abuse their positions in power for their own monetary gain. Inevitably, service 
delivery has been hampered, as the city‟s budget is siphoned off to cadres and cronies in the form of 
predetermined tender allocations. Most disconcerting is the fact that the citizens of eThekwini 
Municipality face disastrous consequences from corruption and this will be discussed in the next 
section. 
4.4 Implications of Corruption in the eThekwini Municipality  
Corruption affects every citizen of South Africa; it threatens sustainable development, ethical and 
moral conduct, values and justice and hampers the rule of law (Corruption Watch, 2015). Those who 
rely on government housing, health care, education and welfare are those who are most greatly 
affected by resources lost to corruption. Corruption delays infrastructure development and fosters 
inadequate and inefficient service delivery to citizens (Corruption Watch, 2015). In this section, the 
social, economic and political implications of corruption in eThekwini Municipality will be discussed.   
4.4.1 Social Implications  
Councillors and bureaucrats in the eThekwini Municipality recounted various social impacts which 
corruption has on the eThekwini Municipality and its citizens. Socially, corruption diverts public 
funds away from essential services that government provides for its citizens. The allocation of 
contracts to cadres and cronies who lack the necessary skills and resources to carry out tenders 
efficiently leads to poor service delivery:  
 Corruption it cripples the society, in substandard jobs, houses 
cracking, roads not being complete (ANC 4, 25 June 2015).  
In housing, because of corruption corners are cut, buildings are 
shoddy … made poorly. People move in they don‟t get tenure, they 
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don‟t get title deeds to their property … within a year it starts to fall 
(DA 9, 28 May 2015). 
The Human Sciences Research Council findings show that the ANC's deployment strategy 
systematically places loyalty ahead of merit and competence, and is a serious obstacle to efficient 
public services (Areff, 2012). However the ANC has defended its policy of cadre deployment in key 
municipal positions. ANC secretary-general, Gwede Mantashe, stated that one of the things we should 
never agree on is to regard cadre deployment as a swear-word, you cannot expect the ANC to depend 
on people who are hostile to the position of the ANC” (Seale, 2014:1). He further noted that the 
policy of cadre deployment could not be done away with as it allows for the alignment of the 
administration and political leadership (Seale, 2014).  
Corruption violates the human rights of citizens in the eThekwini Municipality. The Constitution of 
South Africa outlines the basic services to which citizens are entitled. However, corrupt activity 
hinders the delivery of basic services to its citizens: 
I think it robs the people of eThekwini … people have rights to 
receive services. People got rights to shelter and also a decent living. 
But now people will need to stay or live in informal settlements for a 
very long time … I think it becomes unfair and unjustifiable (ANC 1, 
21 May 2015).  
You have a right to clean water … and a right to be safe. But those 
rights mean nothing if these services are not there. You have rights 
you can‟t realise because they have been polluted by corruption (DA 
10, 28 May 2015). 
Corruption thus directly violates the human rights of citizens in the eThekwini Municipality. It is the 
lack of basic service delivery to citizens, specifically the poor, who are reliant on government 
subsidised services and who are the worst affected. When citizens do not receive basic services such 
as water and housing, their human rights are violated.  
Corruption also fosters inequality among its citizens due to the disparity in services received by the 
rich and poor. Furthermore, citizens become disenchanted with service delivery which results in mass 
service delivery protests. According to the Civic Protests Barometer 2007-2014, the number of 
protests in South Africa reached a high of 218 in 2014. The eThekwini Municipality was the third 
highest protest-prone municipality in South Africa (Powell & Visser, 2015). These protests are 
characterised by violence as a means to highlight the inefficiencies of the government and the poor 
quality of life citizen‟s experience: 
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Service delivery is hampered, the service protests that are happening 
are because there is no service delivery. The protests are happening 
because people are not happy with government that promises things 
and they are not receiving (DA 6, 13 May 2015). 
You see people on the streets burning tyres, destroying cars, doing 
all sorts of things …  It‟s been so many years, they waiting for their 
service delivery … it‟s not happening (IFP 1, 14 May 2015).  
Corruption not only has social impacts but economic implications as well.  
4.4.2 Economic Implications 
Councillors and bureaucrats identified the various economic implications corruption has on the 
eThekwini Municipality and its citizens. An important economic implication of corruption is that the 
City‟s budget becomes depleted due to the irregular expenditure that is not recovered. The City thus 
has to turn to higher levels of government to cover its loss and inevitably reduce expenditure on basic 
services. Corruption creates a situation in which the local government cannot sustain itself and will 
eventually succumb to deficits:  
eThekwini, there is no tomorrow and corruption is not sustainable … 
we will go broke at the end of the day and that is coming quite fast. I 
think within the next eight years we will be broke. Now this is a city 
where, when I first was a councillor about 12 years ago, it had an 
egg nest of R6 billion invested in various places. It has now down to 
R2 billion … it can‟t go on like this … the city and the country have 
finite resources that have to be spread in a reasonable way (DA 5, 7 
May 2015).   
Additionally, corruption hinders international companies from investing in eThekwini Municipality. 
A bad reputation is created, as companies feel that the costs of kickbacks to acquire contracts will be 
too costly, preventing investment. This will stunt economic development, reduce the flow of foreign 
capital and possible job opportunities in the city. Furthermore, corruption affects the tourism industry 
as international travellers fear the political instability that is associated with corruption: 
We should be creating a safe society, where external companies, 
whether it be in the city or country will want to come and invest 




It can affect the credit rating in terms of the municipality … investors 
will do all the checks and balances before investing … we always 
market eThekwini as South Africa‟s playground in terms of tourism 
attraction … (corruption) … can have repercussions and knock on 
effects (ANC 3, 3 June 2015).  
Corruption in the eThekwini Municipality has led to irrecoverable irregular expenditure and budget 
deficits which drastically impact on service delivery. Corruption also has numerous political 
implications.  
4.4.3 Political Implications 
Politically, corruption undermines democracy and the rule of law. In a democratic system, legitimacy 
can be lost when people misuse their position and power for private gain. Councillors and bureaucrats 
recounted various political implications of corruption in the eThekwini Municipality. Politically, 
corruption may lead to a situation in which the city becomes ungovernable. Additionally, it creates a 
situation in which the ANC is delegitimised, as corruption may be regarded as synonymous with the 
ANC, in turn, legitimising opposition parties:   
Political, I guess that it (municipality) becomes ungovernable and 
that no party will be able to control it. Like Somalia, it‟ll be fire all 
over the place, fire and blood (DA 5, 7 May 2015).  
Politically, it can seriously damage the municipality that‟s led by the 
ANC. So they will then say ANC is corrupt look at eThekwini (ANC 3, 
3 June 2015). 
Politically, it works against the ruling party, whenever corruption 
gets exposed or allegations of corruption, it works in favour of the 
opposition party who actually expose it (DA 1, 4 May 2015). 
Another issue that has been highlighted strongly by councillors in eThekwini Municipality is that 
corruption creates divisions within the ANC. According to Khoza (2015b), eThekwini which is the 
ANC‟s biggest region has been marred by the Party failing to convene a successful elective 
conference. The highly influential regional chairperson‟s position is being contested between 
eThekwini mayor James Nxumalo and Councillor Zandile Gumede, both members of the eThekwini 
executive council (Khoza, 2015b). A split thus exists in the ANC where two factions have arisen, 
caused by aspirations for power. At the ANC conferences there are major arguments in terms of who 
will run the City‟s budget. Inevitably, this individual will be able to determine who is awarded tenders 
and how the budget will be managed: 
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Serious problem in the ANC, two serious factions with James 
Nxumalo and Sandile Gumede fighting one another because both 
want power. So they can clean out the city. James Nxumalo is 
controlled by Cele and Gumede is controlled by Zwele Mkhize, those 
are the two factions (DA 6, 13 May 2015). 
I‟m thinking there‟s two things going on at the moment , it‟s an issue 
of positions, prestige and power… money will contribute to that but 
the key is holding positions in terms of power (ANC 3, 3 June 2015). 
Corruption has numerous political implications for eThekwini Municipality. Not only does it 
delegitimise the ANC, it also undermines the principles of democracy. Additionally, it creates 
divisions within political parties and creates instability within the Municipality.   
It is thus imperative to discuss the measures to curb corruption in the eThekwini municipality, which 
is the theme of the last section of this Chapter. 
4.5 Measures to Curb Corruption in the eThekwini Municipality  
Since the release of the Manase Report, it is significant to note the anti-corruption agencies that have 
responded  and the various measures that have been adopted in response to the heightened levels of 
corruption. There are numerous anti-corruption agencies active in the eThekwini Municipality such as 
the SAPS, the AG, PP, PSC and SIU (Public Service Commission, 2001; Sebudubudu, 2002; Berning 
& Montesh, 2012). Various committees have also been instituted to curb corruption. These either play 
an oversight role or have been specifically formulated to investigate reported acts of corruption. These 
include: EXCO, MPAC, Audit Committee, Risk Committee, Ethics Committee, Ombudsman and 
CIIU (Sarju, 2015). However, the effectiveness of these agencies and measures in preventing, 
detecting and responding to corruption is questionable. This section will assess the measures adopted 
by the eThekwini Municipality to curb corruption, the challenges faced, measures proposed by 
councillors and bureaucrats to address corruption, and the role the NGOs and the media play in 
highlighting, exposing and reducing corruption. 
4.5.1 Measures Adopted   
According to Pillay (2014) the PP is mandated to investigate and make recommendations to state 
departments in reference to instances that may result in prejudice to citizens. The PP does not identify 
itself as a key role-player in the fight against corruption (Pillay, 2014); however it highlights and 
refers corrupt cases to the relevant agencies. The PP was noted by interviewees as an instrument that 
is used to address corruption in the eThekwini Municipality. Some felt it was effective in addressing 
corruption, while others felt the PP had no follow-up criminal investigation after its findings.  
100 
 
Another instrument mentioned by respondents was the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsperson 
seeks to address complaints relating to maladministration, fraud and corruption with impartiality and 
to find solutions with relevant agencies (eThekwini Municipality, 2015). Some interviewees felt that 
the Ombudsman was an effective instrument in dealing with corruption, but only with those who hold 
lower posts in government. Others contended that the Ombudsman was ineffective, lacked legitimacy 
and was a waste of time because it was selective in the cases of corruption which it investigated. 
Additionally, the lack of political oversight of this office was problematic, as it was directly under the 
control of the city manager: 
I have personally gone to the City Manager and brought to his 
attention, allegations of corruption … he is dismissive … it will be 
investigated by the Office of the Ombudsman. I have seen the 
Ombudsman Office act very quickly against a member of staff who 
was accused of theft by false pretences. They even came immediately 
and arrested her in her office. Yet, they will not lift a finger to 
investigate the real cases of corruption that are happening … the 
problem is, that particular office works with almost no political 
oversight. They are not going to the executive committee and stating 
what is being done to curb corruption. We don‟t know how many 
people are being arrested, how many people taken to court or fired 
or disciplined or anything. It‟s all done behind closed doors … the 
Ombudsman Office is directly under the Office of the City Manager. 
If the City Manager doesn‟t want to give you information that‟s it. 
(DA 1, 4 May 2015). 
Interviewed councillors also identified various committees that have been instituted to address 
corruption which include the ethics committee, risk committee (see Table 4.7) and the MPAC. Some 
felt that these committees were successful, while others called into question their effectiveness in 
curbing corruption. More specifically, the MPAC was identified as an effective measure, however it 
suffers from budgetary and expertise constraints which have limited its ability to take on a greater 
number of cases: 
Let‟s say in 2012, was the setup of the ethics committee, then we got 
MPAC … you got your policies put into place like your whistle 
blowing and anti-fraud and corruption. But over and above that 
there is also a risk in terms of internal control, they have put together 
a kind of risk that we must be also alert … so you‟ve got a risk 
strategy … they are effective (ANC 3, 3 June 2015). 
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I think the oversight committees are effective, such as MPAC … if we 
hear of anything we investigate it and we try to deal with it, but the 
capacity for proper investigation is seriously lacking … we employ 
the wrong people I guess … we have also been quibbling for a MPAC 
budget and we have been turned down every time … I think there is a 
fear that we will become too good (DA 5, 7 May 2015). 
For matters implicating politicians there‟s an ethics committee. So in 
terms of structures and processes in place, they have done well … 
there‟s another issue now, talking of the effectiveness (Bureaucrat 1, 
28 May 2015). 
We do have the Municipal Accounts Committee, which incidentally 
should have been in place many years ago, but of late has been put 
into place and at least that is a body in fact that highlighted some 
areas of concern -  poor accounting practices, poor administration, 
tender irregularities (DA 9, 28 May 2015) 
Table 4.8 Top priority risks relating to corruption (2013/2014) 
Risk Name Risk Description High Level Controls 
Supply Chain Management Inability to procure and 
distribute goods and services in 




 Revised organogram 
Human Settlement expectation Inability to effectively deliver 




 Backlog Services Task 
Team 
 Housing Delivery 
Strategy 
Public Protest The risk of public protest due to 
2014 National election 
 Permits for public 
protest 
 Ward committees 
Fraud, Theft and Corruption The impact of activities and 
decisions that are taken in an 
unethical manner by 
stakeholders 
 Fraud Hotline 
 Ethics training for staff 
 Declarations of interests 
 Anti-Fraud and 
corruption policy 
 Code of conduct 
 Disciplinary processes 




Governance Processes Unclear separation, 
understanding, implementation 
and coherence of administrative 
versus political activities 




Source: MPAC Minutes (2015:31-32) 
 
Table 4.8 indicates the top priority risks identified by the risk committee for the period 2013/2014. It 
also provides the high level controls that have been proposed and implemented to reduce the risks that 
prevail in the eThekwini Municipality.  
In order to maintain good governance, the Municipality established the CIIU to ensure that the 
Municipality is clean and corrupt-free (Integrated Development Plan, 2014/2015). However, this Unit 
faces challenges in terms of lack of capacity and person power which hinder its ability to function 
effectively. Another issue is the lack of follow-through by the City Manager and committees in terms 
of action against criminals from the findings by the CIIU: 
The city integrity and investigations unit was established to fight 
fraud and corruption in the eThekwini Municipality …  functionally 
this unit reports to an oversight committee, your MPAC … we also 
report to the audit committees, there are two in fact, there‟s audit 
and risk committee … capacity is the main issue. I can tell you my 
team, I don‟t think I could ask for more, they are working a seven 
day week, extended hours, on average each forensic investigator has 
close to 40 cases, that‟s not healthy, but what do you do those are the 
challenges … our role is part of the process to fight fraud and 
corruption. If person A is charged with ABC, a criminal case is 
opened and different people need to take action … whether action is 
taken however is a different story (Bureaucrat 1, 28 May 2015) is. 
The Office of the AG has a “constitutional mandate to audit and report on the accounts, financial 
statements and financial management of public sector agencies” (Pillay, 2014:61). Consequently, the 
AG is not an anticorruption agency but takes preventative action toward corruption through a small 
forensic auditing division. The AG has played a significant role in identifying irregularities in the 
eThekwini Municipality which essentially prompted the Manase investigations. Some interviewed 
councillors noted that the AG‟s office has become less detailed in its reporting in recent years and 




I think we have an Auditor-General and he is becoming less effective, 
because I think his audits are becoming less and less detailed (DA 5, 
7 May 2015). 
The AG, you can now receive a clean audit report, with matters of 
concern if you report all fraud and corruption in your financials (DA 
6, 13 May 2015).  
The SAPS was also mentioned as an instrument to curb corruption, but there were some concerns that 
it was an organisation entrenched in corruption:  
It is a serious concern about the number of police who have 
allegations and cases of corruption against them (ANC 2, 22 May 
2015). 
Allegations of corruption in metro police in the Manase Report … 
when I asked the City Manager where the criminal investigation to 
this was… he said we have done the cases numbers and investigating 
it. However, it‟s very easy for people higher up to let these dockets 
lie (DA 1, 4 May 2015). 
Generally, members of the opposition who were interviewed indicated that not enough was being 
done by government to address corruption in the eThekwini Municipality. Not enough time, money 
and person power has been invested in campaigns and commissions to curb corruption:  
Not enough is being done, the fact of the matter is that when the 
Mayor James Nxumalo came in, his opening address was heavily 
leaning towards anti-corruption and doing the right thing. Yet, we‟ve 
seen throughout his term very senior people who sit as right hand 
men and woman in EXCO themselves found guilty of things that 
could be construed as corrupt (DA 1, 4 May 2015) 
Corruption having two people commissions or 10 people 
commissions, what is that going to do for the people (DA 2, 4 May 
2015). 
No, they don‟t give a damn, nobody cares, enriching yourself as 
quickly as possible with as much money at any means possible - 
that‟s the attitude of Durban‟s operation (DA 6, 13 May 2015). 
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Mixed views of government‟s endeavours to curb corruption were held by some members of the 
ANC. Some indicated that corruption is being dealt with effectively and government is doing 
everything in its capability to curb malfeasance. However, it is hampered by the ability of corruption 
to manifest itself in different forms. Others felt government could do more to address corruption in the 
eThekwini Municipality:  
I think there are some inroads in effect by the Council in respect to 
corruption. Because even if you can look at the number of tenders 
given through Section 36 … there has been a decrease in the amount 
of tenders (ANC 1, 21 May 2015). 
I know your topic is specifically on eThekwini, but I would like to 
draw it nationally in all municipalities, all provinces. I think we need 
to roll up our sleeves and deal … not enough, still more needs to be 
done (ANC 2, 22 May 2015). 
I think enough is being done, but the issue of corruption, you‟re 
dealing with a virus, a virus mutates in different forms, just like an 
HIV virus. You use this drug it will find to express itself in another 
form … it‟s got a human factor within the system. So when you are 
dealing with that you can put all the measures in place … but there 
will always be that component (ANC 3, 3 June 2015). 
Various problems persist which hinder the formulation of measures to curb corruption and prevent the 
measures instituted from effectively reducing the levels of malfeasance in the eThekwini 
Municipality. One of the greatest challenges that faces the eThekwini Municipality in the fight against 
corruption is the lack of accountability and transparency. Due to the lack of oversight in public 
procurement processes, corruption has thrived. The Municipality has been criticised for not 
implementing an effective internal monitoring system (Tolsi, 2011).  Furthermore, there is poor 
implementation of good strategies that have been developed to effectively run the public procurement 
sector:  
We don‟t have enough oversight within the eThekwini Municipality 
… the problem is the municipality is run as a clandestine 
organisation. It is full of political intrigue … a hall of shadows and 
mirrors, you don‟t really know   what‟s actually going on. Don‟t 




The lack of astute political leadership is a grave challenge in the fight against corruption. Instead of a 
leadership that advocates a true anti-corruption campaign, there are politicians who are repeatedly 
accused of corrupt acts. This creates a society in which citizens become desensitised and immune to 
corruption, impeding the ethical infrastructure of society: 
It is the moral fibre of the society we live in but over and above that 
is the issue whether there is an ethical infrastructure that is inside 
the system itself. You may have whistle blowing -those are just tools 
in doing it, but you still need to look in terms of the ethical and moral 
reasoning of the people involved inside the system (ANC 3, 3 June 
2015). 
There‟s no Ubuntu, we need moral regeneration to revive our 
consciousness and just remind each and every one of us where we 
are coming from because it is like people have forgotten (ANC 2, 22 
May 2015). 
Another challenge to curbing corruption is the labour laws of the country. The Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA) contains no provisions that prevent an employee from resigning 
when faced with disciplinary action. The BCEA also contains no provision giving employers the 
power to refuse to accept a resignation (The South African Labour Guide, 2015). Numerous 
resignations by senior officials implicated in the Manase Report have taken place in the eThekwini 
Municipality: 
For instance in the eThekwini Municipality … some resign before 
charges were laid …  It‟s not fair, but there‟s nothing much we can 
do because it‟s our labour laws, which state that once I resign 
nobody has a right to follow me (ANC 2, 22 May 2015). 
There are stages in the Act that says what you can do, whatever is 
being done is per what the Act offers … people run away, when you 
resign you have committed something serious. It closes the chapter 
from the Municipality, but it doesn‟t close from SAP‟s (ANC 3, 3 
June 2015). 
Thus, the laws of the country allow those facing disciplinary hearings to resign. However, it must be 
noted that disciplinary hearings can still continue even though an individual resigns (The South 
African Labour Guide, 2015). In an article by the Daily News, the ANC provincial spokesman, Senzo 
Mkhize, noted that even those who have quit their jobs at the Municipality were still being 
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investigated (Mbanjwa & Barbeau, 2013). However the problem in eThekwini is that, once 
councillors and officials resign, the Municipality then fails in its duty to continue investigations 
against those who were implicated in corrupt acts.  
Corruption is a complex, elusive and constantly mutating phenomenon. It is difficult for policy-
makers to develop definitive strategies that will adequately address corruption due to its dynamic 
nature. Multiple challenges have been evident and the eThekwini Municipality is largely ill-equipped 
and has not scratched the surface in curbing corruption. However, councillors have highlighted 
numerous measures that the eThekwini Municipality could employ to curb corruption more 
vigorously.  
4.5.2 Measures Proposed 
Due to councillors being part of the local government system, many note the inadequacies and 
inefficiencies of the current endeavour to fight corruption. They are also privy to the ways in which 
corruption affects the lives of citizens and the means by which the system is abused.  
Councillors largely proposed that those found guilty of corruption should face the full might of the 
law. According to the ANC provincial spokesman, Senzo Mkhize, those who have broken the law 
must be charged criminally and face the full might of the law (Mbanjwa & Barbeau, 2013). Hence, 
through the implementation of the law, individuals found guilty of corruption should be named, 
shamed, fired and arrested. In doing so, the principles of the South African Constitution will be 
upheld:  
Arrest some people, make some examples. People need to be locked 
up and when they are locked up they should not be coming out on 
sick parole (DA 1, 4 May 2015). 
They must face the might of law, there is no other way, you know you 
cannot have your bread buttered on both sides. You cannot eat your 
cake and still have it. So really we need to ensure we get good 
governance and issues related to public accountability must be taken 
seriously (ANC 1, 21 May 2015). 
The law must take its course, you must serve time, they must weigh 
the charge (ANC 2, 22 May 2015). 
There needs to be strong political will, if an official or politician is 
found guilty of corruption they should be fired immediately … we 
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need to start instilling in our society and leaders the shame of being 
corrupt (DA 2, 4 May 2015). 
Another measure proposed is to institute an independent investigative unit in the AG office or an 
apolitical investigation sector under the Ombudsman with capabilities to investigate and act against 
corruption. Additionally, the use of independent external auditors to conduct audits on local 
government clusters will remove political influence and allow for unbiased investigations:  
To me in an ideal situation the AG would have an investigation 
section. Immediately when they find rubbish going on to pass it to 
investigative sectors and actually lay criminal charges (DA 6, 13 
May 2015). 
Get an outside independent unit in to investigate these things and to 
have a totally neutral investigative branch. We had the Scorpions 
and now the Hawks, but even these people are subject to political 
persecution … at a local level ... form an independent investigative 
branch under the office of the Ombudsman and make it open and 
transparent, where you have people from all political parties … and 
give them the power of subpoena and they need to have a multi-
disciplinary task team … who can actually go and arrest (DA 1, 4 
May 2015). 
Interviewed councillors also highlighted blacklisting as an activity that has been instituted by local 
government. Councillors encouraged the use of blacklisting of companies that do not complete 
tenders as per specifications. The eThekwini Municipality established a committee to blacklist errant 
businesses and prevent them from doing work for the City (Padayachee, 2013). However this 
committee was weak and ineffective:  
I don‟t see effective blacklisting of companies either. Once you 
cannot do the job … you should be blacklisted and should not be 
doing business with the city anymore (ANC 1, 21 May 2015).  
Stronger political leadership was required to curb corruption. If someone was found guilty of 
corruption s/he should not be allowed to hold a post in local government. Furthermore, laws should be 
enforced to prevent councillors from entering the supply chain management department:  
For example, if I‟m found guilty of corruption today and I get fired 
and they will have a bi-election in my ward, nothing stops me from 
standing as a councillor. My party might not take me back, but I 
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could stand as an independent candidate … there needs to be some 
kind of legislation that says if you are found guilty of all these kinds 
of stuff [corruption], you are not going to be a public representative 
anymore (DA 1, 4 May 2015). 
Well I think the first thing is that there has to be measures to ensure 
that councillors do not interfere with the administration of the 
procurement or SCM. They should be made aware of the political 
administration dichotomy that as councillors you are responsible for 
the development of policies, and then you must not also jump in the 
line and interfere with what officials are supposed to be doing (ANC 
1, 21 May 2015). 
Another measure proposed was the introduction of ethical training during induction and the 
appointment of an ethical officer to allow for synergy between the different committees that deal with 
corruption: 
I feel the issue of ethical training needs to be part of every single 
individual who enters the system, as part of induction. You mustn‟t 
take for granted the issue of ethics and morality – it is critical ... I 
think for me one of the key things we need to include in induction is 
being ethical. Hence, I‟m speaking about the issue of ethical 
infrastructure, because we can have all these things … where is all 
the coordination? For example, if you have city integrity we should 
have an officer, ethical officer in the municipality … you should have 
somebody responsible for ethics in administration (ANC 3, 3 June 
2015). 
Through the induction of ethical training, employees of the state will be well versed in acts that are 
considered to be corrupt. Furthermore, this form of education on malfeasance will allow for a 
regeneration of the moral fibre of those in positions of power, and create the verve that is needed to 
address corruption. The introduction of an ethical officer will reinforce rules and regulations on 
corruption and establish consistency concerning the procedures and protocols that need to be adopted 
by various committees in order to curb malfeasance.  
It was further noted by interviewees that education about legislation during induction will improve 
knowledge and awareness of the rules and regulations. This will also address the issue of limited 
knowledge of the MFMA and SCM, and help prevent the occurrence of corrupt acts. Skills audits, 
regular testing of job requirements and further basic education would help improve the competency of 
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councillors and officials. According to Mdletshe (2013) the eThekwini Municipality enrolled 25 
councillors for an executive leadership development programme aimed at capacitating councillors 
with regard to matters pertaining to local governance. Furthermore, lifestyle audits on officials and 
councillors of the municipality were proposed in order to ascertain if individuals are living beyond 
their means:  
For people involved directly in the supply chain unit we said we need 
to do a lifestyle audit … check their partners and spouses as well so 
we are able to see (ANC 4, 25 June 2015). 
The final measure proposed by interviewees to curb corruption is the rotation of workers in the SCM. 
This will prevent officials from conducting a particular job for a prolonged period of time, hence 
reducing the prospects to establish corrupt ties: 
The rotation of workers, from one section to another (SCM), one 
person must not be dealing solely with a particular area…we need to 
rotate (ANC 4, 25 June 2015).  
There are diverse ways in which corruption is manifested with multiple impacts on society. Needless 
to say, it is almost impossible to derive one universal solution to curb and eradicate corruption from 
the eThekwini Municipality. NGOs and other civil society organisations can play a role in the fight 
against corruption.  
4.6.3 Role of NGOs 
The NGOs see corruption as a social cancer that impoverishes and disempowers citizens, heightens 
socio-economic polarity and destroys the social and moral fabric of society. NGOs have in-depth 
knowledge of sectors that are susceptible to corruption (Holloway, 2006). They play an informative 
role for the public and exert pressure on the government to act on corruption. In the eThekwini 
Municipality, a clear dichotomy was evident in the opinions held by interviewed councillors on the 
role NGOs play in the fight against corruption.       
Some councillors and bureaucrats held a positive disposition toward NGOs, indicating that they play a 
role in the fight against corruption, for example, in alerting the public to cases of corruption and 
making the perpetrators feel uncomfortable. However it was felt that NGOs need greater support from 
the public in order to fulfil their public accountability role:  
Well, they (NGOs) are doing their part, but need support of the 
people… the involvement of the community is very important (ANC 4, 
25 June 2015). 
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They (NGOs) do play a role, remember they alert us, you see these 
guys specifically look at what‟s happening in corruption and for 
some reason these guys get the information on what‟s happening … I 
think they doing enough, but not getting enough support to really 
push the thing forward (DA 8, 19 May 2015). 
As far as I know, they are to report what they see wrong happening, 
they are more like whistle blowers, also to make noise … they are 
trying their best … but the fact of the matter, we know they are there, 
they exist, they do make noise but are not supported by other 
structures (Bureaucrat 1, 28 May 2015). 
On the other hand, a large proportion of councillors indicated that NGOs did not aid the fight against 
corruption because they lacked authority or legitimacy, they do not truly understand how corruption 
works, they were not vocal on issues of corruption, were too idealistic and not practical, and did not 
attend Council meetings to become informed on issues: 
No, which NGOs locally have done anything to tackle corruption, 
they are not doing anything … first of all if NGOs were so interested 
in corruption they would come to our meetings, obtain copies of the 
agendas. I don‟t see any, I stand to be corrected, but I don‟t see any 
major NGOs getting involved in the fight against corruption. They do 
not call me or any other EXCO member of the council and asking 
what can we do to help fight against corruption. Not coming with 
money to help fund court cases and that‟s where it counts at the end 
of the day (DA 1, 4 May 2015). 
 I don‟t even see their role … the only people who become vocal 
about corruption is the opposition, they will look and leave no straw 
unturned (ANC 1, 21 May 2015). 
No, they not doing enough. The problem is with them they don‟t 
understand what corruption is. How is corruption taking place in 
terms of patterns? Who are the corruption potentialities? (ANC 2, 22 
May 2015). 
NGOs are not the only agents that have had an impact on curbing corruption. The media has a vital 




4.6.4 Role of the Media 
The media plays a significant role in investigating and reporting on corruption, its causes and 
consequences and prompts possible solutions (Wasswa and Kokooza, 2011). The media informs the 
public about corrupt acts that occur in the government and promotes strategies to curb malfeasance.  
Some councillors who were interviewed held the opinion that the media plays an influential role in 
curbing corruption. Through freedom of the press, corruption is exposed to the public. Furthermore, 
the media provides a system of checks and balances for the government, who are aware that the media 
will report on the corruption and force them to take action on cases. However, the media does suffer 
from the threat of litigation which has significantly hindered its ability to report freely:  
Well the role of the media is very important. Those people who are 
the media they do tell us on the ground what is happening. In fact, 
the government of South Africa is afraid of the media … I would say 
if the media is not playing their role we would be like other African 
countries so I really congratulate and commend the media in South 
Africa because even if they are being threatened, they do report what 
is happening (IFP 1, 14 May 2015). 
Media is robust in tackling it (corruption) of late I have noticed the 
media is reluctant to publish anything on corruption, where it 
directly implicates anybody unless they have documents backing it 
up. A few years ago they were keen to write complete stories … but 
the threat of litigation is so bad these days that they won‟t do that 
anymore … we‟ve seen a few of the bigger papers come short like 
that (DA 1, 4 May 2015). 
I think the role of the media in bringing corruption to the attention of 
public has been superb … I don‟t think there‟s any country like South 
Africa where the media has got all the rights to expose corruption 
(ANC 1, 21 May 2015). 
Other councillors contended that the media was neglecting its duty in reporting accurately (DA 4                                                                                       
, 4 May 2015) owing to various reasons, such as newspapers being politically aligned and being 
owned by ANC supporters and by not running stories on opposing political parties. However this can 
be disputed in terms of the conflict that arose between the eThekwini Municipality and the Daily 
News in 2005. The Editor of the Daily News, Dennis Pather, and journalist, Veven Bissetty, were 
accused of launching a campaign to discredit the work of the Municipality (Sutcliffe, 2005). Bissetty 
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had written articles pertaining to matters such as street children, the employment of consultants, the 
rates system and the decision of EXCO to support the holding of the South African municipal games 
in Durban. Sutcliffe (2005) stated that the articles failed to provide the facts, quoted unnamed sources 
telling untruths, and had only obtained comment from the DA. Thus, in response, the Municipality 
stated it would no longer have any official dealings with the Editor or journalists from the Daily 
News. This included the placing of advertising in the Daily News as it would constitute a clear abuse 
of public funds (Sutcliffe, 2005). This exemplifies one instance in which political affiliations 
negatively affected the freedom of press in the eThekwini Municipality.    
Some of the interviewed councillors contended that the quality of journalists and journalism has also 
declined dramatically over the years. The media, specifically the newspapers, are subject to many 
inefficiencies resulting in a poor effort in the fight against corruption. They suffer from a lack of 
investigative capacity, idle reporters and shoestring budgets:  
I‟m a former editor of a newspaper … newspapers are suffering from 
a lack of capacity, they should be investigating every bit of 
corruption they can get their hands on and they are not … the lack of 
capacity, not investing enough money in reporters and they don‟t 
have the will anymore (DA 5, 7 May 2015). 
 In so many local daily newspapers the standard of journalism is very 
poor … much of the time it is sensationalist and they don‟t dig deep 
enough and will take an off the cuff remark and make it news … I‟ve 
had to phone journalists up and ask them where did you get that 
information because you weren‟t even there (DA 9, 28 May 2015). 
Papers used to be good, journalists were very investigative, now the 
quality of journalists is very bad, it‟s like the tabloid … you just read 
a story that is rehashed (ANC 3, 3 June 2015). 
Holistically, corruption is a challenging issue for the media to tackle; threats of litigation have made 
media houses fearful to challenge individuals who are deemed to be corrupt. Since its 52
nd
 National 
Conference in Polokwane in December 2007, the ANC has threatened to curb access to information 
and to introduce a Press Tribunal (where the state will be judge, jury and executor) to indict errant 
journalists. These measures have emerged amidst reports of escalating corruption and controversial 
public decisions which have implicated the ANC elite. As the ANC fails to deliver to the poor and 
disadvantaged, and the independent press exposes how hundreds of billions of Rand have been 
squandered through corruption, exacerbating socio-spatial inequalities of the apartheid era, some 
113 
 
senior ANC officials labeled the media as the „opposition‟. Hence, blaming the messenger for the 
message (Maharaj, 2012).   
4.7 Conclusion 
Corruption is a disease that has plagued the eThekwini Municipality. Due to its complex and elusive 
nature a „Corruption Conundrum‟ has arisen, exemplifying the difficulty in characterising and proving 
corruption. Interviewed councillors and bureaucrats identified numerous casual factors attributing to 
the rise in corruption in Durban. These largely pertained to self-enrichment, greed, power, politics and 
a lack of moral obligation by councillors, officials and citizens alike. A key focus of this study was 
the public procurement sector.  
Mismanagement, fruitless, irregular and wasteful expenditure typifies the SCM. Councillors and 
officials lack expertise and the basic knowledge of legislation, resulting in the abuse of SCM 
legislation and the MFMA. This was evident from the abuse of Section 36 and the lack of disclosure 
of business interests by councillors. The blatant abuse and manipulation of SCM legislation has led to 
mismanagement and poor service delivery to citizens. This is a direct infringement of the human 
rights of citizens of the eThekwini Municipality.  
Various social, economic and political implications of corruption in the eThekwini Municipality were 
identified to illustrate how corruption actively undermines democracy and creates a society in which 
inequality prevails, where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Since the release of the Manase 
Report, the eThekwini Municipality has publicly declared that it is dedicated to the fight against 
corruption. Local government has established numerous committees, strategies and commissions to 
curb corruption. NGOs and media entities have also made an attempt to aid the fight against 
corruption. However, these measures have not even scratched the surface to expose and curb 
corruption.  
The siphoning of money from the public purse to accommodate the lavish lifestyles of those in power 
and their allies, has reached alarming levels. Tender manipulation, cadre deployment and crony 
protection have resulted in numerous lucrative contracts being repeatedly allocated to the selected 
élite. Tender abuse persists in the Municipality and irregular expenditure is the norm, due to the 
continuous awarding of tenders through section 36 (Manda, 2015b).  
The South African Constitution guarantees socio-economic, political and environmental rights to all 
living in South Africa. However, corruption undermines the rights of all those who rely on 
government for their basic services. Legislation to prevent and curb corruption has not been enforced 
in the eThekwini Municipality. Local government need to adopt mechanisms and strategies to ensure 
that the policies and legislation that are put in place are implemented effectively. Policies and 
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legislation need to be re-evaluated to ensure that the fight against corruption is spurred on and to 

























EVALUATION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Corruption is a phenomenon that appears to be increasing throughout the world. It is complex, 
clandestine, and affects both the developed and developing countries to varying degrees (Pearson, 
2001). For decades, international institutions like the WB and the IMF had remained silent on the 
issue of corruption. However, during the late 1990s, many regional institutions, business and non-
governmental organisations began to focus on corruption (Bukovansky, 2006). Malfeasance actively 
contributes to the de-legitimisation of political and institutional systems in which it takes root 
(Camerer, 2009) and it is used to benefit the interests of the élite, while the poor suffer from the 
ravages of corruption. In South Africa, corruption flourished under the apartheid administration 
(Hyslop, 2005). These corrupt constructs have persisted in the democratic dispensation, violating the 
human rights of South African citizens. The public procurement sector has been riddled with 
corruption. It has become synonymous with kickbacks, tenderpreneurs, factionalism, cronyism and 
the manipulation of systems and processes for private gain (Zondi, 2012).  
The aim of this study was to critically investigate corruption in the procurement sector in local 
government with specific reference to the case of eThekwini Municipality. This study found that 
corruption was rampant in the eThekwini Municipality, specifically in the public procurement sector. 
Corruption was attributed to various causes and adversely impacted on the local government‟s ability 
to provide basic services to the urban poor. In Durban, there are many different actors who engage in 
corruption in the public procurement sector, including councillors, officials and private business 
persons. Despite legislation designed to create a fair and transparent procurement process, the SCM is 
fraught with corruption which has impeded its ability to function effectively. Cases identified in this 
study included councillors and officials conducting business with the Municipality; incompetency and 
limited knowledge of legislation; unauthorised irregular and wasteful expenditure; abuse of Section 
36 of the SCM policy; an unfair procurement process; inadequate and inefficient contract 
management and inadequate SCM controls. More significant is the presence of cronyism, cadre 
deployment and tenderpreneurs, which has significantly hindered the fair allocation of tenders in the 
Municipality. Overall, it is the poor who experience the ravages of corruption and violations of their 
rights as they are reliant on government for basic service delivery. Various measures in the form of 
anti-corruption strategies have been instituted to curb corruption in the eThekwini Municipality; 
however, given the extensive nature of corruption, these strategies have largely failed in curbing and 
preventing corruption in this Municipality.   
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This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section presents the evaluation of the key findings 
of the study. The second section offers some theoretical reflections of how the human rights based 
approach relates to corruption in the eThekwini Municipality. The third section, provides 
recommendations to prevent corruption in the eThekwini Municipality.  
5.2 Evaluation 
The objectives of this study were to: 
 Review international trends in corruption and the procurement sector;  
 Investigate specific cases of corruption in the procurement sector in the eThekwini 
Municipality;  
 Assess the social, economic and political implications of corruption in eThekwini 
Municipality;  and  
 Examine the instruments and mechanisms that are used in preventing, detecting and 
responding to corruption and the effectiveness of such measures. 
5.2.1 International trends in corruption and the procurement sector 
It was evident from the study that although corruption is extensive and impacts on every society, 
international institutions and scholars had largely been silent and ignored the issue of corruption (Leff, 
1964; Bukovansky, 2006; Sampson, 2010). However this changed in the 1990s with the end of the 
Cold War and the fall of totalitarian states, which ushered in openness, democratic principles and 
spurred on the anti-corruption campaigns. Collier (2013) contended that the post-Cold war trends 
toward democratisation, transparency and greater public accountability lifted the veil of silence 
surrounding political corruption. Publicised acts of malfeasance at this time also highlighted that 
corruption was evident and increasing in both the developed and developing world. This contrasts 
with the findings of Klitgaard (1988) who contends that corrupt activities are more widespread and 
systematically embedded in the developing world than in the West.  
A review of the relevant literature revealed that there is no universally agreed definition for corruption 
and this is a challenge. Koetzle and Sandholis (2000) contended that nearly every published work 
dealing with corruption from the 1960s has tried to deal with the problem of defining it. The greatest 
problem in attempting to define corruption is that its meaning differs in different social contexts. 
Hence, what may constitute corruption in one society can differ greatly from that which is regarded as 
corruption in another. This is due to different cultural and traditional norms (Hodgkinson, 1997; 
Atuobi, 2007; Spector, 2012; Dimant, 2013). Similarly, in this study, a „corruption conundrum‟ arose 




The literature reviewed revealed that corruption has become an international concern, due to the 
increased awareness of the detrimental effects of this malfeasance. Strategies to fight corruption have 
become a priority in policy discussions around the world. International organisations have adopted 
various anti-corruption instruments and reforms in the fight against corruption. This study revealed, 
however, that even though the international community has been successful in drawing attention to 
the issue of corruption, the anti-corruption efforts have largely failed to curb this practice (Doig & 
Riley, 1998; Kpundeh, 1998; Szeftel, 1998; Riley, 2000; Warigi, 2001; Johnston, 2005;  and Persson 
et al., 2010).  
This study found that the public procurement sector is an area of rampant malfeasance. Corruption 
and its associated risks are manifest throughout the entire public procurement cycle, and may differ at 
each phase (Klitgaard, 1992; Appolloni & Mushagalus, 2013; OCED, 2015). Abuses in the public 
procurement sector relate to the manipulation of procurement processes by a number of different 
actors who include senior managers, officials, councillors and private businessmen/women. The 
procurement sector has become synonymous with bribery, kickbacks, nepotism and favouritism. Even 
though legislation pertaining to public procurement regulation is established, it is largely abused and 
manipulated for self-gain. Klitgaard (1992) contended that countries enact laws and rules which 
outline comprehensive and well-regulated systems in public procurement and violations of those laws 
and rules are criminalised. However, legislation is ignored and carried out inefficiently, which enables 
opportunities for corruption to exist in the SCM.   
5.2.2 Corruption in the procurement sector in the eThekwini Municipality 
According to Bolton (2006), public procurement in South Africa has been given constitutional status 
and is seen as a means of addressing past discriminatory policies and practices. However this study 
reveals that public procurement has been unsuccessful in addressing the discriminatory practices of 
the apartheid regime, due to a certain élite group of formerly disadvantaged people being able to 
manipulate and benefit from the current procurement system. This is in line with the findings of 
Hilliard & Wissink (2001), CASAC (2011a) and Zondi (2012) who noted that since 1994, a small 
minority of previously disadvantaged individuals who are politically well-connected have become 
exceedingly rich through benefiting from state tenders, while the majority are still largely 
disadvantaged. In South Africa, the SCM is an important tool for managing public procurement, yet 
this study reveals that the SCM has faced numerous challenges which has allowed for loopholes to be 
created and corruption to flourish. Similarly, Ambe and Badenhorst-Weiss (2012) contend that despite 
the use of SCM as a strategic tool, the public procurement sector faces challenges that have made it 
vulnerable to corruption.  
In Durban, the first challenge encountered in the SCM was that some councillors and officials 
conducted business with the eThekwini Municipality. Van Vuuren (2014) contends that the problem 
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is the looting of state coffers, where millions of Rands are being awarded in tenders to municipal 
officials and their families. Despite SCM regulation 44 prohibiting tender awards to persons in the 
service of the state, numerous contracts were awarded in the eThekwini Municipality and this 
contravened the MFMA and SCM legislation. The awarding of contracts to persons employed by the 
state and councillors has increased over the years, and has nullified the fair and transparent tender 
process in the Municipality. Ten councillors and one hundred and sixty-nine officials were identified 
as having business interests in the Municipality. The most prominent case involved the current Chief 
Whip, Stanley Zamokwakhe Xulu, who had collectively earned R12 386 855.19 from the eThekwini 
Municipality. However, when he was found guilty of corruption, he only received a R195 002.22 fine.  
The study revealed that councillors were under the impression that they were allowed to trade with the 
City as long as they disclosed their businesses interests. However, the study showed that there were 
inconsistencies in the proper completion of disclosure forms by councillors; forms being incomplete 
and inaccurate information being captured. Furthermore, required signatures from Deputy City 
Managers or the City Manager were missing on disclosure forms. Additionally, there was neglect and 
failure of officials to identify councillors who were shareholders of companies doing business with 
the Municipality. 
The study revealed that action should have been instituted by the Council in terms of paragraphs 13 
and 14 of Schedule 1, Code of Conduct for Councillors of the Municipal Systems Act, No 32 of 2000, 
against all implicated councillors for contravening paragraph 6 of this Act. In this regard, the actions 
taken against errant councillors and officials were minor and viewed as a „slap on the wrist‟ in 
comparison to the acts committed. Many received fines, final written warnings, or resigned, and only 
six guilty officials were dismissed. Similarly, Bauer (2000) contends that in South Africa the system 
functions in such a way that people who are accused continue in their posts, move to another 
department or slide into retirement.  
The second challenge encountered in the SCM is incompetency of councillors and officials and a 
limited knowledge of legislation. These findings concur with studies conducted by Kalombo (2005); 
Sheoraj (2007); Ambe & Badenhorst-Weiss (2012) and Managa (2012). Councillors and Officials 
indicated that a lack knowledge of the provisions of the MFMA and Codes of Conduct and other 
relevant legislation had caused them to unintentionally commit corrupt acts in the Municipality. Lack 
of education and training was a major challenge for councillors and officials and inevitably impeded 
their capability to function at their full capacity in a complex local government system. Similarly, 
McCarthy (2006) contends that there is a lack of capacity and knowledge among officials to handle 
procurement processes that has led to bad governance. However Migiro and Ambe (2008) argue that 
many councillors and officials have attended a number of training workshops on SCM, but they still 
lack the appropriate knowledge for proper implementation of the regulations.  
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The third challenge encountered in the SCM in the eThekwini Municipality is unauthorised, irregular 
and wasteful expenditure. According to the AG Report (2013/2014) the irregular expenditure in the 
eThekwini Municipality was R334, 8 Million. The study revealed that the unauthorised, irregular and 
wasteful expenditure was attributed to the failure of the political and bureaucratic leadership to 
enforce the necessary supply management regulations. There is no oversight or accountability within 
the Municipality over money spent, resulting in legislation being flouted and money being misused. 
This was exhibited through the case of duplicate payments and irregular, upfront payment to 
Dimension Data. 
This study showed that an unfair procurement process is one of the contributing factors to corruption 
in the SCM. Lack of advertising, not obtaining three price quotations, not listing accredited 
prospective providers, inadequate administration of providers, competitive bids not being invited and 
inadequate public invitations to tender were all evident in the eThekwini Municipality. This is similar 
to the findings of Matthee (2006) and Van Zyl (2006) who assert that practices relating to non-
compliance with the SCM allow for  uncompetitive processes for both quotations and bids, lack of 
appropriate bid committees; use of unqualified suppliers and passing over of bids for expediency.   
The study showed that inadequate SCM controls, monitoring and the neglect of oversight have 
allowed for the tender process to be manipulated for private gain in the Municipality. This is 
supported by Stemele (2009) who argues that there is lack of proper monitoring and evaluation. 
Similarly, Ambe & Badenhorst-Weiss (2012) assert that inadequate monitoring and evaluation are 
linked to the absence of a control environment and that government entities are unable to implement 
SCM as required by the policy. In this manner, deviations or non-compliance with SCM policy 
remain undetected. 
Another huge challenge to the SCM is the manipulation of legislation for private gain in the form of 
Section 36. According to Rangata (2008), Section 36 contracts are used as an easy way to bypass 
normal tender procedures and support the desired contractors.  However although Section 36 was 
promulgated for emergency situations only (Supply Chain Management Policy, 2005), this study 
revealed that Section 36 contracts were common in the eThekwini Municipality, and that this Section 
was used as a means to subvert the normal tender procedures. This is in line with the findings of 
Reddy & Wallis (2011); Schulz-Herzenberg et al., (2012) and Mhlongo (2014). This study attributed 
such abuses to various reasons such as cronyism, self-enrichment and poor planning. Inadequate and 
inefficient contract management was also a challenge in the SCM and usually formed the basis for 
Section 36 contract renewals. Similarly, Ambe & Badenhorst-Weiss (2012) stated that poor planning 
and budgeting have affected the implementation of SCM. Luyt (2008) argues that there is a need to 




5.2.3 Implications of corruption in the eThekwini Municipality 
This study revealed that corruption has resulted in numerous social, economic and political 
implications for the eThekwini Municipality. According to Boersma (2012) corruption has many 
dimensions and has numerous political, economic and social consequences. This study indicated that 
socially, corruption has diverted public funds away from essential services that government provides 
for its citizens. This is similar to the findings of CASAC (2011b), Manyaka & Nkuna (2014) and 
Brink (2015). Furthermore, the allocation of these contracts to cronies and cadres who lack skills and 
resources resulted in poor service delivery to citizens.   
According to Sansom & Mckinlay (2013:111), “the image of communities protesting against service 
backlogs, maladministration and corruption is a common occurrence in South Africa”. Mass service 
delivery protests are a common occurrence in the eThekwini Municipality. It is the continual 
dissatisfaction of service delivery that fosters violent protests. Similarly, in a study by Haans (2014) it 
was noted that protests broke out in Brazil, in which middle class Brazilians called for better public 
services and less corruption. 
This study revealed that there are also economic implications of corruption in the eThekwini 
Municipality. Councillors and bureaucrats noted that corruption leads to depletion of the City‟s 
budget due to the irregular expenditure. Inevitably, corruption creates a situation in which the local 
government cannot sustain itself and will eventually succumb to deficits. Economically, corruption 
also prevents international investment and stunts economic development. This is similar to the 
findings of CASAC (2011a) which states that corruption has a negative effect on foreign investment 
by destroying investor confidence.  
This study revealed that corruption has multiple political implications in the eThekwini Municipality. 
According to Rose-Ackerman (1997) corruption undermines trust in the efficient functioning of a 
political system, which leads to instability and possible disengagement by citizens. This study 
revealed that corruption may lead to a situation in which the City may become ungovernable. This is 
supported by the findings of Mottiar & Bond (2012) and Mbazira (2013) who highlight the 
declaration made by the ANC Youth League in the Western Cape to make the city ungovernable 
through protests if services remained undelivered.  
According to Jain (2001) numerous political contestations arise when individuals vie for the benefits 
that corrupt activity may generate. This study indicated that divisions had been evident in the 
eThekwini Municipality, due to conflict over who would make decisions concerning the City‟s budget 
and inevitably the lucrative contract distribution. An evident split in the ANC was present in 
eThekwini, characterised by a struggle for power, prestige and control over public resources. Twala 
(2014) contends that at national, provincial and local levels, factionalism is evident within the ANC.  
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5.2.4 Measures for preventing, detecting and responding to corruption in the eThekwini 
Municipality  
This study revealed that South Africa has multiple corruption fighting agencies and a strong 
legislation to combat and curb its effects (Rangata, 2008; Majila et al., 2014). Since the release of the 
Manase Report numerous measures have been instituted to combat corruption in the eThekwini 
Municipality. However, in reality, these have failed in their endeavour to combat corruption. This can 
be attributed to the lack of effective implementation and enforcement of law. Additionally, there is a 
lack of co-ordination between various anti-corruption organisations, rendering them inefficient and 
incapable of curbing corruption (Public Service Commission, 2001; Sebudubudu, 2002; Rangata, 
2008; Camerer, 2008; Ellero, 2015). 
This study indicated the various anti-corruption agencies and committees that were effective in the 
eThekwini Municipality. These included the PP, the Ombudsman, the ethics committee, risk 
committee, MPAC, CIIU, the AG and SAPS (Sebudubudu, 2002; Berning & Montesh, 2012). 
However even these measures, in some instances, were noted to be ineffective and insufficient to deal 
with corruption. Challenges ranged from lack of follow-up with criminal investigations after findings, 
lack of legitimacy and political oversight, budgetary and expertise constraints and lack of capacity and 
man power (Public Service Commission, 2001; Sebudubudu, 2002; Camerer, 2008; Rangata, 2008). 
Similarly, Gumede (2011) contends that, on the surface, South Africa has the necessary anti-
corruption rules, watchdogs and enforcement agencies, however these are not sufficient. Corruption 
flourishes where there is weak capacity in the enforcement agencies, or where there are gaps in the 
laws, and lack of political will.  
The key players in combating corruption are civil society organisations and the media (Caiden et al., 
2001). According to Holloway (2006), NGOs have an informative role to play for the public and to 
exert pressure on the government to act on corruption. The study revealed that some NGOs played a 
significant role in drawing attention to corruption in the eThekwini Municipality. They alert the public 
to cases of corruption and create levels of discomfort for those engaged in corrupt acts. However the 
study also found that NGOs lack authority and legitimacy. Similarly, Price (2003) contends that 
NGOs influence can be limited due to lack of authority, legitimacy and access.  
The study revealed that the media has, to some degree, played an influential role in curbing corruption 
in the eThekwini Municipality. Through freedom of the press, corruption is exposed to the public and 
this creates a system of checks and balances for the government (Ahrend 2002; Brunetti & Weder 
2003; Fardigh et al., 2011). However, the study also revealed that the media had also been neglecting 
its duty in reporting accurately. This is due to a number of reasons such as media houses being 
politically aligned, the declining quality of journalists and their training, and the threat of litigation.   
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5.3 Theoretical reflections 
According to Dimant (2013), the impact of corruption is multifaceted and varies greatly across 
countries. The corruption discourse has developed prolifically over the years  (Kajsiu, 2014), however 
there is little consensus on aspects of corruption, making it difficult to theorise. This is evident in this 
study on public procurement corruption in the eThekwini Municipality, as there is no distinct theory 
that can be used to understand corruption.  
According to Rubinstein & Maravić (2010) the Weberian-Ideal Typical Approach sees corruption as a 
lack of rationalisation of the public service. Loopholes exist in the poorly developed bureaucratic 
system in which corrupt acts can occur. In South Africa, the public procurement sector is used as a 
policy tool to address the discriminatory and unfair practices of the past. Prior to 1994, this sector was 
geared toward large and established contractors, and it was difficult for new contractors to participate 
in government procurement procedures. Reforms in public procurement and the introduction of the 
SCM policy, were initiated to promote principles of good governance and to address the inconsistency 
in policy application, lack of accountability and supporting structures (Ambe and Badenhorst-Weiss, 
2012). However, despite the employment of these measures, corruption in the public procurement 
sector in the eThekwini Municipality is rampant. Instead of creating an efficient service delivery 
system, a situation has been created in which the narrow élite accrue huge fortunes by means of 
„tenderpreneurship‟, and poor service delivery is the common experience for a large proportion of 
citizens.  
The Structural Functionalist approach sees society as a collection of coherent systems in which all 
societal problems have a function, including corruption (De Graaf et al., 2010).  According to Waquet 
(1992) corruption can provide protection and influence for social groups with material wealth. In the 
case of public procurement corruption in the eThekwini Municipality, this could be portrayed through 
cadre deployment and cronyism in which tenders are repetitively given to selected individuals, 
specifically, those who show their allegiance to the ANC. Hence corruption in this sense is a means 
by which the ANC can maintain control over the resources of the eThekwini Municipality. 
Some scholars argue that the Systems theory can be utilised to adequately explain corruption (Preston 
et al., 2002; Hiller, 2010). This theory identifies corruption as a result of the overlapping of systems, 
resulting in the abuse of another system‟s logic. The overlapping of roles and systems were evident in 
the eThekwini Municipality at two different junctures. First, there is a blurring of lines between the 
political party and the state, making the state an extension of the political party, allowing for no 
accountability, transparency and the manipulation of SCM procedures. Additionally, the anti-
corruption agencies suffer from overlapping mandates which affects their operating ability and 
hinders their efficiency in combatting corruption (Public Service Commission, 2001). 
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The Post Positivist Approach focuses on how corruption is socially constructed (De Graaf et al., 
2010). In this theory, corruption has a social meaning and must be understood with reference to its 
social setting (Sissener 2001). In this study, a corruption conundrum was evident in the eThekwini 
Municipality, specifically, in the difficulty in characterising and proving corrupt acts.  
The Public Choice Theory views corrupt officials as rational individuals who employ the most 
profitable course of action (De Graaf et al., 2010). In the public procurement sector, tenders are seen 
as a source of wealth, and an area in which loopholes and kickbacks can be acquired. Service delivery 
is imperative and is needed on a daily basis for the citizens of eThekwini Municipality. This explains 
why officials, councillors and bureaucrats capitalise on the loopholes in the SCM legislation to obtain 
kickbacks.   
All these theories do not however adequately account for corruption in the public procurement sector 
in the eThekwini Municipality. These theories neglect to take into consideration the historical 
background of South Africa, which has resulted in service delivery deficits to the poor. Prior to 1994, 
public procurement was geared towards large and established contractors. It was a challenge for new 
contractors to participate in government procurement procedures. With the democratic dispensation 
public procurement has been used as a policy tool to address the discriminatory practices of the past 
(Ambe and Badenhorst-Weiss, 2012). Reforms and the SCM were instituted to promote principles of 
good governance and introduce a preference system to address the socio-economic objectives. 
However these have faced numerous challenges, and there is non-compliance with procurement and 
SCM legislation, as well as with tender procedures (Ambe and Badenhorst-Weiss, 2012). There has 
thus been poor service delivery to the citizens of eThekwini Municipality and the local government 
grapples with corruption in the public procurement sector. These theories also fail to provide an 
understanding of the factors that contribute to corruption in the eThekwini Municipality, such as the 
legacy of colonialism and the apartheid regime. 
While there are a number of different theories that can provide insight into the corruption discourse,  
it has become apparent that corruption impacts on the most vulnerable sections of the society such as 
women, children, minorities and those who are poor (Gebeye, 2012). Corruption undermines the 
ideals of equality, justice and human dignity and violates the human rights of poor citizens through 
the diversion of public resources and the right to basic service delivery. In the eThekwini 
Municipality, corruption impedes service delivery, entrenching inequalities and fuelling 
dissatisfaction that citizens experience.  
According to Gebeye (2012) corruption is a global challenge and its degree of severity varies from 
country to country. However, it is the poor in these countries that are most affected by corruption due 
to their powerlessness to change the status quo and their reliability on state resources to survive. This 
was exemplified in the eThekwini Municipality, as it is the poor and those reliant on basic service 
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delivery whose rights are violated. Corruption in the eThekwini Municipality results in large scale 
unauthorised, irregular and wasteful expenditure, in which billions of Rands were lost. Furthermore, 
corruption directly undermined the Constitution and the Bill of Rights as citizens were unable to 
access basic services such as housing and water, which they have a right to as per the Bill of Rights. 
Similarly, Olaniyan (2014) states that it is incontestable that corruption undermines the rights outlined 
in the Bill of Rights.  
Instead of utilising the SCM processes and reforms to address the inequalities of the past, a new élite 
has been created due to cronyism, „tenderpreneurship‟ and the manipulation of legislation, such as 
Section 36, which entrenches inequality. Cadre deployment in the eThekwini Municipality also 
contributes to human rights violations. Apart from preventing qualified and experienced officials from 
getting jobs, it has also created a situation in which incompetence and lack of expertise by officials 
has fostered inadequate service delivery to citizens of the Municipality. Thus, instead of legislation 
preventing corruption, loopholes were created and the system was manipulated to gain kickbacks 
which severely hampered service delivery to citizens.  
With the release of the Manase Report in the eThekwini Municipality, numerous measures have been 
instituted to curb and prevent corruption in the eThekwini Municipality to ensure that the human 
rights of citizens are upheld. However these have largely failed in their duty to reduce corruption. It is 
the poor who are subject to the consequences of corruption, and it is for this reason that many embark 
on large scale service delivery protests. This was the case in the eThekwini Municipality when 
numerous communities engaged in violent service delivery protests in order to advocate for better 
service delivery and to highlight the inadequacies of the current government.  
The media and NGOs also played a role in drawing attention to the human rights violations caused by 
corruption and have played an informative role in educating citizens on their human rights. Corruption 
in the public procurement sector is a grave issue that has many knock-on effects. Not only does it 
create a lack of transparency and accountability in public procurement processes, it delegitimises the 
government. It also allows for the manipulation of legislation for personal gain and redistributes 
money intended for the provision of public services into the pockets of the corrupt. It allocates tenders 
to individuals who do not carry out projects to specifications, or do not deliver the services at all.  In 
its entirety, corruption in the public procurement sector results in poor service delivery to its citizens, 
which is a direct infringement of their human rights and is contrary to the Constitution of South 
Africa. Through the use of the human rights based approach to corruption, this study has drawn 
attention to the fact that corruption is not just the misappropriation of money or abuse of power. It 
emphasises that corruption has detrimental effects on citizens which can lead to human rights 





Despite South Africa‟s comprehensive anti-corruption legislation and institutions, malfeasance 
continues to increase (CASAC, 2011a). After the Manase Report, the eThekwini Municipality 
introduced a myriad of committees and measures to curb corruption. However levels of corruption 
still remain high in the public procurement sector in the eThekwini Municipality. The following 
recommendations should be considered to address public procurement corruption in the eThekwini 
Municipality. 
5.4.1 Procurement reform  
Corruption in the public procurement sector in the eThekwini Municipality is rife. There need to be 
strict rules and vigilance pertaining to tender processes, such as in awarding tenders. Also, state 
officials conducting business with the Municipality should be blacklisted and punished. A re-
evaluation of what can be classified as an emergency in terms of Section 36 is sorely needed.  
Another area that needs serious attention in procurement reform is blacklisting. In the eThekwini 
Municipality, a blacklisting committee was formed to address corruption (eThekwini Municipality, 
2015). However the effective and efficient blacklisting of companies who are corrupt is absent 
(SALGA, 2011). This has allowed companies who should be blacklisted to continue receiving 
contracts, amassing huge amounts of money, with little or inadequate service delivery to the public.   
5.4.2 Developing skills and knowledge through education and teaching  
Municipalities across South Africa face challenges in the application of the concept of SCM as well as 
the legislative requirements binding SCM (Migiro & Ambe, 2008). In the eThekwini Municipality 
many councillors have been found guilty of conducting business with the Municipality and they 
exhibited no recollection of codes of conduct, provisions of MFMA and SCM. Councillors and 
officials need to be educated on the law and legislation pertaining to the SCM. Furthermore, from this 
study it was noted that many councillors lack basic education which prevents them from carrying out 
their duties effectively and from understanding legislation and regulations. The government has 
instituted programmes to facilitate education programmes and ABET classes however councillors and 
officials need to be educated about corruption and ethics. This may build a strong and informed 
constituency against corruption (Manyaka & Nkuna, 2014) and promote and encourage ethical 
behaviour at a local government level.  
5.4.3 Allocation of Contracts 
An area that was plagued with corruption is the allocation of tenders in the SCM. Large-scale 
decentralisation has occurred within municipalities all over South Africa (Siddle, 2011). 
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Municipalities thus have bid adjudication, bid evaluation committees and public officials making the 
decisions on the allocations of tenders (Ambe & Badenhorst-Weiss, 2012). This places power in the 
hands of officials and can allow for bribery, kickbacks and „tenderpreneurship‟. Greater oversight and 
transparency is needed throughout the procurement process to allow for the fair and equitable 
distribution of tenders in the Municipality. Alternatively, public officials should be prevented from 
issuing tenders (Zondi, 2012). 
5.4.4 Reducing opportunities for corruption 
It is imperative that the oversight and accountability institutions such as the AG and the PP are 
mandated with powers to take disciplinary action against corrupt individuals (Manyaka & Nkuna, 
2014). With greater manpower and expertise these institutions could play a significant role in curbing 
corruption. People engage in corrupt activities as they know they can beat the system, however if the 
prevention and detection systems are strong, people are less likely to engage in corruption because the 
chances of being caught and punished are greater (Manyaka & Nkuna, 2014). Raising public 
awareness of the existence and consequences of corruption is also imperative. By educating the public 
on corruption and how to report it, the campaign against it will be advanced.  
5.5 Conclusion  
Corruption is a feature of both the developed and developing world and affects all citizens. Corruption 
is cancerous and contagious as it erodes the moral fibre of society. Malfeasance manifests itself in 
many forms in post-apartheid South Africa. However, corruption in the public procurement sector and 
the manipulation of tenders have become a grave challenge. Public procurement corruption in the 
eThekwini Municipality is a reflection of the challenges and manifestations of corruption experienced 
throughout South Africa, and globally. 
Numerous social, economic and political consequences of corruption were evident in this study, 
nevertheless, the main implication of corruption in the procurement process is poor service delivery to 
citizens. This has resulted in human rights violations and citizens taking to the streets in violent 
service delivery protests in order to highlight their grievances and poor quality of life they experience.  
It is the poor of the eThekwini Municipality who face the detrimental impacts of corruption as they 
are reliant on the government for basic services for their survival. Therefore, in order for South Africa 
to fulfil its constitutional commitments to openness, transparency and basic services for all, there 
needs to be vigour and a renewed spirit to fight against the scourge of corruption. A holistic approach 
that identifies the implications of corruption for society is required in order to fully understand the 
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Appendix 1: Interview Guide 
Collusion, Cadres and Corruption: A critical study of the procurement sector and corruption in 
local government the case of eThekwini Municipality.  
Interview Guide for Councillors and Bureaucrats 
1. Corruption has become a global crippling phenomenon that has dramatically increased in 
contemporary society. Do you agree or disagree with this statement and why? 
2. What are the causes of corruption? 
3. What are the social, economic and political implications of corruption? 
4. How do you feel corruption in eThekwini infringes on the human rights of citizens? 
5. Do you think enough is being done by the local/provincial/national government to address 
corruption? 
6. Are you aware of measures that have been successful in curbing corruption? 
7. Do you think the measures that have been implemented by the local/provincial/national 
government are effective? 
8. What measures do you propose should be taken in order to curb corrupt activities? 
9. Do you know of the Manase report and what is your opinion of the report? 
10. What measures have been instituted to curb corruption post-Manase report? 
11. Do you feel the tendering process in the eThekwini municipality is fair and transparent? Yes 
or no, and provide reasons for your answers. 
12. Do you feel non-governmental organizations and anti-corruption organizations are doing 
enough to address corruption. Agree or disagree and why? 
13. How does corruption effect your view of the government or the political party that is in 
power? 
14. How do you feel individuals that engage in corruption should be dealt with? 
15. In your view in which sector of government is corruption most rife and why? 




















Appendix 3: Consent form 
Dear Sir / Ms 
The title of this master‟s research is Collusion, Cadres and Corruption: A critical study of the 
procurement sector and corruption in local government the case of eThekwini Municipality. The aim 
is to critically investigate corruption in the procurement sector in local government with specific 
reference to the case of eThekwini Municipality. Four of the objectives in the research focus on 
specific cases of corruption in the procurement sector in the eThekwini Municipality, public 
perception of corruption in the procurement sector in eThekwini Municipality, assess the social, 
economic and political implications of corruption in eThekwini Municipality and examining the 
instruments and mechanisms that are used in preventing, detecting and responding to corruption and 
the effectiveness of such measures. 
It will be highly appreciated if you a councillor in the eThekwini Municipality can help me- Shanice 
Rajah to obtain information through conducting an in-depth interview. This in-depth interview aims to 
obtain information from you a councillor in the eThekwini Municipality on your view of corruption. 
This interview will be recorded on an electronic device that is a 
Dictaphone, however, all tapes will be kept in in secured locked safe. When the final draft of the 
thesis is produced all tapes will be incinerated and destroyed. The participation is voluntary and will 
be treated in a confidential manner. Your details will be kept confidential and there will be no way 
information can be traced back to you the participant. If you wish to opt out of the in-depth interview 
at any time you are free to do so. If you have any questions do not feel afraid to ask. 
Declaration: 
I ……………………………………………………………………….. (Full name of participant) 
hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of this research project 
and I consent to participation in this research project. I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw 
from the project at any time, should I so desire. 
Additional Consent 
I hereby consent to: 
Audio-record my interview YES / NO 
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT        DATE 
……………………………………       ………………… 
Researcher: Shanice Rajah Supervisor:   Brij Maharaj 
shanice123r@gmail.com /081 5536843   maharajb@ukzn.ac.za/031 260 1027 
 
